The Campaign for Control:Immigration and Ideology in the UK Parliament 1961-2016 by Jones, Michael
        
University of Bath
PHD
The Campaign for Control








Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. Sep. 2019
 The Campaign for Control 
 
Immigration and Ideology in the UK 
Parliament 1961-2016 
 
Michael Adam Jones 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 














Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author 
and copyright of any previously published materials included may rest with third 
parties. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who 
consults it understands that they must not copy it or use material from it except as 







In the time it has taken to write this thesis I have acquired many debts. The first 
of these is to Dr. David S. Moon. Dr. Moon followed the project from its sketchy 
origins, provided inestimable moral support and assistance during the research, 
and oversaw its completion. I am also extremely grateful to Dr Nicholas Startin, 
the Head of Department at the University of Bath. Nick has been indefatigable in 
his support for this project, and ensured its efficient production. My thanks also 
to Dr Magda Nasieniak, who read the conceptual and analytical framework with 
great care and precision, and it evolved greatly in response to her comments. 
 I am very grateful to the many family members, friends, and colleagues 
who have assisted my work and tolerated my excessive demands. I am especially 
grateful to my beloved girlfriend, Hui Gao, who has been unwavering in her 
kindness and support. I also owe a great debt to many individuals who lived 
through the events examined in this thesis, who took time to discuss them with 
me: my thanks to Abhishek Upadhyay, Nick Westlake and Max Taylor.  
Finally, I offer a last and inadequate word of thanks to my parents, Kim 
and Peter, and younger brother Daniel. This thesis has taken almost four years of 
my life to write and research, and it could not have been written without the 







Unlike much previous scholarship, this thesis examines how parliamentary 
discourse plays a decisive role in shaping migration policy. For reasons not fully 
known, mainstream political ideology has been virtually ignored by both 
conventional and radical political science. The academic literature on migration 
politics is characteristically anti-parliamentarian and, in some cases, tends to treat 
establishment parties as “minor characters with undefined roles” 
(Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006, p.176). To fill this gap in the academic 
literature, the thesis has undertaken a content analysis of speeches in the 
Commons Chamber. Using a range of case studies from 1961 to the present day, 
the dissertation shows how recent large-scale immigration is the result of a 
bipartisan ideological commitment: the attachment of the Conservative and 
Labour parties to ‘managed migration’, mapped on to selective Cabinet-level 
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The Politics of Migration: Why (Mainstream) 
Political Parties Matter 
 
 
“Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove 
that the other party is unfit to rule – and both commonly succeed, and are right.”  
- HL Mencken1 
 
“Parliamentary democracy and the party system have in recent years been 
criticised not only for their inability to solve some of our problems but also for the 
failure to reflect others adequately… Political debates concentrating on economic 
and other management issues between government and opposition (whether 
Labour or Conservative) sometimes appear to blank out everything else, while a 
number of issues are not sufficiently discussed because they have not been fitted 
into the current pattern of political debate”  





Few subjects arouse such widespread concern and strongly held views – for and 
against – as immigration. In contemporary British politics, loud and contradictory 
claims are often made for and against greater controls: according to some 
politicians, immigrants are rejuvenators of ageing populations, engines of 
economic growth, and saviours of social democracy; to others they are to blame 
for stagnant or declining wages, overcrowded commuter links, and exorbitant 
house prices. More often than not, politicians possess conflicting agendas on 
migration and are, to varying degrees, able to mobilise support behind these 
agendas. Looking ahead, the salience of the issue is likely to endure into the latter 
half of the 21st Century as net migration continues to rise, offering political space 
for pressure groups, dissident factions and new political parties. 																																																								
1 Quoted from Mencken (1956), ch.330 
2 Quoted from Messina (1989), preface	
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Corresponding to these developments, there has been growing academic 
interest in the politics of migration and the campaigns for greater immigration 
control. For example: 
• Researchers of national identity have explored the interaction of immigration and 
nation-building (Fitzgerald 1996; King 2000; Zolberg 2006);  
• Public opinion scholars have examined the drivers of anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Citrin et al. 1997; Ivarsflaten 2005; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Sides and 
Citrin 2007; Ford 2011; McLaren 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2016);  
• Post-nationalist scholars have studied transnational facilitators of migration such 
as the European Union, ECJ and ECHR. (Guiraudon 2000; Guiruadon and Lahav 
2000; Guiraudon and Joppke 2001; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Ellermann 2009). 
• Researchers of interest-group behaviour have focused on a broad array of groups 
positioned for or against immigration (Freeman 1995; Gimpel and Edwards 
1999; Haus 1995; Joppke 1998; Watts 2001; Balch 2010; Consterdine 2015; 
2018); and 
• Academic scholars specialising in British politics have analysed the institutional 
response to the dilemmas migration policy has raised for successive British 
governments since the early 1960s (Layton-Henry 1984; Messina 1989; Spencer 
1997; Hansen 2000; 2003; 2009; Bale 2003; 2008; Givens and Luedtke 2005; 
Bale et al. 2010). 
There has, moreover, been growing attention to the ideological and 
political impacts of movements described variously as ‘populist’ or ‘anti-
establishment’ (Carter 2005; Norris 2005; Williams 2006; Schain 2006; Mudde 
2007; Akkerman 2012; Furedi 2018). Right across Europe and beyond, populist 
parties opposed to mass immigration are challenging political elites, and, in some 
cases, winning elections. British political scholarship on the UK Independence 
Party (UKIP), in particular, has become a small cottage industry, with dozens of 
book titles and articles added to the literature annually (Ford et al. 2012; Ford and 
Goodwin 2014a; 2014b; Goodwin and Milazzo 2015; Evans and Mellon 2016; 
Thrasher et al. 2018).  
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Yet, while this new research has contributed to our knowledge of the 
politics of migration, we still know relatively little about the ideologies of the two 
most dominant parties in Britain: Labour and the Conservatives. The absence of 
mainstream parties from the immigration ideologies literature, while perplexing 
in itself, is perhaps even more puzzling given the considerable evidence which 
points to the relative autonomy of political elites (Balch 2015). After all, the 
claim that governing parties ‘matter’ for migration politics is on one level 
tautological: dominant parties form governments; and governments dictate 
migration policy. Yet, despite this obvious and self-evident truth, mainstream 
political ideology has been virtually ignored by both conventional and radical 
political science. The academic literature on migration politics is 
characteristically anti-parliamentarian and, in some cases, tends to treat 
establishment parties as “minor characters with undefined roles” 
(Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove 2006, p.176).  
Unlike much previous scholarship, this thesis focuses on the ideological 
dimensions of mainstream politics, and specifically the dilemmas this area of 
public policy has raised for the House of Commons since the early 1960s. There 
are, of course, exceptions: Ian Spencer’s (1997) British Immigration Policy Since 
1939, and Randall Hansen’s (2000) Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war 
Britain, for example, offer some evidence of the importance of parliamentary 
discourse in reconfiguring and fine-tuning public policy. On the other hand, these 
monographs lack a quantitative framework and are now quite dated. Meanwhile, 
the voluminous literature on the UK Independence Party provides much useful 
historical material on the role UKIP has played in reshaping the political milieu. 
However, these volumes conspicuously fail to link the politics of migration in 
Britain to the broader political currents of which it is obviously part. As 
Triadafilopoulos and Zaslove (2006, p.171) put it, “[mainstream] political parties 
have received relatively short shrift among students of the politics of migration.”  
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1.1.2. Research strategy 
Using a range of case studies from the 1960’s to the present day, the author will 
undertake a quantitative content analysis (QCA) to capture how immigration 
policies are debated in the Commons. This methodology will involve the 
classification of parts of a speech through the application of a structured coding 
scheme. As the above suggests, ideational scholars specialising in immigration 
ideology have been drawn predominately towards movements described 
variously as ‘populist’, ‘radical right’ or ‘anti-establishment’. Using a QCA, the 
author will redress what he regards as an anti-parliamentarian bias in migration 
policy research. 
More broadly and ambitiously, however, the QCA will attempt to show 
how mainstream parties set the tone and define the parameters of public debate. 
In contrast to previous times, one needs to give greater consideration to the role 
of “depoliticisation” – a process that aims to restrict the scope of public debate 
and thereby to foreclose the electorate’s options/legitimate responses. By simply 
not discussing issues to the extent that they were discussed previously, political 
parties can effectively ‘remove’ those issues from the formal arena by preventing 
their full and open public deliberation. This was something that I learnt first-hand 
through my engagement with politics in the 2000s and 2010s, first as a 
parliamentary researcher and then as a political speechwriter. With this in mind, 
the following autobiographical statement sets out some brief background issues in 
preparation for the more detailed discussions that will come later. 
 
1.1.3. Origin of the research topic 
In recent years, I have become increasingly concerned about the politicisation of 
migration scholarship – and, in particular, scholarship related to individuals not 
wanting increased future immigration or who are sceptical about the benefits 
immigration may bring. Much research about attitudes to immigration, rather than 
embodying a commitment to objectivity and fairness, becomes a vehicle for some 
social scientists to express disapproval, in both academia and the wider world. 
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For example, over the past few years it has become common practice in academic 
circles to proclaim that  
• mainstream political parties are trying to ‘out-UKIP UKIP’ on anti-immigrant 
rhetoric; 
• the Conservatives have created a “hostile environment” for immigrants and 
asylum seekers; and 
• the Labour party has become more ‘right wing’ on immigration restriction.  
While not entirely incorrect, these arguments are nevertheless misleading. Party 
positions on immigration tend to be highly incoherent, and the need to consult 
‘stakeholders’ often leads to more liberal policy outcomes. Governments have no 
a priori interest in creating a “hostile environment”, not least because restrictions 
on migration and asylum attract so much criticism from bien-pensant 
commentators. 
Furthermore, although MPs have become more representative of the wider 
population in certain senses, the debate on immigration has become increasingly 
circumscribed, and what little inter-party competition remains has become 
focused on the ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ management of the state. Terms such as 
‘managed migration’ were coined to avoid more traditional – and comprehensible 
– alternatives such as border control or national security. On what for many 
voters is actually a cultural question, the establishment’s rhetoric on immigration, 
and a whole host of other policies, has become straitjacketed.  
In the years since I had this realisation, I have dedicated a lot of my 
academic work to exploring the idea of managed migration, leading to a 
sustained interest in the political rhetoric of politicians in both contemporary and 
historical contexts. Taking in a broader, diachronic view has allowed me to see 
that, contrary to popular claims, the anti-populist movement has won over fairly 
loyal support from MPs who share coherent, deeply felt and in many cases 
legitimate concerns about anti-immigrant racism. As shall be seen below, this 
chapter implicitly addresses this phenomenon by establishing a general model of 




1.1.4. Conspiracies of silence: toward a neo-elitist theory of migration 
politics 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theory of migration politics by 
combining two distinct streams of scholarship that are seldom discussed in 
unison:  
• decision-making power; and 
• nondecision-making power 
Much of our conventional understanding of politics is what we may refer to as 
decision-making power, such as Acts of Parliament and annual budgetary 
spending. This is, indeed, a fundamental part of politics. However, this chapter, in 
seeking to provide a more nuanced understanding of political dynamics, 
addresses both its decision-making (section 1.2) and nondecision-making 
components (sections 1.3-1.4).  
Nondecision-making power, to summarise briefly, is the ability to shape 
the political agenda by decontesting certain ideas, or, conversely, by 
‘normalising’ previously illegitimate ones. Some modes of discourse may be 
‘policed’ in a highly effective manner; other modes, though, may exist in a 
greyzone, condemned as ‘bad’ by civil society groups yet not so effectively 
policed as to prevent their use.  
Seen through this lens, immigration policymaking in liberal democracies 
can be assessed through the prism of ‘politicisation’ and, more controversially, 
‘depoliticisation’. In pursuing this analysis, the chapter stresses the ability of 
political parties 
i. to impose normative limits on acceptable anti-immigration stances 
(politicisation of anti-racism);  
ii. to keep immigration-related issues off the political agenda because they 
have not been fitted into the current pattern of political debate (societal 
depolitcisation); and  
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iii. to present controversial or contested issues as being matters of fate over 
which human beings can have little to no control (discursive 
depolitcisation) 
Often labeled ‘neo-elitist’, this theoretical approach develops a vision of 
politics as a struggle over the saliency of issues (particularly for the phase of 
electoral breakthrough) and over issue position ownership (especially for the 
phase of electoral persistence) (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Shifts 
in the boundaries of legitimate discourse in liberal democracies occur in both 
directions: previously legitimate ideas may become marginalised or excluded, 
while previously unacceptable ideas may enter into the mainstream. As E.E. 
Schattschneider (1960, p.71) so eloquently put it: “Some issues are organized into 
politics while others are organized out.” Whether we like it or not, political 




1.2 Decision-making power 
 
At its simplest level, politics centers on the exercise of decision-making power. 
Robert Dahl (1957, p.207), a political theorist at the University of Yale, equated 
decision-making with the simple formula that A has power over B to the extent 
that A can “get B to do something that B would not do otherwise”. In politics, 
this perspective assumes the primacy of political institutions as policy-making 
communities and vehicles for popular representation (‘governmental 
politicisation’).  
While this is doubtless true, as far as it goes, in my view it does not go far 
enough: crucial questions of variation arise not only between different political 
institutions but also from differing and deeply rooted historical narratives of 
immigration. This is, in my view, a conjunctural phenomenon, not a structural 
feature of policy-making in liberal democracies. Previously acceptable policy 
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proposals may become stigmatised and excluded, while previously illegitimate 
and effectively marginalised themes may gain a legitimate foothold in public 
debate. My contention here is that the contours of legitimate political discussion 
are one of the crucial stakes of the debate, and that these boundaries change over 
time.  
This is a very different outlook on politics, cogently expressed by Dr Matt 
Wood and Professor Matthew Flinders (2014), where they suggest that some 
policies are purposefully left off the agenda (‘societal depoliticisation’) while 
other policy options are defined as inevitable, unstoppable or matters of human 
fate (‘discursive depoliticisation’). In other words, if you can control the mode of 
discourse within which decisions are made, then you can effectively shape the 
outcome of the decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, p.634). This 
reality highlights the importance and primacy of nondecision-making power.  
 
1.2.1 Governmental politicisation 
As far back as 1997, Gallya Lahav (1997) argued that immigration had become 
one of the broadest, deepest, and most intellectually challenging topics in all of 
public policy. The reasons for this, she argued, are twofold:  
• Absorption. First, there is a ‘problem’ of immigration in terms of intake. 
Questions here focus on strategies for control and regulation: Should we 
encourage immigrants to join our societies, or try to keep them out? If we are 
going to take some in but refuse others, how should we decide which ones to 
accept?  
• Assimilation. Second, there is a ‘problem’ of immigration in terms of 
incorporation. Questions here focus on strategies for assimilation: What can we 
ask of immigrants once they arrive? Should they be expected to assimilate, or 
can they properly demand that we make room for the different cultures they 
bring with them?  
Some political scholars, such as Donley T. Studlar (1974), have argued 
that anti-immigration sentiment was so powerful in post-war Britain that the 
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major parties3 had to concede to the public’s demands for restriction by 
politicising a ‘campaign for control’. Indeed, for over three decades, 
Conservative and Labour governments managed to combine a liberal approach to 
flows of capital and trade with effective limits on the flow of immigrants. One 
explanation for this can be found in what political scientists call the demand-side 
of politics – the interplay of public policy with citizens’ moral values, concerns 
and preferences. As illustrated in Figure 1., voters’ immigration scepticism has 
changed remarkably little over time: citizens’ preferences and concerns have 
remained relatively stable.  
 
Figure 1. ‘Do you think that too many immigrants have been let into this 
country’  
 
Source: Evans and Menon (2017) p.42 
 
																																																								3	To speak of party responsibility for migration policy is, of course, to speak predominantly of the 
Conservative and Labour parties. The problem of duopoly in British politics, and specifically 
post-war British parties of government, is not a central concern of this thesis. Nevertheless, after 
surveying the post-1958 politics of migration, it is difficult not to conclude that the duopoly of 
Conservative and Labour is a serious impediment to both the Liberal Democrats and more radical 
movements such as UKIP. With regard to the latter, Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system 




Often labeled ‘governmental politicisation’, this theoretical approach 
develops a vision of politics as the confluence of elitist and popular elements in a 
well-ordered democratic state (Wood and Flinders 2014). In this view, the 
capacity of the immigrant-receiving states to execute rational, self-interested 
immigrant policies has remained fairly constant (Zolberg 2006). For example, 
state apparatus for the control of immigration has already developed to the stage 
where not only are tourists made to suffer inconvenience at ports of entry, but 
considerable expensive operations, involving dozens of police and immigration 
officers, are mounted to root out a handful of illegal entrants and over-stayers 
(Hampshire 2013). 
Pushing the boundaries of this viewpoint, it can be inferred that a high 
degree of symmetry exists between public demands for restriction and 
government policies to control immigration. This is, for example, the view of 
Erica Consterdine (2018b), a migration scholar at Sussex University: 
“Countless restrictive measures have been placed on almost every migration 
stream since 2010, when the coalition government set itself a flawed net migration 
target. This was driven by a Conservative Manifesto to reduce annual immigration 
from hundreds of thousands of people to tens of thousands. Behind the changes to 
the immigration rules has been an overarching policy to create a “hostile 
environment”. The public is now seeing the harsh and inhumane implications of 
this policy, with the Windrush Generation, who helped to rebuild post-war Britain, 
being denied their rights.”  
While not entirely incorrect, Consterdine’s (2018b) argument is nevertheless 
misleading. In almost all cases since 1997, the responsiveness of political elites to 
public demands for restriction has been poor. Theresa May’s pledge in 2010 to 
reduce annual net migration to the “tens of thousands” has, for instance, been a 
complete failure. Although May first spoke about creating a “hostile 
environment” for illegal immigrants in 2012, only a tiny fraction of illegal 
immigrants are sent back to their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal 
procedures, it is decided that they have not got grounds to remain. In this context, 
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British MPs are represented – plausibly enough  – as a ‘liberal elite’, and thus as 
favoring modes of decision-making that are insulated from the pressures and 
passions of democratic politics.  
Moreover, almost all major parties of government are under constant 
pressure to adopt technocratic programmes and to avoid policy commitments 
which might conflict with the anticipated ‘responsibilities’ of office (Beck 1992; 
Crouch 2004; Balch 2010). For	 example,	 national elites have been happy to 
outsource decision-making to ‘arms-length’ institutions like the European 
Commission or ECHR (Zaiotti 2011). More than any other issue, immigration 
serves as a particularly powerful test case of claims that politicians are unduly 
influenced by special interests. Thus, an alternative view to governmental 
politicisation is what can be termed depoliticisation. This is not so much an 
antagonistic view of politics per se as an observation of where party-competitive 
elements do not, or should not, exist. Dr Matt Wood and Professor Matthew 
Flinders (2014), for example, identify three interrelated trends:  
• Governmental depoliticisation 
• Societal depoliticisation 
• Discursive depoliticisation 
Taking Wood and Flinders’ (2014) conceptual framework as a starting 
point, we need to assess how the Westminster model is applied and what 
limitations there may be to how it is exerted. Firstly, governmental 
depoliticisation refers to the delegation of political decisions away from ‘the 
centre’, so that that they are controlled by non/quasi-governmental organisations 
or instituted in transnational bodies like the European Commission. In addition, 
governments may depoliticise migration by bringing important commercial or 
social actors directly (or indirectly) into the decision-making process. The 
Westminster model, therefore, has lost power upwards to global and European 





1.2.2. Governmental depoliticisation (i): pluralism 
The claim that political parties matter for understanding migration policy is on 
one level tautological because the practice of inter-elite competition, as noted 
above, is a legitimate and necessary part of the liberal democratic process, and 
therefore of migration policy.  
Paradoxically, however, policy outcomes are also dependent, not only on 
party-competitive elements, but also on consensus-seeking practices in complex 
social systems – practices that permit a certain amount of rigidity. Thus, while 
democratic states undoubtedly vary in terms of their social, human and cultural 
capital, they nevertheless share certain ‘consensual’ features which create similar 
political incentives (stakeholder consultation) and policy-making dynamics 
(technocratic governance) (Watts 2007).  
The substantive conclusions, or findings of this literature, are usually 
labeled ‘pluralist’. Pluralist accounts, to summarise briefly, hold that public 
policy results form the accumulated pressure of the most powerful interest groups 
(see Eckstein and Apter 1963; Dahl 1961; 1976). Depoliticisation, here, is not 
defined by revolts against the political elite – for any revolt can only replace one 
ruling elite with another. Instead, depoliticisation requires that factions among the 
elite – representatives of different social forces or rival elements of the same one 
– should openly cooperate and seek to draw into their ranks the most talented 
negotiators, campaigners and public speakers. In such a system, mainstream 
politicians seek to build coalitions through compromise. For example, doctors’ 
professional associations can strongly influence decisions on health policy, 
environmental action groups can strongly influence planning decisions, and so on 
(Watts 2007). 
It is important to note that, historically, interest groups played only a 
limited role in shaping migration policy. A few pro-immigrant and anti-racist 
organisations – the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), the 
Coloured Peoples’ Progressive Association (1958), the West Indian Workers’ 
Association (1961) and the Runnymede Trust – all campaigned against 
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restrictions on Commonwealth immigrants. According to migration scholar 
Randall Hansen (2000, p.7), however, these organisations were “weak” and 
provided “no significant check on any restrictionist impulse 1950s governments 
might have had”.  
Today, however, the situation is vastly different. A panoply of new 
interest groups have emerged, ranging from CSOs and not-for-profit voluntary 
organisations (public-orientated interest groups), as well as trade unions and 
organised parts of the business community (policy-orientated interest groups) 
(see Table 1). Applying a model of client politics developed some years ago by 
Mancur Olson, migration scholar Gary Freeman (1995) argues that contrary to 
traditional concerns that democracy would tend towards majoritarian decision-
making (populism) and preferences (ethnic homogeneity), in practice organised 
interest groups are likely to impose their niche concerns on to everyone else. 
Freeman (1995) shows that not only is collective action by majorities difficult to 
achieve, even when they have interests in common, but situations can occur 
where the minority, bound together by concentrated selective incentives, can 
dominate the majority. 
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Depoliticisation, here, is reflected in the institutionalisation of stakeholder 
consultation, by establishing a plural network of asylum organisations, think 
tanks and professional bodies/sectoral interest groups. Because of this, party 
positions on immigration tend to be highly incoherent, and the need to consult 
stakeholders leads to more liberal policy outcomes (Balch 2015; Consterdine 
2015). Parties on the political right, for example, have been naturally inclined to 
try to limit migration to control fiscal costs, but both pro-business and pro-
Common Market inclinations push them in a more expansionist direction.4 For 
instance, at the top end of the labour market, there is growing competition 
between large corporations to attract highly-skilled graduates in value-added 
sectors such as chemical and mechanical engineering, computer science and 
investment banking (Hollifeld 2000; 2004 Cerna 2009). As Goldman Sachs 
(2018) put it on their official Web site, 
“We strive for excellence. To achieve it, we must have the best people, and the 
best people are drawn from the broadest pool of applicants. The people we need 
can be found only by looking across the full spectrum of race, color, religion, 
creed, sex, age, national origin, citizenship status, disability, qualified veteran 
status, genetic information, marital status, sexual orientation and gender identity.” 
Meanwhile, at the lower end of the labour market, unskilled migrant 
labourers are increasingly used to fill jobs that are considered dirty or degrading 
(Piore 1979). This is the notion that immigrants are needed to do “the jobs 
Britons won’t do”. As is typical of developed, capitalist economies, few people 
want to work unpleasant jobs that pay less than some combination of welfare and 
subjective-value-of-leisure-time. Consequently, the leading supporters of the pro-
immigration camp may be found within the bourgeois and business elite, much of 
which considers a heavy, continuing flow of immigrants (legal or otherwise) as 
an important source of unskilled labour (Menz 2009). Table 2, for example, 																																																								4	For more than half a century, the British Conservative party has been divided over solicitousness 
of the interests of pro-EU business organizations and attentiveness to grassroots immigration 
scepticism in their ranks (see Bale 2012; 2012).	
		
26	
provides a useful mnemonic for models of economic migration and its projected 
political consequences: 
 
Table 2. Economic Models of Migration Effects and Projected Political 
Consequences  
Model Relevant actors Economic effect Politics 
Production/output 
model 
Capital, labour Profits increase, wages 
decrease 
Class cleavages: 
capital +, labour - 
Heckscher-Ohlin 
model 
Two factors (capital, 
labour) or skilled, 
unskilled labour 
No wage effect (in long 
run), change in 
production 
Model predicts none 
but expect short-run 
opposition from 
workers bearing cost 
of adjustment. 
Specific-factors model Three factors (capital, 
land, labour) or 
unskilled labour, 
unskilled labour, capital 
Wages decrease, profits 
increase contingent on 
assumptions 
Sectoral cleavages: 
mobile factor +, 
specific factors -  
Fiscal models Young, middle aged, 
elderly; federal vs. 
state? 
Greater participation in 
welfare programs; 
federal government 




, skilled workers +/-
(?); in high 
immigrant states -, 
federal governments 
+ 
Source: Freeman and Kessler (2008) 
+ = wins; - = losses 
 
More sophisticated versions of the pluralist model do often concede many 
of these points. For instance, a neo-pluralist school of thought has refined the 
traditional pluralist position by suggesting that not all groupings are equal, with 
businesses having disproportionate power and influence (Moloney 2006). As 
Freeman and others have recognised, organised parts of business community are 
a concentrated constituency, who are resource-rich and well-served to 
collectively organise and advocate their interests.5 This is in contrast to the 
diffuse and disadvantaged groups from the native population – the cost-bearers of 
immigration – who compete with immigrants for jobs and housing. To some 
extent, therefore, it can be argued that the concept of depoliticisation is 
indivisible from the structure of the political economy.  
In contrast, parties on the social democratic left have been traditionally 
torn between fealty to the social conservatism of their working class ‘base’ and 																																																								
5 ‘Insider’ business groups can call on MPs to submit written and oral questions, lay the 
groundwork for MP-to-MP discussions, or relay information about important developments inside 
the Cabinet (Coxall 2011). 
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responding to their bourgeoisie supporters’ concern for migrant welfare. With 
regard to the latter, it is not uncommon for social democratic parties to bring 
important civil society organisations (CSOs) directly/indirectly into the decision-
making process (Coxall 2011). Typically, CSOs include cultural, faith-based or 
humanitarian organisations such as Oxfam, Save The Children, Christian Aid, 
Shelter, Barnardos and Médecins Sans Frontières. In return for ‘insider’ access, 
CSOs will often provide MPs with organisational support, technical expertise and 
tools for political campaigning (Watts 2007, pp.10-13). According to data in 
Table 3, CSOs have disproportionate power and influence in the arena of 
immigration policy, contrary to the expectations of the neo-pluralist model.  
 
Table 3. Civil society actors’ political claims-making over immigration, 
Britain, 1990-2004  
 Share of claims-
making (%) 
Average valance 
position (range -1 
to +1)* 
Supra-, transnational and foreign 10.5 +0.34 
British state 60.0 -0.03 
Government and executive 30.1 -0.29 
British civil society 25.0 +0.67 
Specific pro-migrant rights and welfare 9.6 +0.92 
General solidarity, human rights and 
welfare 
3.1 +0.82 
Anti-racist 0.4 +0.80 
Churches 1.1 +0.73 
Professional (incl. lawyers) 2.7 +0.69 
Trade unions 1.1 +0.63 
British ethnic minorities 1.7 +0.56 
Media 1.7 +0.29 
Other and ‘unknown’ 2.4 +0.29 
Employers 0.8 -0.33 
Extreme right and anti-immigration 0.4 -0.80 
Non-British immigrants (constituency) 4.5 +0.78 
All British 85.0 +0.18 
All actors 100.0 +0.22 
N 1438  
Source: Stratham and Geddes (2006), p.256 
* -1 is ‘restrictionist’, +1 is ‘expansionist’ 
 
Depending on the issue and on the moment, CSOs may cooperate with 
governments, exercise pressure on governments, or even try to undermine 
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governments by aiding and abetting human traffickers.6 Whatever their individual 
strategies, however, all of them have responded to the ‘campaign for control’ in 
ways that are at odds – sometimes radically – with the popular restrictionist 
consensus. At a time when European governments are re-imposing the 
distinctions between legality and illegality, many of these human rights 
campaigners fulfill Oxfam’s definition of the ‘global citizen’ who is “aware of 
the wider world and has a sense of their own role as a world citizen” and “is 
outraged by social injustice” (quoted from Carr 2012, p.218).  
 
1.2.3. Governmental depoliticisation (ii): post-nationalism 
Governmental depoliticisation is a process that comes primarily from forces 
resident within the nation state, but occasionally it can result from forces that 
transcend the national-political community. These ‘forces’ include important 
transnational institutions like the European Commission, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The 
emergence of “a new doctrine of international community” was first articulated in 
1999 by Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, for example, during an infamous 
speech in Chicago: 
“Today the impulse towards interdependence is immeasurably greater. We are 
witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I 
mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually 
dependent… Global financial markets, the global environment, global security and 
disarmament issues: none of these can he solved without intense international co-
operation.” 
Among the most important guides in this inquiry is Saskia Sassen, a 
Dutch-American sociologist at the University of Columbia. Although much 																																																								
6 Since June 2016 many illegal migrant flotillas have been rescued near the Libyan coast by NGO 
vessels “without any prior distress call”, suggesting that the rendezvous had been pre-arranged. 
Frontex’s annual report in 2016 concluded that people traffickers prefer to call aid-agency vessels 
directly, rather than the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre in Rome (see Farrell 2017).  
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criticised on theoretical grounds (Messina 2007, pp.239-45), the terminology and 
approach adopted by Sassen (1996; 2006) and other post-nationalist scholars 
(Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1997) is still widely prevalent in empirical studies of 
Anglo-American politics. Unlike traditional political scholarship, which uses a 
vocabulary that assumes the primacy of the nation state (and political conflicts 
based upon producer interests), post-nationalist critics often stress the impact of 
globalisation in undermining these assumptions.  
For Sassen (1996; 2006), liberal democracies face embedded constraints, 
which limit their prerogatives in the formulation of immigration policies. 
International migrants are ‘global citizens’ with human rights, and immigration 
policies are thereby constrained, particularly in democratic societies. To take the 
most obvious example, important elements of domestic migration policy have 
been shifted to the European Union (EU), a political and economic union with a 
‘common market’7 and right to ‘freedom of movement’8 (Zaiotti 2011). Whether 
such reforms are judged good or bad is a separate issue not discussed in this 
thesis. The key point is that European integration had at least three major 
consequences for British public administration in the 1990s-2010s:  
• the erosion of state sovereignty; 
• the sectoralisation of policy-making; and  
• the de-nationalisation of citizenship.  
																																																								
7 EU integrationism strengthened considerably after the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) 
in 1987. This revision of existing European treaties led to the creation of the single market; and 
the UK had been one of the main driving forces behind this, as the Thatcher government was keen 
to liberalise trade agreements between member states. 
8 The SEA was followed by the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which brought about a 
sea change in the nature of European integration, introducing the basis for the single currency as 
well as cooperation in areas such as defence and migration. John Major, who succeeded Margaret 
Thatcher as British Conservative Prime Minister, secured amendments to, and opt-outs from, 
those things which he objected – notably the Social Chapter, and Economic and Monetary Union, 
respectively. Nevertheless, the Treaty marked a shift in British relations with Europe.  
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Such reforms go hand in hand with an emerging body of international law 
– channeled through the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of 
Justice (see Guiruadon and Lahav 2000; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Ellermann 
2005, 2009). This is most clear in the case of human rights, which by definition 
are rights universally held by humans qua humans (Guiraudon 2000; Gurowitz 
1999). According to political sociologist Yasemin Soysal (1994), recent 
migrations have helped put into place a permanent, alternative post-national 
model of membership anchored in a world-level discourse of human rights. In 
Soysal’s view (ibid.), the incorporation of immigrants reveals a profound 
transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and 
in the way it is codified. 
Soysal’s thesis is disputed, however, by German sociologist Christian 
Joppke (1998), who views such constraints as largely self-imposed by national 
legal systems or as a result of institutional path-dependency. Liberal state 
sovereignty, in Joppke’s view, is “self-limited”; and these limits become 
especially visible when the state attempts to deploy its coercive powers, as is 
often the case with detention centers and law-enforcement agencies (1998, 
pp.271-2).  
A more nuanced interpretation of the post-nationalist thesis has been 
presented by the distinguished political scholar Rod Rhodes, who takes into 
account a more multileveled approach to present a holistic theory, one which 
reflects the growing importance of quasi-governmental organisations and the 
corresponding loss of hegemony by nation states. In a vastly influential article for 
The Political Quarterly, Rhodes (1994) argued that we should speak of a 
“hollowing out” of the British state: power is being given away from the core of 
government, so the capacity of the centre to steer the system is reduced. 
Depoliticisation, here, is seen as a mode of statecraft instituted by politicians to 
deflect accountability from governments as decision-making is placed at ‘arms-
length’ from the centre. With this in mind, Rhodes (1994) identified four 




• The loss of functions through local government reform; 
• European integration; and 
• Managerial technocracy 
Whilst much of the rhetoric around EU regulations and their impact on 
national sovereignty has been exaggerated, these rules do, nonetheless, act as a 
constraint: (i) first, by constraining policy choices, the EU limits competition 
between political parties; and (ii) by constraining policy choices, it limits the 
repertoire of national governmental institutions. As argued by Rhodes (1994; 
1996; 1997), neoliberalism has led to the privatisation of many national 
industries, while Europeanisation has moved many policy fields upwards, to the 
supranational level, where they are often stored in technocratic institutions such 
as the European Commission. 
 
1.2.4. Rethinking depoliticisation 
To summarise briefly, governmental depoliticisation is one of the most 
interesting concepts for analysing contemporary patterns of governance. Applied 
to the politics of migration, post-nationalist scholars have shown how 
transnational norms, courts and bureaucracies facilitate asylum and family 
migration in the face of executive opposition (see Guiruadon and Lahav 2000; 
Ellermann 2005, 2009; Gibney and Hansen 2003). In other words, the rights 
extended to certain categories of migrant – e.g., immigrant spouses, children, 
aged dependents, refugees and EU nationals – have placed greater constraints on 
the decision-making power of political elites (Soysal 1994; Rhodes 1994; 1996; 
1997; Sassen 2006).  
Yet, despite these self-imposed limits on national sovereignty, the recent 
political history of the EU accords only partially with Sassen’s thesis. Consider, 
for example, Angela Merkel’s decision in 2015 to invite over a million Syrian 
refugees into Germany. While there was a lot of rhetoric extruded about how 
Merkel was exemplifying “European values,” the German Chancellor was not 
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actually acting through the EU or in concert with other European governments. 
Instead, Merkel gave an executive order on migrant status – one that violated the 
rules of the Dublin convention – and it got implemented. According to Thomas 
de Maizière, a former Federal Minister for the Interior, the suspension of the 
Dublin convention was “not as such a legally binding act”, but more of a 
“guideline for management practice” (quoted from Oltermann and Kingsley 
2016).  
The implication of Merkel’s decision is clear: when EU governments sign 
up to international treaties they often do so without incorporating them into 
domestic legislation; others incorporate them with severely restraining caveats; 
and some governments ignore them altogether (Hansen 2009). Indeed, Christian 
Joppke himself commented that, under conditions of majority government, a 
single party commanding strong party loyalty faces little resistance from the 
supranational and transnational regime (Joppke 1998 p.269). This is especially 
true in Britain’s case: with no codified bill of rights and courts lacking political 
clout, human rights are largely “absent from the scene” (ibid, p.141). 
Another problematic development for post-nationalist theory is the rise of 
Euroscepticism, culminating in the Brexit vote of 2016. Whatever their previous 
handicaps, Eurosceptic forces within the British government are currently 
ascendant (Clark at al. 2017). For example, in 2014 the leaderships of the 
Conservative and Labour parties were unanimously agreed on the importance of 
EU membership. Tribal, partisan loyalties, and fear of antagonising Europhile 
party leaders restrained intra-party, Eurosceptic factions from building bridges to 
like-minded counterparts. Since the 2016 referendum, however, inter-party 
discussion on supranationalism is no longer overtly suppressed, especially within 
the Conservatives. It is now clear that Prime Minister May shares the 
Eurosceptics’ view that the UK’s future lies outside of the EU Common Market, 
or indeed any system replicating a Common Market. This is in direct contrast to 
the position held by David Cameron, May’s predecessor as Prime Minister and an 
ardent Remainer. In short, party competition on supranationalism, as on several 
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other salient subjects previously avoided by the major parties during the post-
Cold war era, has been renewed.  
Alternatively, migration scholars from the pluralist tradition have 
attributed the era of mass migration to the accumulated pressure of the most 
powerful interest groups. Indeed, new sources of power such as pressure groups 
representing new social movements have increased in influence since the 1980s. 
At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that the real-world 
impact of pressure groups depends critically on the institutions that channel it 
(Olson 1971). Political institutions in the UK, for example, offer fewer access 
points to interest groups than their counterparts in the US, where a potent 
coalition of powerful economic and ethnic lobbies supporting open borders has 
emerged since the 1960s (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, pp.45-55; Joppke 1999, 
pp.60-61; DeLaet 2000, pp.95–98; Freeman and Birrell 2001, pp.65-68; Tichenor 
2002, pp.242-246).  
None of this of course means that British politicians no longer listen to 
big business; nor does it mean they no longer worry about being ‘pro-business’. 
What is does mean, however, is that politicians in the UK are freer to champion 
more restrictive policies than their counterparts in the US. Pro-immigration 
lobbies in the UK are directly integrated into an elaborate (if relatively 
formalistic) consultative process, but are largely reactive rather than aggressively 
pro-active (King 1992). As Professors Paul Stratham and Andrew Geddes (2006, 
p.254) discovered, “Rather than promoting client politics, the government 
appears as an active ‘entrepreneur’ dominating and influencing the political 
environment.”  
Put simply: the pluralist and post-nationalist models of governmental 
depoliticisation have underestimated the autonomy of Britain’s major parties and 
their ability to implement migration policy at the national level. A striking feature 
of Table 4 for example is the dominance of national state actors, accounting for 
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six-tenths of “political claims-making”9 (60.0%). In comparison to other policy 
fields, such as unemployment (Statham 2003b) and racism and discrimination 
(Koopmans and Statham 2000b), immigration appears to be an especially 
national political elite-dominated field. 
 
Table 4. Collective actors’ political claims-making over immigration, Britain, 
1990-2004  
 Share of claims-
making (%) 
Average valance 
position (range -1 
to +1)* 
Supra-, transnational and foreign 10.5 +0.34 
Non-European supra- and 
transnational 
4.1 +0.71 
Foreign national 2.9 +0.17 
European supra- and transnational 3.5 +0.06 
British state 60.0 -0.03 
Judiciary 7.9 +0.41 
Other state agencies 5.9 +0.18 
Legislative and political parties 16.1 +0.19 
Government and executive 30.1 -0.29 
British civil society 25.0 +0.67 
Non-British migrants (constituency) 4.5 +0.78 
All actors 100.0 +0.22 
N 1438  
Source: Stratham and Geddes (2006), p.253 
* -1 is ‘restrictionist’, +1 is ‘expansionist’ 
 
1.2.5. Nondecision-making power 
The argument presented here is that the pluralist and post-nationalist models of 
governmental depoliticisation have tended to approach the topic through a fairly 
narrow conceptual lens. Empirically, these models have underestimated the 
ability of the major parties, as a consequence of their duopoly over national 																																																								
9 An instance of political claims-making is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It 
consists of intentional and public acts which articulate political demands, decisions, 
implementations, calls to action, proposals or criticisms (Koopmans and Statham 1999b; 
Koopmans et al. 2005).	
		
35	
political power, to set the tone and define the parameters of public debate. As 
will be shown in sections 1.3-1.4, there is a range of cross-disciplinary literature 
that focuses attention on quite different, yet equally important manifestations of 
depoliticisation in the wider public and governmental spheres of society. These 
relate to 
• the agenda-setting role played by politicians, spin doctors and the media in 
shifting issues off the agenda of public deliberation (‘societal depoliticisation’); 
and  
• the ideological role of elites in making certain issues appear to be ‘normal’ or 
‘natural’ (‘discursive depoliticisation’) 
Societal depoliticisation refers to the “privatisation of issues”, not 
formally, but “in terms of their salience as topics in public debate” (Wood and 
Flinders 2014). There might be a lot of public concern over, say, the religiosity of 
(some) Muslim refugees from Syria and its impact on national security, but if that 
discussion does not suggest that Islam is a relevant factor, then it is effectively 
privatised.  
Discursive depoliticisation, meanwhile, refers to the “normalisation of 
political issues”, in the sense that they are presented in political discourse as 
being matters of ‘fate’ over which humans can have little control (ibid.). As Tony 
Blair so memorably put it to the Labour party faithful at the 2005 Labour party 
conference, “I hear people say we have to stop globalisation. You might as well 
debate whether autumn should follow summer” (quoted from Evans and Menon 
2017, p.31).  
In accordance with Wood and Flinders’ (2014) framework, let us consider 
a more recent group of political scientists: the neo-elitists. These scholars have 
adopted an alternative approach which, instead of starting with the decision-
making power of the executive, focuses on the nondecision-making power of 
individual political actors (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Depoliticisation, here, is 
enacted through a host of verbal constraints and clinamens, which are exogenous 
to the basic model of liberal policymaking. As a result, immigration policies 
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supported by large majorities of the British public, even if nominally adopted by 
governments (e.g., reducing net migration to “the tens of thousands”), may not be 
fully implemented by the machinery of government. This phenomenon raises 
both conceptual and empirical questions. 
 	
1.3 Nondecision-making power (pt.1): the role of elites in 
agenda-setting 
 
The simplest paradigmatic idea of power is the notion of decision-making power. 
As elected representatives, it is MPs that compete for electoral support from 
voters; political parties that form governments; and governments which make 
immigration policy. Such an approach focuses on the overt decisions made by 
elites who hold key posts in governing bodies.  
To sharpen the argument, however, let us consider an alternative (albeit 
complimentary) analysis, which takes the role of decision-makers a step further – 
arguing that the apparatus of state control is moving away from the past’s 
emphasis on governmentality and toward more contemporary techniques of 
diversion, bias and misconception (Lukes 2005, pp. 18-20). In this situation, 
power is not just about making decisions, but also about setting ‘the agenda’ that 
leads to those decisions.  
Of particular interest for scholars is the ability of MPs vis-à-vis 
mainstream channels of communication – television, newspapers, radio and, 
increasingly, social media – to nudge the national conversation in a more 
favourable direction.10 Under these circumstances, power can be exercised, 
societally, by politcising certain issues while depoliticising others – leading to 
what E.E. Schattschneider (1960) called “the mobilization of bias”. This is 
essentially the process that analysts of the supply side of politics are concerned 																																																								
10 In this respect, political parties have been found to be more influential than any other group of 
news sources because they act as “guardians” of the formal agenda and often better understand 
journalists’ need for “mediasexy stories” (Brighton and Foy 2007). 
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with – to identify how particular elite discourses shift/shape the nature of 
decision-making. In such contexts, power is held not only by elected officials but 
also by the speechwriters, journalists and special advisors who draft briefings, set 
up meetings and shape itineraries. In other words, if you can control the ‘mode of 
discourse’ within which decisions are made, then you can shape the outcome of 
the decision-making process (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, p.634). 
 
1.3.1. Societal politicisation (i): racism 
Historically, the study of agenda-setting power in the field of migration has 
focused on the role played by political parties in mainstreaming “racism”. 
Randall Hansen (2000, p.10) refers to this thesis as the “racialisation account”. 
According to it, the British state was not merely responding to racists; it played a 
central, perhaps the central, role in creating racism. As Paul Foot, a former 
investigative journalist, argued in 1965 
“Commonwealth immigration in Britain, before they become playthings of party 
politics, and despite a total lack of government concern or planning, were greeted 
with general friendliness and hospitality. Of course there was a colour bar in some 
pubs. Of course there was some antagonism in some factories and bus garages. 
But these were exceptions. Overall, the reaction was kind, even helpful. A 
considerate and co-ordinated effort by politicians to assist assimilation and to 
isolate and punish the racialist minority would have been decisive.” (Foot 1965, 
pp.233-4) 
The chief effect of racialisation, according to its critics, has been to 
stimulate popular concern over immigration and then to use manifestations of 
such concern to justify the introduction of immigration controls. This theory is 
related to the supply-side of politics, most notably in the struggles over the 
saliency of issues (particularly for the phase of electoral breakthrough) and over 
issue position ownership (especially for the phase of electoral persistence) (e.g. 
Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). For example, in a passionate polemic on 
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elite discourse and ‘racism’, Teun van Dijk (1993) places the blame squarely on 
political elites whom he argues have allowed racists to set the terms of debate: 
“[Since] the elites have most control over such public discourse and 
communication, they also are most responsible for the cognitive or ideological 
reproduction of racism. Recall that this special responsibility also holds by default, 
for instance, that when elites either condone or refrain from taking action against 
the discursive reproduction of racism – perhaps by allowing the use of racist 
media discourse, textbooks, or political propaganda… We shall see later that the 
white elites in Western countries usually self-servingly opt for freedom of speech, 
that is, for the rights of in-group members, and against the right of out-group 
members to be free from racism.” (van Djik 1993, p.27) 
A common perception which has informed virtually all racialisation 
scholarship is that political parties have consistently been at the centre of race-
related conflict. Through a mixture of persuasion, manipulation and opportunism, 
Conservative and Labour leaders have politicised race and ‘nudged’ the national 
conversation in a more illiberal direction. Some racialisation scholars are more 
sophisticated than others – attending to the relationship between party-political 
competition and public opinion, for example (e.g., Miles 1982). That being said, 
almost all racialisation theorists embrace the central claim that political parties 
have been active participants in a process of normalising anti-immigrant racism. 
In the words of Aurelien Mondon (2016), “Racist discourse is no longer limited 
to the margins; it is mainstream and this needs to be widely acknowledged before 
it can be stopped”. 
Although the original thesis’ research was limited to the 1960s-80s, these 
arguments have broadly coloured academic judgments of migration policy in the 
post-Cold war era. Conservative leaders, in particular, have been accused of 
racism for proposing a tougher line on immigration in their 2001 and 2005 
manifestos, variously warning Britons that their country was turning into a 
“foreign land” (Ford and Goodwin 2014, p.135) Since then, both Conservative 
and Labour Home Secretaries have introduced tougher regulations for foreign 
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students, immigrant spouses and unskilled migrant workers; they have also 
resisted calls for a one-off amnesty for irregular migrants, endorsed suggestions 
that immigrants are a burden on public services, and pushed to curb migrants’ 
access to welfare benefits and the NHS (ibid, p.275). In short, the current political 
establishment is seemingly offering racists most of what they want on their core 
issue. 
Of course, any understanding of agenda-setting power in the 21st Century 
must also consider of the role of mass communications  – television, newspapers, 
radio and, increasingly, social media. Empirically, the role of mass 
communications in shaping political attitudes has been documented, among 
others, by Stromberg (2004), Gentzkow (2006), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010), 
Gerber et al. (2009), and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), among others. Against 
this background, pro-immigration campaigners distressed by the negative 
portrayal of migrants in Britain have often accused the media and its individual 
allies of being under the control of powerful oligopolistic forces allied with the 
populist position. Consonant with classic and contemporary ‘news values’, 
immigration issues are “mediasexy” as well as dovetailing nicely with the ‘racist’ 
agendas of some media owners (see Brighton and Foy 2007). Here, racialisation 
scholars identify two distinct and interrelated trends in the coverage of 
immigration-related issues: 
• Quantitative shift. First, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
immigration-related newspaper articles (van Dijk 2007) 
• Qualitative shift. Second, there has been a significant shift in the nature of the 
coverage. According to Balch and Balabanova (2016), media coverage of asylum 
and immigration policy narrowed considerably in the 2006-2013 period and 
became much more communitarian across all of the newspapers. 
In this view, the anti-immigration lobby is better organised than its pro-
immigration opponent, and political elites respond to such mobilised demands, 
leading to the normalisation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment. 
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Moreover, the existence of a powerful right-wing lobby in the British media has 
allowed mainstream figures to couch their restrictionist arguments in racist 
‘tabloid’ language (Khiabany and Williamson 2011). Metaphorically, refugees 
are often depicted as a “flood”, whereas asylum seekers are typically represented 
as coming in “swamps”. This rhetoric is used not only by right-wing populists 
who claim to be speak for ‘ordinary people’; it is also accepted by migration 
liberals who concede the political agenda to those who are opposed to 
immigration (Wodak 2015). To paraphrase the former leader of the Green Party, 
Natalie Bennett (2013), there has been a rhetorical “race to the bottom” on the 
issue of migration. Whoever talks toughest, therefore, will be most likely to 
connect with voters. 
 
1.3.2. Societal politicisation (ii): anti-racism 
At this point it must be stressed that the arguments set out by van Djik (1993; 
2007) and others flatly contradict the more orthodox view that official anti-racism 
is now a lot more powerful than racism itself. While Western European politics 
have not historically centered on racial cleavages in the way that US politics 
have, the extreme racism manifest in European colonialism and WWII may have 
given rise (belatedly) to a broad social norm against racism (Bowser 1995; 
Mendelberg 2001; Art 2006). This counter-thesis, for lack of a better term, is 
referred to here as the deracialisation account. In the words of demographer Eric 
Kaufmann (2017, p.6), 
“The immigration debate takes place in a public square alive to charges of racism. 
When voicing conservative views on immigration, many in the West feel a 
‘cultural cringe’. They worry about violating social norms against racism, not just 
in front of others, but even in their private thoughts, where their ‘generalised 
other,’ in the words of psychologist George Herbert Mead, stands in judgment.”  
The relationship between anti-racist norms and desired immigration levels 
has been investigated by (among others) Rob Ford, Scott Blinder, Pierre-André 
Taguieff and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten. These scholars have argued, implicitly or 
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explicitly, that some modes of restrictionist discourse are ‘policed’ in a highly 
effective manner. Indeed, high among the reasons why non-EU citizens migrate 
to Europe is the belief that Europe is more tolerant and welcoming than most 
parts of the world. 
Going further, Elisabeth Ivarsflaten and colleagues (2010) speculate that 
the anti-racism norm might be a crucial “missing piece of the puzzle” in 
explaining variations in the successes of the radical right. According to this view, 
norms against racism exist broadly in Western Europe, and can be mobilised by 
political elites to counteract populist, anti-establishment efforts to reshape the 
agenda. Pierre-André Taguieff (2013 p.1528) describes this norm in the following 
terms:  
‘[O]ver the last thirty years of the 20th century, the word “racism” became an 
insult in everyday language (“racist!” “dirty racist!”), an insult derived from the 
racist insult par excellence (“dirty nigger!”, “dirty Jew!”), and given a symbolic 
illegitimating power as strong as the political insult “fascist!” or “dirty fascist!”. 
To say an individual is “racist” is to stigmatize him, to assign him to a heinous 
category, and to abuse him verbally […] The “racist” individual is thus expelled 
from the realm of common humanity and excluded from the circle of humans who 
are deemed respectable by virtue of their intrinsic worth. Through a symbolic act 
that antiracist sociologists denounce as a way of “racializing” the Other, the 
“racist” is in turn and in return categorized as an “unworthy” being, indeed as an 
“unworthy” being par excellence. For, as people say, what can be worse than 
racism?” 
In this regard, several observers have commented that racism has become 
less prominent in recent years. Specifically, it has been argued that the rise in 
interethnic contact has diminished the public’s interest in race-related questions. 
In one survey, 75% of British respondents supported a law sanctioning racial 
discrimination and 51% went further, supporting a law imposing special 
punishments for racially-motivated attacks (Blinder et al. 2013). Anecdotally, 
prejudiced acts by public figures are often severely criticised and even met with 
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formal sanctions, including sacking from public positions. Some recent examples 
include:  
• the sacking of Conservative MP Anne Winterton in 2002 for telling a racist joke 
at a private function;  
• the 2007 resignation of Tory candidate Nigel Hastilow after declaring that Enoch 
Powell was “right”;  
• the 2011 sacking of Patrick Mercer, a former Conservative shadow minister, 
following Mercer’s claim that being called a “black bastard” was part-and-parcel 
of life in the army; and  
• the expulsion of Labour activist Marc Wadsworth in 2018 for heckling a Jewish 
Labour MP at the launch of a report on anti-Semitism.  
The evidence, though hardly sufficient, seems to support the view that the 
anti-immigration policies demanded by some tabloids are strongly opposed, for 
example, by the BBC (West 2013b) – the world’s largest public broadcasting 
organisation – and big Internet monopolies such as Google and Facebook 
(Murray 2017). Ironically, big business, once considered a bête noire of the 
radical Left, is now an open advocate of anti-racism as a world-organising 
principle. One could see this in Starbucks’ recent decision to hire 10,000 
refugees, over a 5-year period, in response to President Trump’s ‘Islamophobic’ 
executive order temporarily barring Muslim refugees. Many other leading 
conglomerates and multinationals, including Amazon, Ford, Goldman Sachs and 
Microsoft, came out against the Trump policy.  
One might also add that the British authorities exercise considerable self-
censorship over reports that might implicate members of the black, Asian and 
minority ethnic (BAME) community. This was borne out, to a large extent, in the 
northern town of Rotherham when organised gangs of British-Pakistani men 
raped more than a thousand young girls over a thirty-year period. The inquiry into 
the abuse found that although the perpetrators were almost all men of Pakistani 
origin, operating in gangs, staff of the local council described their “nervousness 
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about identifying the ethnic origins of perpetrators for fear of being thought as 
racist” (quoted from Murray 2017).  
It is important to note that, historically, the anti-racist movement was 
focused on fighting discrimination in employment and housing. For most of this 
period the political elite assumed that problems arising from non-white 
immigration would be resolved by existing racial QUANGOS or by voluntary 
immigrant advisory services then emerging locally (see Messina 1989 for a book-
length treatment).  
Over time, however, anti-racist policy-makers embarked on a steady 
process of mission creep.11 Once they had established certain ideals, the geocenter 
of the movement shifted away from fighting discrimination in employment and 
housing, and towards the criminal prosecution of people for so-called ‘hate 
speech’. This trend was reflected in the impact of race-relations policies 
introduced by the government after the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry in 1999, 
headed by Sir William Macpherson. A series of institutional and legal reforms 
were introduced to combat ‘institutional racism’ – the most significant of which 
was the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000.  
In addition to this, racism has undergone a number of semantic shifts in 
recent decades. Traditionally, the noun was used to describe the extreme 
arguments being made for genetic determinism: its usage began in the social 
sciences, especially through the efforts of John B. Watson in psychology and 
Franz Boas in anthropology – together with Boas’ students Ruth Benedict and 
Margaret Mead (Barkan 1992). At that time racism referred to the blood-and-soil 
nationalism so prevalent in Nazi Germany and in other countries that looked to 
Germany as a model (Taguieff, 2013, p.1528). 
Over time, however, anti-racism grew more radical, seeking not only to 
extirpate racial prejudice but also to stigmatise non-racial opinions, words and 
statements-of-fact: “…a racism which has as its dominant theme not the 
																																																								
11 ‘Mission creep’ is a term used in the military to describe a migration away from the original 
purpose to an entirely new direction. 
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biological heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural differences” (quoted from 
Balibar 1997, p.33). Among other things, anti-racist campaigners began to insist 
that all cultures are of equal rank and value, and that the political, intellectual and 
artistic achievements of the West should not enjoy any preference. Those who 
think differently are guilty of “Eurocentrism”. According to Professor Nick 
Haslam (2016), this increased sensitivity to presumed expressions of prejudice 
represents a form of concept creep. In Haslam’s (2016) view, “concept creep runs 
the risk of pathologizing everyday experience and encouraging a sense of 
virtuous but impotent victimhood”. 
 
1.3.3. Economism, migration and societal depoliticisation 
Explanations for the politicisation of the race issue vary considerably. On one 
side of the debate, racialisation scholars argue that successive British 
governments have allowed racists to set the terms of debate and have then 
inflamed the situation even further by introducing racist immigration policies. On 
the other side, decracialisation scholars argue that while Britain has an elitist 
political system where policy-making is usually determined in an autonomous 
fashion, on this issue anti-racist norms have been so pervasive and hostile that 
policy-makers have had to ignore popular demands for greater immigration 
controls.  
There is, however, a third agenda-setting hypothesis: the societal 
depoliticisation argument. This concept has been posited by Wood and Flinders 
(2014) to describe the transfer of issues from the public to the private sphere: by 
simply not discussing political issues to the extent that they were discussed 
previously, political actors can effectively ‘remove’ those issues from the formal 
agenda (e.g., by preventing their full and open public deliberation). This thesis 
has been deftly articulated by the political commentator Douglas Murray in his 
polemic The Strange Death of Europe. Politicians, he argues, are colluding with 
big social media monopolies like Facebook to curb debate online: 
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“[Even] in 2015, at the height of the migration crisis, it was speech and thought 
that was constricted. At the peak of the crisis in September 2015 Chancellor 
Merkel of Germany asked the Facebook CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, what would be 
done to stop European citizens writing criticisms of her migration policy on 
Facebook. ‘Are you working on this?’ she asked him. He assured her that he was. 
In fact the criticism, thought and discussion ought to have been boundless. 
Looking back, it is remarkable how restricted we made our discussion even whilst 
we opened our home to the world.” (Murray 2017, p.3) 
One thing this demonstrates is that whereas the benefits of mass 
immigration undoubtedly exist and everybody is made aware of them, the 
disadvantages of importing huge numbers of people from outside the EU are 
withdrawn from aspects of the public sphere (in this case, the Internet) via 
underhand practices such as shadow banning, de-monetisation and the rigging of 
autocompletes.  
Also facilitating the efforts of the major parties in keeping migration off 
the agenda are the difficulties anti-immigration groups experience in articulating 
their views through mainstream modes of discourse, that is, the conventions of 
language-based communication. For example, according to Eric Kaufmann 
(2017), Europe’s increased sensitivity to presumed expressions of ‘hate’ has 
compelled migration sceptics whose true motivations are ethnocultural to couch 
their grievances in economic terms:  
“Divides over immigration force liberals to confront the question of whether 
diversity is a moral imperative or a matter of taste. In Europe, conservative white 
pressure has steered the political conversation toward reducing immigration. But 
immigration skeptics, most of whom affirm liberal antiracism norms, are generally 
unwilling to couch their position in ethnocultural terms, pretending instead that 
they are concerned about pressure on public services or jobs.” 
There is, to be sure, a widespread assumption in the UK – at least among 
the political commentariat – that the debate around migration continues to be 
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dominated by the language of economics (Williams 2006; Goodhart 2013; Skey 
2014; Bennett 2014; Embery 2016; Cobley 2018). To take a small but suggestive 
example from Kaufmann (2017): in one focus group study of migration attitudes, 
a female participant complained of the Croydon tramlink in London, saying that 
“I might have been the only English person on that tram... I didn’t like it... I could 
have been in a foreign country.” This lady was challenged by another participant 
who asked, “Why should that affect you that there’s minorities on the [tram]?” In 
response, the woman re-framed her argument:  
“It doesn’t affect me. It, um... I’ve got grandchildren and children... I don’t think 
things are going to get any better or easier for them, to get work.”  
Though there are many issues that motivate citizens to support movements 
variously described as ‘populist’, their estrangement from technocratic discourse 
is surely one of them (Fitzgerald 1996; Canovan 1999; Lucardie 2000; Mudde 
2007). During his national conference speech in 2013, former UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage described parts of the UK as increasingly “unrecognisable”, thanks to 
recent years of large-scale immigration. Unlike the female participant in 
Kauffman’s focus group, however, Farage was unequivocal and unapologetic: 
“In scores of our cities and market towns, this country, in a short space of time, 
has, frankly, become unrecognisable. Whether it is the impact on local schools and 
hospitals, whether it is the fact that in many parts of England you don’t hear 
English spoken any more, this is not the kind of community we want to leave to 
our children and grandchildren.”  
The political outlook of UKIP is best described as national populist12. 
Insofar as it seeks to address the people of Britain, its rhetoric contains an 
important communitarian element. During an interview in 2015 on the subject of 
EU migration, for example, Farage was asked about the fiscal arguments in 																																																								
12 Populism has been defined as an ideology that separates society into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups – ordinary people and a corrupt elite – and that believes that politics should be 
an expression of volonté générale (general will) (Mudde 2007). 
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favour of freedom of movement. According to Farage’s interlocutor, EU migrants 
are net contributors, in terms of the taxes they pay and the new jobs they create. 
Rather than offer a rebuttal, however, Farage chose to reject the premise of the 
interviewer’s question, arguing instead that politics was not just about economic 
growth. He argued that, for many people, the issue of migration was not reducible 
to economic self-interest; rather, it was the social consequences of mass 
immigration that concerned voters. This, he said, is a lot more important than 
“pure market economics” (quoted from Harris 2014):  
“If you said to me, would I like to see over the next ten years a further five million 
people come in to Britain and if that happened we’d all be slightly richer, I’d say, 
I’d rather we weren’t slightly richer, and I’d rather we had communities that were 
united and where young unemployed British people had a realistic chance of 
getting a job. I think the social side of this matters more than pure market 
economics.” 
The resonance of what Farage says is recognised even by some supporters of 
liberal immigration policy; Labour party activist Sunny Hundal (2014), for 
example, states: 
I actually agree with Nigel Farage that the social side of immigration matters more 
than pure economics. In fact, what I find it frustrating when people talk about 
immigration solely in economic terms because it dehumanises people and reduces 
them to their economic value. 
According to political commentator John Harris (2014), UKIP’s re-appropriation 
of cultural themes offers a huge political advantage to the national populist 
movement: 
“One of the biggest political openings for Farage is easily explained. Both main 
parties do not think to question the supremacy of supposed growth and the idea 
that national "prosperity" must be king. Labour politicians have either bought this 
idea, or dare not depart from it for fear of being called out as anti-business. The 
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Tories, who might once have sounded a more nuanced voice on the basis of 
conservatism (remember that?), now talk maniacally about the necessity of Britain 
giving its all in what they call the “global race”.” 
It could be argued that party competition on immigration, although 
considerably circumscribed, was not deliberately restricted. However, this 
perspective does not explain the deliberate strategies that the major parties 
pursued to depoliticise migration. For example, in his newspaper column for the 
Evening Standard, former government advisor Andrew Neather (2009) revealed 
that government ministers frequently talked about immigration and its social 
consequences, but only along pre-approved economic lines. During the 
publication of a government white paper in 2001, Home Office officials focused 
exclusively on the economic benefits of migration: arguments about job creation, 
employment and the delivery of public services. In contrast, arguments made for 
the benefits of ethnic diversity (included in earlier drafts) did not make it to the 
final copy. Neather (2009) offers an explanation for this editorial decision: 
“Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for 
immigration boom. But ministers wouldn’t talk about it. In part they probably 
realised the conservatism of their core voters: while ministers might have been 
passionately in favour of a more diverse society, it wasn’t necessarily a debate 
they wanted to have in working men’s clubs in Sheffield or Sunderland.” 
The central argument presented here is that the persistence of strong illiberal 
public opinion on the subject of diversity convinced many New Labour strategists 
to circumnavigate public opinion. They did this by framing their immigration 
policy as a technical response to the ‘needs’ of the UK economy. Controversial 
discussions – about the increasing ethnocultural diversity of the UK – were all 
but effectively shut down. In short, what Schattschneider (1960, p.71) calls a 





Up until now, my analysis has been guided by three implicit assumptions which I 
now wish to elaborate and make explicit: (a) since the 1950s the two major 
parties have been at the centre of Britain’s race-related problems (section 1.3.1); 
(b) the boundaries of ‘legitimate’ immigration discourse have shifted over time, 
but at any given time there are struggles over their location and over their 
‘enforcement’ (section 1.3.2); and (c) political elites choose the issues they 
discuss or ignore and the decisions and constituencies they represent (section 
1.3.3).  
Following on from this general analysis, a fourth assumption will be 
added: (d) whilst parties are office-seeking organisations that try to maximise 
votes, they are also fundamentally configured by a set of defining ideas (e.g., an 
‘ideology’) which provides a coherent package of principles and beliefs. This 
ideology, in theory, reflects both the party’s tenets and their core constituents 
concerns and thus acts as blueprint to guide political action.  
 
1.4 Nondecision-making power (pt.2): the role of ideology 
 
“Ideology”, according to political philosopher Michael Freeden (2003), “evokes 
strong emotional responses”. It suggests a doctrinaire mode of thinking, 
somewhat removed from everyday life, that purports to hold answers for every 
conceivable human problem. Those who have studied the relationship between 
parties and immigration policy have thus tended to focus on political strategy – 
on the assumption that parties are above all office-seeking organisations, 
committed to a view of politics as vote maximization and competency in the art 
of ‘statecraft’ (Bulpitt 1996).  
My argument here is that political elites do not passively acquiesce to 
public demands to restrict immigration. As Freeman and Kessler (1998) 
convincingly argue, “domestic politics, rather than constituting a powerful and 
uniform stimulus for restrictionism, is a much more complex force that actually 
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undermines such efforts.” The values contained in Table 5, for example, show 
considerable differences between elite and non-elite opinion on what Thomas 
Raines and colleagues (2017) describe as the identity axis.  
 
Table 5. Comparing elite and public attitudes towards immigration (% of 
respondents)  
 
Perceived effects of immigration on Elite Public 
The country 
Has been good for the country 57 25 
Neutral – neither agree nor disagree 16 31 
Has been bad for country 24 44 
Cultural life 
Immigrants enhance cultural life 58 32 
Neutral – neither agree nor disagree 15 29 
Immigrants have not enriched cultural life 26 38 
Crime 
Has made crime worse 30 51 
Neutral 15 25 
Has not made crime worse 54 24 
Welfare 
Is a strain on the welfare state 35 55 
Neutral – neither agree nor disagree 14 24 
Is not a strain on the welfare state 49 21 
Source: Raines et. al. (2017), p.20 
 
In effect, Wood and Flinders’ (2014, p.165) more extensive category of 
‘discursive (de)politcisation’ performs much the same role as ideology does in 
mainstream political science. On the one hand, ideology provides a coherent 
package of principles and beliefs, and in doing so they act as devices for 
mobilising mass political activity (discursive politicisation). Ideology is thus 
deserving of comprehension on its own terms, as a primary endogenous (internal) 
device for organising ideas and other cognitions. On the other hand, ideologies 
can be used to manipulate a person’s perception of legitimate options, by framing 
certain policies as ‘unchangeable’, ‘inevitable’ or ‘natural’ (discursive 
depoliticisation).  
 
1.4.1. Discursive politicisation (i): globalism 
In the setting of Britain, political debate is often described as a clash between the 
‘right-wing’ government of Theresa May and her ‘left-wing’ Labour opponent. 
Indeed, a long-standing truism of political sociology, since the classic work of 
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Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), is that working class voters 
tend to support the parties of ‘the left’, and middle class voters those of ‘the 
right’, throughout Western society. Ideologically, a right-wing government places 
the business entrepreneur at the center of the economy and emphasises her role in 
social development, while a left-wing government elevates the worker to this 
status and places labour at the foundation of society.  
In the course of researching and writing this thesis, however, the author 
found reliance on Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) vocabulary more of a hindrance 
than a help. To begin with, many MPs in the parliamentary Labour party have 
adopted policies and practices that, in the British context, could be described as 
‘centrist’ or managerial. Some of these policies included 
• the contracting out of public services to the private sector; 
• the development of internal markets in the NHS; and 
• the ‘incentivisation’ of highly publicised targets and performance league figures 
According to New Labour’s academic critics, these managerial policies 
represented a betrayal of ‘Old’ Labour values such as workers’ rights and the 
implementation of a mixed economy. One academic proponent of this view has 
been Professor Colin Hay of Sheffield University, who has argued that “the 
Labour government conceived neither of the need for, nor indeed the possibility 
of… an alternative to the ascendant neoliberalism of the times” (cited from 
Dillow 2007, p.8). Although perhaps overstated13, Hay’s conclusion reflects a 
certain reality: that during the 1990s and 2000s the parties pursued a remarkably 																																																								
13 Hay exaggerates the shift in two crucial respects. First, New Labour’s commitment to prudent 
macroeconomic policies – low inflation and balanced budgets – is not a departure from Old 
Labour, but a reaffirmation of it. Hugh Dalton, for example, argued for a stable cost of living 
index, while Gordon Brown’s ‘golden rule’ (that governments should only borrow to invest rather 
than to finance current spending) can be seen as a return to the public finance principles of Old 
Labour Chancellor Stafford Cripps (Fielding 2002). Second, Hay’s thesis hugely understates New 
Labour’s commitment to social justice. Many policies – such as the pensioners’ Minimum Income 
Guarantee, the Working Families Tax Credit and the National Minimum Wage – helped to raise 
the incomes of the lowest quintile (Toynbee and Walker 2011). 
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similar course. To be sure, when he took over as Labour leader in 1995, Tony 
Blair talked about breaking through old left-right barriers, stating that 
“New Labour is neither old left or new right. We understand and welcome the new 
global market. We reject go-it-alone policies on inflation and the macro-economy. 
We stand for a new partnership between government and industry” (quoted from 
Appleton 2005) 
New Labour’s willingness to break with traditional political convention became 
clear when Gordon Brown, Blair’s successor as Prime Minister, revealed that he 
wanted to include cabinet members from outside the Labour Party in a proposed 
“government of all the talents”.  
Corresponding to this development, many left-wing politicians have 
abandoned their normal suspicions of big business and embraced free market 
assumptions about internationally competitive labour markets (Hay 2007). 
According to author Ben Cobley (2018), market-based solutions are preferred in 
this instance because “the market is favouring the right people – those of non-
British, non-English ethnicity over the ethnic British and English, thereby 
aligning ‘free’ markets with the system of diversity.” The essence of this 
globalist ideology was perhaps best summarised by former Labour leader Ed 
Miliband, who claimed that 
“Setting an annual [immigration] limit is a dirigiste system where the state decides 
on the number of people to be let in each year. What the Government are 
proposing is a system led by employers, which is flexible and can respond to the 
needs they identify.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.436, cols.188-272, 5 July 2005) 
[emphasis added] 
Many of the ideas associated with New Labour – its commitment to 
European federalism, its embrace of human rights and belief in the free market 
economy – are ones that one classically associates with globalism, not social 
democracy. Underpinning the globalist worldview is belief in world-systems 




1.4.2. ‘First-order’ versus ‘second-order’ ideologies 
Over the past 2-3 years it has become fashionable in journalistic circles to 
proclaim the ‘death of Blairism’ following the election of Jeremy Corbyn as party 
leader in 2015. While Blair stood for free market capitalism, Corbyn champions a 
mixed economy; while the former encouraged private enterprise, the latter stands 
for renationalisation. Corbynism is couched in that diffuse, yet potent, pledge to 
defend “the many against the few.” 
Few pause to think that this narrative, while appealing to large numbers of 
people across political divides, is unintentionally misleading in that it covers New 
Labour only from the perspective of public sector management. A defining 
feature of those who self-identify as ‘left-wing’ in Britain today, however, is their 
ideological commitment to post-national norms, transnational identities and 
supranational institutions (Furedi 2018). Corbyn, like Blair, has sincere 
commitments to overseas aid, international development and human rights. For 
example: 
“Refugees are not migrants. They have been forced from their homes, by war, 
famine or other disasters. Unlike the Tories, we will uphold the proud British 
tradition of honouring the spirit of international law and our moral obligations by 
taking our fair share of refugees.” (Labour 2017, p.29) 
In addition to this, Corbyn has been keen to promote global civil society which, 
indeed, became a symbol of New Labour’s commitment to moral 
cosmopolitanism: 
“We will work with our international partners to build support for UN reform and 
make its institutions more effective and responsive. We will appoint dedicated 
global ambassadors for women’s rights, LGBT rights and religious freedom to 
fight discrimination and promote equality globally.” (Labour 2017, p.118) 
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Seen through a non-economic lens, one could legitimately argue that the New 
Labour government promoted its left-wing ideology under a new globalist14 
banner: all those ‘Old’ Labour principles and values were still there, but they had 
to be channeled though a postmaterial	 policy agenda, which had an exiguous 
relationship at best to questions of political economy. As Blair himself admitted 
back in 2006, 
“There is a debate going on which, confusingly for the politicians, often crosses 
traditional left/right lines and the debate is: open v closed. Do we embrace the 
challenge of more open societies or build defences against it?” (Guardian 2006) 
From this perspective, globalism can be classified as a first-order 
ideology15, since it relates to the status of transnational bodies, a macro-political 
issue. Managerialism, on the other hand, can be classified as a second-order 
ideology, since it relates to the imposition of competitive behaviour on the public 
sector, a meso-political issue. Occasionally, these first- and second-order 
ideologies dovetail, as in the case of economic migration; in other cases, 
however, they do not.  
Moreover, while the center-right may have won the argument about the 
economy in the 1980s it has not won the argument on a wide range ‘first order’ 
issues, with the result being that the parameters of debate have shifted steadily 
outwards – towards transnational norms (‘diversity’), institutions (the EU) and 
non-governmental organisations (global civil society). This perspective is 
consistent with the work of Ronald Inglehart and his “postmaterialism” 
hypothesis. Drawing on large attitudinal surveys, Inglehart (1977) showed how 
people were moving away from traditional materialist concerns over economic 
redistribution and the management of scarce resources. Instead, after 30 years of 																																																								14	 Globalism, like every other ideology, is heterogeneous in its internal architecture, and 
differences between rival factions can be very significant. Blair, for example, is a champion of 
humanitarian warfare and the Trident nuclear defence system; Corbyn, on the other hand, is a 
champion of non-interventionism and unilateral nuclear disarmament.   
15 Author’s term 
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macroeconomic growth and the rapid expansion of higher education, citizens 
were adopting new postmaterial priorities such as human rights, environmental 
sustainability and ‘diversity’. With regard to the latter, Professor Frank Furedi 
(2016) claims that animosity towards borders is inspired less by free market 
economics than by a loathing of ethnic homogeneity: 
“Today, arguments in favour of mass migration don’t focus on the virtues of free 
movement; they focus on what are seen as the positive effects of mass migration 
on a host society. These positive effects are frequently communicated in the 
language of economics. But, increasingly, immigration is valued on the basis that 
it has a transformative effect on national culture, too. […] In the British context, 
immigration is sometimes argued for on the basis that it will turn Britain into a 
more enlightened, less British, society.” 
The discursive politicisation of diversity, in Furedi’s (2016) view, “inevitably 
encourages more diversity, to the point where society becomes increasingly 
segmented along the lines of lifestyles and subcultures”. Indeed, New Labour’s 
policy of relaxing immigration controls from 1997 onwards reflected a common 
desire to make Britain more open, international and diverse. As recalled by 
former New Labour adviser Andrew Neather (2009), one of the key arguments 
for relaxing border controls was that it would make Britain more multicultural: 
“I remember coming away from some discussions with the clear sense that the 
policy was intended – even if this wasn’t its main purpose – to rub the right’s nose 
in diversity and render their arguments out of date. That seemed to me to be a 
manoeuvre too far.” 
None of this entails a complete rejection of the left-right continuum. 
Labour’s appeal in many traditional working-class strongholds was evident at the 
2017 GE, where the party polled over 60 per cent in constituencies such as 
Liverpool Wavertree, St Helens North, Norwich South and Merthyr Tydfil and 
Rhymney. It is these kinds of results that are leading some Labour activists to talk 
ambitiously about a “post-Brexit socialist revolution”. That being said, 
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postmaterial values such as ethnic diversity, human rights and ‘global civil 
society’ are likely to move to centre stage. The key issue that underlies all of 
these different controversies is a conflict over the status of national sovereignty 
and of the nation state. Indeed, Corbyn’s appeal with the post-nationalist elite was 
evident at the 2017 GE, where the party won seats in the affluent constituencies 
of Kensington and Canterbury. As discovered by psephologist Paula Surridge 
(2017) in a constituency-by-constituency analysis of the 2017 general election, 
the more working class voters there are in a constituency, the more it tended to 
swing Conservative; the fewer there are, the more it tended to swing Labour.  
 
1.4.3. Discursive politicisation (iii): new public management 
To summarise, a defining feature of those who self-identify as ‘left-wing’ in 
Britain today is their commitment to transnational norms, institutions and non-
governmental organisations. Thus, the old paradigm of a ‘left-wing’ arguing for 
municipal socialism or a mixed-market economy has been replaced, to a large 
extent, by a globalist ethos that defies traditional left-right categories.  
Similarly, the application of the term ‘right-wing’ to capture the outlook 
of today’s British Conservatives is even more confusing. In the early 1990s Tory 
MPs still self-consciously promoted traditional conservative values and 
frequently argued for ‘faith, flag, and family’ – meaning to uphold religious 
morality, loyalty to nation and the traditional nuclear family (Bale 2010; 2012). 
For reasons that have still not been fully examined by scholars, the British 
Conservative party abandoned ‘faith, flag and family’ in the latter part of the 20th 
century (see Wheatcroft 2005 for a book-length treatment). As Theresa May 
herself admitted, traditional Conservative values are “just plain unattractive”: 
“never forget that this fact. Twice we went to the country unchanged, unrepentant, 
just plain unattractive. And twice we got slaughtered. Soldiering on to the next 
election without radical, fundamental change is simply not an option.” (quoted 
from Scholefield and Frost 2011) 
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Some of the reformers, like Francis Maude and George Osborne, were neoliberals 
animated most obviously by the ambition to emulate Tony Blair and New 
Labour. For others, like David Willets and Oliver Letwin, social and economic 
forces seem to have been the primary spur. Many of the ideas associated with 
modern-day Conservatism – worship of the state, its dislike of traditional values 
and embrace of diversity – are ones that one classically associates with 
managerialism, not Conservatism (Dillow 2007). This is especially true for a 
postmodern leader like May who, free from substantive commitments and 
ideological constraints, has perfected the art of staying in power by means of 
unpredictable changes of course. 
Conceptually, managerialism can be defined so broadly that it covers 
many of the topics discussed here in this chapter. Some precision is necessary, 
however, and is provided by Christopher Hood’s (1991) discussion of the seven 
components in the new public management (NPM) doctrine:  
• hands-on professional management;  
• explicit standards and measures of performance;  
• greater emphasis on output controls;  
• disaggregation of public sector units;  
• greater competition in the public sector;  
• stress on private sector styles of management; and  
• greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. 
One of the most significant manifestations of NPM has been the rise of a pan-
European policy of managed migration, culminating in the introduction of a 
points-based immigration system in 2006 (Hampshire 2013). This doctrine stands 
for both a passionate rhetorical defence of large-scale economic and student 
migration as well as for a schematic, coldly rational conceptual system which 
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seeks to deter illegal immigration.16 Discursive politicisation, here, has involved 
the invocation of managerial competence, as articulated by Theresa May in 2010: 
 “The benefits of well-managed migration are deeply rooted in British values, 
reflecting our openness as an economy and society, our liberalism and our 
tolerance.   
So managed well, immigration is something that can bring great benefits. But 
managed poorly, it is something that can cause great economic and social 
pressure.” (Home Office 2010) 
The key question concerning managed migration would seem to be 
whether or not it can legitimately be termed restrictionist. The answer depends to 
large extent on upon what is meant by ‘restrictionism’. On the one hand, 
managerial elites have emphasised the negative distributional consequences of 
illegal entrants and overstayers, such as bogus asylum seekers, unauthorised 
migrant workers, undocumented tourists on expired visas, and immigrant spouses 
in sham marriages (Balch 2016; Consterdine 2018a).  
Yet, while this stance is designed to assuage the growing opposition to 
immigration and perhaps to deter some of the would-be immigrants, core 
supporters of globalism can still pin their hopes on the fact that in Britain large-
scale economic migration is normally granted, and only a tiny number of illegal 
immigrants are sent back to their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal 
procedures, it is decided that they have not got grounds to remain.  
Underpinning the managerial worldview is a commitment to technocratic 
governance and pursuit of the political ‘centre ground’. From this standpoint, 
political order must be intentionally produced through expert managerial 
technique, as opposed to parliamentary skill or political affiliation. Applied to the 
politics of migration: 
																																																								
16 Maurice Duverger (1972, p.9) argued that “two-faced god, Janus, is the true image of power.” 




• Thesis: Migrants promote economic growth, staff public services and boost the 
public finances (globalism) 
• Antithesis: Migrants take British jobs, burden the public services and cost the 
British taxpayer (national populism) 
• Synthesis: Migrants enrich us economically and culturally, but the benefits do 
not rise in proportion to the numbers settling whereas the problems/externalities 
do (managerialism) 
Pursuit of the political middle ground motivated the Conservatives, and 
particularly David Cameron, to avoid all policy commitments which might 
unnecessarily polarize public opinion. Thus, when dealing with a divisive issue 
which had to be addressed in order to demonstrate the party’s competence, these 
had to be given an upbeat tone (e.g., “migration has enriched our culture and 
strengthened our economy”). Such a course was part of the Conservatives 
strategy to project a more caring and cosmopolitan image than in the past. As 
David Cameron explained in his speech at the launch of the Demos Progressive 
Conservatism project, the fundamental thesis of a centre-right government would 
be that “progressive ends can best be achieved by Conservative means” (quoted 
from Letwin 2010).  
 
1.4.4. Discursive depoliticisation 
Though the public is often told that Conservative and Labour are ‘in opposition’, 
that is not always the case. Some of the most bitter rivalries in Parliament have 
involved factional conflicts within individual parties rather than collisions of 
ideology and belief. In terms of substantive policy offerings, the two major 
parties have become increasingly convergent around three axioms: 
• New public management 
• Postmaterial values 
• Managerial technocracy 
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Among the most important guides in this inquiry is the Comparative 
Manifesto Project, a collaborative resource that provides a QCA17 of parties’ 
electoral manifestos. Figure 1.4 summarises the ideological location of the 
Conservative and Labour parties, for example, across a broad range of issues. The 
manifestos for each election are scored on a scale of 0 to 100 according to how 
left- or right-wing they are. Low scores are left-wing. Figure 2 indicates that the 
distance between the major parties after 1997 is considerably less than between 
1983 and 1990.  
 
Figure 2. The converging positions of the parties’ manifestos  
 
Source: Evans and Menon (2017) p.27 
 
Figure 2 yields two interesting insights. First, as the Butskellist era18 came to a 
close, divisions between the government and opposition were unambiguous. The 
Thatcher premiership preserved ideological distinctions in Britain during a period 
when they were collapsing elsewhere in Europe. Second, trends in the ideological 
locations of the Conservative and Labour parties converged, with a predictable 
																																																								
17 Quantitative content analysis 
18 Coined from the names of the prominent Tory Minister R.A. Butler and the former Labour 
leader Hugh Gaitskell, the term ‘Butskellism’ described post-war consensus between the 
Conservative and Labour parties on most economic, political and social questions.  
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agglomeration between 2000 and 2005. This cross-party consensus was 
composed of several elements:  
(a) In the first place – and perhaps most strikingly – Labour embraced a 
‘new public management’ (NPM) approach to public service delivery. This was 
accompanied by a parallel rejection of government ownership and state 
intervention (Hay 2007).  
(b) Second, there was broad if not unquestioning support for postmaterial 
values, especially when it came to global issues such as gender equality, the 
environment, gay rights, intra-European cooperation, humanitarian aid and, of 
course, “diversity” (Fielding 2002).  
(c) Finally, this consensus also included an uncompromising belief in 
managerial technocracy (Hay 2007) – a manifestation of elite rule that has sprung 
up into existence only over the last three decades, and amounts to a fundamental 
denial of democracy. The essence of managerial technocracy was perhaps best 
summarised by former Labour leader Gordon Brown, who claimed that 
“These are global problems that need global solutions; these can't be solved as 
problems without building capable and effective global institutions for the future. 
The institutions we built in the 1940s won't solve the next crisis." 
As political priorities have changed, so, too, has what politicians aspire to do in 
government. From the Bank of England to the European Commission and 
Council of Ministers, public policy is increasingly farmed out to bureaucrats at 
‘arms-length’ institutions.  
A further consequence of technocratic governance is that policy debates 
came to be couched in increasingly hazy jargon: words such as ‘sustainable’, 
‘holistic’, ‘joined-up’, ‘collaborative’, ‘modernise’, ‘citizen-centered’ and 
‘dynamic’ (Hood 1998). Terms such as ‘efficiency savings’ and ‘streamlining’ 
were coined to avoid more inflammatory – and comprehensible – alternatives 
such as ‘cutting wages’ or ‘sacking people’.  
This phenomenon may be encapsulated in Wood and Flinders’ (2014) 
concept of discursive depoliticisation. This appears in the crafting of speeches 
		
62	
that are deliberately designed to manipulate a person’s perception of legitimate 
responses, by framing certain policies as ‘unchangeable’, ‘inevitable’ or ‘natural’. 
For example, according to Tony Blair 
 “In the field of politics… ideas are becoming globalised. As problems become 
global – competitivity, changes in technology, crime, drugs, family breakdown – 
so the search for solutions becomes global too. What amazes me, talking to other 
countries’ leaders, is not the differences but the points in common.” 
Here, depoliticisation is part of a “two-stage shift” (Wood and Flinders 2014), 
whereby the hollowing out of the public sphere leads, in turn, to a sense of 
diminished interest in public affairs (see, also, Beck 1992). Faced with the 
allegedly uncontrollable exogenous constraint of globalisation, Blair claimed in 
1999 that  
“We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not. We cannot refuse to 
participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political 
ideas in other counties if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on 
conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still 
to be secure.” 
The combination of broad convergence between the major parties, the 
trend towards the depoliticisation of key administrative functions, and the 
discursive constraints imposed by managerial technocracy fostered the 
impression that political parties could do less and less: this was the era of ‘there is 
no alternative’ (TINA). Applied to the politics of migration, TINA could be 
considered the defining reason why immigration policy shifted under Labour. 
After all, according to the government “Migration is driven by globalization”, 
and thus states must respond to the imminent flows of people and make it work in 





1.5. Research questions 
 
The choice of research questions (RQ) addressed in this thesis reflects the key 
themes in Britain’s growing immigration debate as well as the key arguments 
made by MPs over the past 60 years. With regards to the ability of politicians to 
influence the dominant values and perceptions of a society (e.g., ideological 
power), the key question is: 
RQ1. To what extent have the ideological orientations of MPs evolved over time, and 
does the direction of change support Christopher Hood’s claim that elite-level 
orientations have gradually yielded to a managerial consensus? 
There is, moreover, an additional matter which comes back to the quotations from 
Eric Kaufman (2015; 2017). It is here that the thesis engages with the ability of 
politicians to influence the salience of topics on the political and public agenda: 
RQ2. To what extent have MPs politicised the racial, religious and/or cultural 
characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control? 
RQ2. To what extent have MPs depoliticised the racial, religious and/or cultural 
characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control? 
By looking at how mainstream parties have talked about immigration, we can see 
if they left the non-economic field wide open for groups such as Leave.EU to 
campaign on – a clear explanation (if not the only one) for why national populist 
movements can be so effective. As explained in section 1.3, this is a particular 
problem for those on the centre-left who have tended to dismiss immigration 
sceptics as ‘racist’, rather than thinking more seriously about what these broader 




Ideally, the findings of this thesis can be placed in what has been called 
Pasteur’s Quadrant: an argument that the study is important for both advancing a 
body of knowledge and research and also important for solving some practical 
problem or meeting some political challenge (Stokes 1997). For example, if the 
depoliticisation thesis is proven to be valid, then the political establishment could 
easily speak, act, and legislate in ways that drain support away from national 
populist parties. Yet, to do so would require some deep rethinking about the value 
of national identities and cohesive moral communities. Indeed, one could argue 
that the great question for European policymakers after the Brexit vote of 2016 is 
this: How do you reap the gains of immigration (economic and social) while 





The central argument presented in this chapter is that the racial conflicts 
engendered after the 1950s motivated both major parties to extricate a number of 
ethnocultural issues from the electoral arena. On top of this, the political elite’s 
commitment to globalist ideology impacted upon a number of key policies, 
including immigration. Many of these decisions were taken by democratically 
elected governments, although not always with much public debate and input. 
Furthermore, once these expansionist policies had been implemented, they 
became depoliticised, as national politicians no longer wanted to debate or 
discuss them.  
This, of course, raises an important methodological question: How is the 
researcher to investigate the role of ideology in structuring elite discourse on 
immigration? Furthermore, how is the researcher to investigate the ability of 
politicians to delimit the range of apparent policy choices? To answer these 
questions, chapter two sets out the relevant context in terms of research strategy. 
Using a range of case studies from the 1960’s to the present day, the author will 
undertake a QCA to capture how immigration policies are debated in the 
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Commons. This research strategy will involve the classification of parts of a 
speech through the application of a structured ‘coding framework’ from which 
conclusions can be drawn about the politicisation/depoliticisation of contentious 
issues.  
Once this coding framework has been put in place, the author can begin to 
cover in detail the instances in which the phenomena under discussion are most 
clearly demonstrated, leaving as implicit the fact that similar courses of 
development may have occurred elsewhere. Chapters 3-5 will be organised into a 
series of divisions based around the aforementioned case studies, while Chapter 6 
will discuss the main findings from the research project, as well as providing 
answers to the research questions. If the story of the Conservative and Labour 
parties’ consensus on immigration offers any lessons, it is that the convergence of 
party policies and elite political consensus without popular consent are not 
without cost. The cost to political parties may or may not be diminished electoral 
support; the cost to the nation is certainly the fallout which results from neglected 





Conceptual and Analytical Framework 
 
 “All men needed to hear their stories told. He was a man, but if he died without 
telling the story he would be something less than that, an albino cockroach, a 
louse.”  
                                                                                                               – Salman Rushdie19 
 
“We tell ourselves stories in order to live… We look for the sermon in the suicide, 
for the social or moral lesion in the murder of five. We interpret what we see, 
select the most workable of the multiple choices. We live entirely, especially if we 
are writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the 
“ideas” with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is 
our actual experience”  
                                                                                                              – Joan Didion20 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the dissertation’s conceptual and 
analytical framework – one based on the importance of ‘narrative’ in the 
production of ideology. The central assumption underpinning this thesis is that 
ideologies possess an elaborate, narrative-based structure – a three-tier distinction 
between individual policy narratives (PN), their micro-components (setting, plot, 
characters, moral) and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the 
‘metanarrative’ (M)). Forged through my own research as a principal 
investigator, I have developed a coding framework to classify and manage these 
bits of information. Once assembled, these units of analysis will be presented in 
line graph form, with the x-axis representing the measure of time, and the y-axis 
representing the percentage of M/PN. In this way, the thesis will provide a visual 
representation of how the immigration debate has evolved over time. In academic 
parlance, this research strategy is known as a quantitative content analysis 
(QCA). 
																																																								
19 Rushdie (2008) 




2.1. Research strategy 
 
The three main contemporary academic approaches to ideological analysis can be 
described as ‘critical discourse analysis’ (CDA), ‘morphological theory’ and 
‘quantitative content analysis’ (QCA).21 Table 6 offers an overview of these 
major approaches and schools. Typically, two writers within a ‘school’ generally 
have more in common, and are more likely to agree on what has already been 
established and perhaps refer to each other, than two writers in different schools. 
On the other hand, all three approaches are concerned with processes of 
politicisation (contestation) and depoliticisation (decontestation). 
Before I explore each of these three approaches in more depth, however, I 
offer a note of precaution. One of the frustrations of the study of politics is the 
variety of approaches to the subject adopted by academic writers. In contrast to 
physical sciences like biology or chemistry, where there is broad agreement on 
the nature of reality and how we should study it, in the social sciences there is no 
such consensus. This is true even in economics, where despite improved 
statistical techniques for analysing inflation and markets, vigorous heterodoxies 
survive. The international relations scholar, Alexander Wendt, noted with 
justified hyperbole that “social scientific theories rarely die, and if they do, like 
zombies they inevitably come back to life later” (2015, ch.1).  
The reason for this state of affairs is that social phenomena are mind-
dependent in a way that chemical elements and rocks are not, and as such they do 
not present themselves directly to the senses. For this reason, the experimental 
method is largely closed off to political scientists since they do not possess the 
power to ‘see’ into people’s minds. In any case, experiments require identical 
control groups for comparison which, it is arguable, cannot be created. That being 
said, scholars committed to a scientific approach to politics have sought to 
																																																								
21 I have not included Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (DA) because it does not carry out a 
systematic, empirical study of language use.  
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overcome this problem by collecting quantitative and qualitative data about 
political behaviour, institutions and (in this case) ideas: 
 
Table 6. Major contemporary approaches to ideological analysis  
 CDA Morphological theory QCA 
Task Emancipation Evaluation Classification 




















2.1.1 Critical discourse analysis 
The first, and most popular, of these approaches is critical discourse analysis 
(abbreviated CDA). CDA is sometimes mistaken to be a method of data analysis, 
just like QCA, since it assigns significance to forms of linguistic structure – such 
as syntax and word frequency. Yet, more than only a method, CDA is above all a 
methodology (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). It does not only comprise methods 
of data collection and analysis but integrates them with a set of ontological 
assumptions concerning the societal effects of language. These assumptions range 
from the highly charged, “to explain existing conventions as the outcome of 
power relations and power struggle” (Fairclough 1989, p.2), to the highly 
politicised, “[explaining] the role of elites in the reproduction of ethnic 
dominance” (van Djik 1993, ix), depending on the stance of the CDA scholar. 




• A belief in the ‘oppressors-oppressed’ dichotomy: that society is fundamentally 
divided between dominant elites and marginalized groups or identities; and 
• A specific interest in how language conditions these asymmetries in power. 
More explicit definitions of CDA all emphasise the relationship between 
language (text, discourse) and power (social, inequality, dominance). 
Since a large part of its claim to legitimacy rests on these assertions, CDA 
specialists have rarely been slow to defend their own political standpoint, their 
own belief that research must be “critical”. In Fairclough’s words, “critical 
implies showing connections and causes that are hidden” (1992, p.9), which 
means decoding the operations of ideology.  
Methodologically, CDA owes much to the work of British linguist 
Michael Halliday and his systemic functional linguistic (SFL) model. The general 
structure used in CDA is thus consistent with Halliday’s three-level framework. 
According to SFL, language operates on  
• an ideational level (construction and representation of experience in the world); 
• a relational level (enactment of social relations); and  
• a textual level (production of texts).  
Using SFL as a starting point, CDA scholars see language as a key battleground, 
since social reality is constructed by language and language is at the heart of 
social relations, to such an extent that “the social is built into the grammatical 
tissue of language” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, p.140). Thus, by focusing 
on the semantic and/or syntactical features of a text (passives, nominalisations), it 
is possible to reach certain conclusions about the ideology of the text – with 
supposed ‘truths’ defined in the interests of the powerful (indeed, control of 
language is power).  
Two points should be made here. First, CDA’s scholarly edifice is heavily 
conditioned by political bias, rather than scientific criteria, which might be 
thought to take on a secondary role. This has led some critics to accuse CDA of 
operating somewhat haphazardly, moved by personal whim rather than a well-
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grounded analytical framework (Widdowson 1998; Rogers et al. 2005). As a 
result, CDA scholars may routinely (and purposefully) engage in confirmation 
bias, interpreting the data in any way s/he chooses for some political purpose. As 
Michael Stubbs (1997, p.7) points out, “there is very little discussion of whether 
it is adequate to restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be 
sampled, and whether the sample is representative”. In other words, there is a 
danger in CDA that fragments of text can be presented as representative, without 
any explanation as to how relevant recording units are distinguished for inclusion 
in, or exclusion from, an analysis. Indeed, when some CDA samples are closely 
examined, it turns out that much of the analysis hinges on a just few words – such 
as the word “enterprise” in Norman Fairclough’s 1995 article on neoliberalism 
(Verschueren 2001). 
Second, the fact that CDA’s adherents treat language as a repository of 
‘oppressive power’ does not absolve from the need for epistemic humility in their 
research. Unfortunately, in various types of CDA framework, it is common for 
writers to try to circumvent serious epistemological difficulties by taking an 
explicitly moralistic stance vis-à-vis the subject matter. This is particularly 
common in CDA approaches to migration where the usual justification given is 
that a critical perspective is needed to redress “racism”. Accordingly, CDA 
scholars may engage in disconfirmation bias when they leave out important 
aspects of the text that do not fit with the interpretive framework. A review of the 
work of Norman Fairclough, for example, led Jef Verschueren (2001, p.65) to 
conclude that many of the supposed findings are “the product of conviction rather 
than the result of a careful step-by-step analysis that reflexively questions its own 




2.1.2 Morphological theory 
A second, more evaluative, approach to the interpretation of ideology is Michael 
Freeden’s morphological analysis. Freeden (1996; 2003; 2013) has put immense 
erudition at the service of political scholars looking for a roadmap to help them 
navigate the semantic fields of ideology. Unlike many conventional treatments of 
political thinking, however, Freeden has rejected what he terms the ‘one-size-fits-
all’ definition of ideologies, which sees the latter as static belief systems, and 
instead bases his approach on a ‘bottom-up’ analysis. The essence of this position 
was perhaps best summarised by Freeden (2003, ch.6) in Ideology: A Very Short 
Introduction: 
“Ideologies are rarely formulated by political parties. The function of parties in 
relation to ideologies is to present them in immediately consumable form and to 
disseminate them with optimal efficiency. Parties operate at the mass production 
end of the long ideological production line. Ideologies emerge among groups 
within a party or outside of it. Those groups may consist of intellectuals or skilled 
rhetoricians, who themselves are frequently articulating more popular or inchoate 
beliefs or, conversely, watering down complex philosophical positions.” 
From this standpoint, each ideology may be seen as having both ‘core’ 
concepts (that is, those of the highest importance, e.g. the principle of organic 
unity in Conservatism or dialectical materialism in Marxism) and ‘peripheral’ 
concepts (that is, those of secondary importance, e.g. civil associationism in 
Conservatism or commodity fetishism in Marxism). Some ideologies are ‘thin-
centered’ – that is, the core addresses only part of the political agenda: for 
instance, it may have no opinion on what the best distributional or constitutional 
system is. Other ideologies, however, are ‘thick-centered’ (comprehensive). 
According to Freeden (2013), ideologies are to be distinguished not by the 
presence or absence of a concept, but by the proximity, permeability, 




• Proximity draws attention to “the interrelationship of the conceptual meanings 
that ideologies contain”.  
• Permeability identifies “the intersecting of ideological positions, indicating that 
ideologies are by no means mutually exclusive in their substantive stances, nor 
are they separated by clear ideational boundaries”.  
• Proportionality refers to “the relative weight that the conceptual components of 
an ideology possess”; and  
• Priority, accorded to core over adjacent and adjacent over peripheral concepts, 
“emphasizes the major political role of ideologies as ranking devices for socially 
valued or urgent goods” (quoted from Freeden 2015, p.21) 
By studying the morphological evolution of ideologies, Freeden observes 
that the relative political success of an ideology depends on its ability to 
normalise conceptual components as ‘obvious’ and ‘self-evident’ without the 
accompanying need for evidence or argumentation. This, in turn, gives rise to a 
form of discursive depoliticisation, in which each ideology performs a continuous 
“decontestation” of its concepts – that is, it tries to eliminate any and all possible 
counter-narratives, thereby rejecting competing definitions. Concepts may gain or 
lose importance over time, just as new concepts may emerge or fall out of use 
entirely. 
What are we to make of Freeden’s analysis? On the face of it, Freeden 
provides an immensely illuminating analysis of ideological thinking, redefining 
the field of ideological studies as it presently stands. In the interest of pressing 
my critique, however, I am going to resort to stipulation: In the author’s view, the 
claims being made by Freeden on the basis of such analyses are not testable, 
because the analysis is often simply impressionistic, and because the sample of 
texts is small. Freeden provides no quantitative evidence for his morphological 
analysis, and particularly, no quantitative diachronic evidence that the degree of 
permeability/priority has changed over time. In fact, although Freeden’s concepts 
have initiated fruitful lines of research, the methods he uses to obtain his data are 
not explained, and his findings are not set out in such a way that anyone else 
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could refute them. He tends to proceed by accretion rather than classification, 
taking the reader down many historical byways. However fascinating some of 
those byways may be in themselves, they do not always yield a quantifiable view 
of the investigated ideology.  
 
2.1.3 Quantitative content analysis 
It should be made clear at the outset that this thesis takes the viewpoint that 
morphological and other interpretivist methods that are empirical are typically 
extremely useful. They are capable of providing a highly valid source of ‘deep’ 
information about a text. Such an analysis may illuminate the semantic fields of a 
speech, or it may allow us to view the speech through the lens of power by 
examining whose interests it serves.  
Having said this, the goal of my thesis is to produce quantifiable 
categories, and measurements of the amounts of other variables. In either case, 
this is a diachronic analysis. Although some authors maintain that a 
nonquantitative content analysis is preferable, I will undertake a different 
approach: the quantitative content analysis (QCA). Put simply, QCA is a research 
method that classifies textual material, reducing it to more relevant, manageable 
bits of information. This process involves the classification of parts of a text 
through the application of a structured, step-by-step process from which 




• Coding/recording of data 
1) Sampling is the selection of useful data-points from within a larger data 
set. A political speech, for example, may serve as a sample. Whereas ordinary 
listeners may well respond to the speech as a performative act, being impressed 
or unimpressed by the speaker’s oratory, political analysts may see the speech as 
addressing several distinct public policy issues. Scholars may thus divide the 
		
74	
speech into different parts and, ignoring the rhetorical techniques and rituals, 
probe how these public policy issues are defined, what solutions the politician 
offers.  
2) Unitization. To adequately reflect the purpose of the research, the 
analyst must then define the basic units of observation. For example, in the 
operation of counting, the units that are counted must be distinct – conceptually 
or logically – otherwise the numerical outcome will not make sense. Thus we can 
count dollars or sterling but not water; we can count words or sentences, but not 
cadence. This creates a multiplicity of information-bearing instances that readies 
the researcher for subsequent analysis. 
3) Coding/recording of data. A central idea in content analysis is that the 
many words of the text can be classified into much fewer content categories. 
Depending on the purposes of the investigator, this generalization may be based 
on the precise structure of the text (such as grouping together similar plot-lines), 
or may be based on texts sharing similar ideological connotations. Consequently, 
a central idea in QCA is that the units of analysis can be classified into much 
fewer content categories.  
Empirical inquiries into the meanings of mass communication date back 
to newspaper analyses in the late 1800s, when Speed (1893) found the printing of 
newspapers had dropped their coverage of religious, scientific and literary 
matters in favor of gossip, sports and scandals. Such inquiries have since 
mushroomed, moving into numerous areas and becoming the backbone of social 
scientific research (see Krippendorff 2018, pp.10-17). Here, the advantages of 
QCA are twofold: (i) First, it allows for longitudinal studies using archived 
material that may outlive the communicators or the events described in 
text/speeches (Riffe et al. 2014, p.29). Armed with a robust and exhaustive 
coding framework, the analyst can draw conclusions from content evidence 
without having to gain access to politicians who may be unwilling or unable to be 
examined directly. (ii) Second, QCA is a scientific approach to ideological 
analysis, that is to say, it is theoretically deductive, tests hypotheses, is cognisant 
of reliability and falsification, and embraces quantitative methods. In this respect, 
		
75	
QCA remains faithful to the professional concerns of scholars in identifying ideas 
as a fundamental unit of quantitative analysis, and consequently analysing 
ideologies as particular combinations of ideas, whose saliency is not always 
immediately transparent but decipherable through a systematic coding scheme.  
 
 
2.2 Data Collection 
 
With these basic introductory issues in place, section 2.2 provides a more explicit 
and detailed account of the kind of text classification described in section 2.1.  	
2.2.1 Sampling 
As the above suggests, almost all content analyses will need to determine the data 
sample most relevant for achieving its research goals.22 Most QCAs sample large 
texts: books, speeches, video recordings, transcripts of interviews, streams of 
messages or websites.  
Among the most widely used sources for enumerating text in a British 
parliamentary context is The Hansard – a substantially verbatim report of what is 
said in Parliament. MPs’ words are recorded, and then edited to remove 
repetitions and obvious mistakes, albeit without taking away from the meaning of 
what is said.23 These transcripts can be conceived of as ‘finite continua’ 
(Krippendorff 2018, p. 337), and will be utilized as my primary information 
resource.  
The timeframe for this analysis will begin with to the introduction of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill in 1961 and will cover more than five decades of 
parliamentary debate up until 2015 (see below). Due to time constraints, only raw 																																																								
22 Many institutions keep accounts of texts in various forms, including library catalogs; books in 
print; professional guides to scholarly journals; records of legal transactions; variously kept logs, 
diaries, chronicles, histories and almanacs. 
23 Hansard also reports on proceedings in the Commons Chamber and Westminster Hall, as well 
as written ministerial statements, petitions and ministerial corrections, with separate reports 
produced of proceedings in Commons General and Public Bill Committees.	
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data will be included for the 2015 Immigration Bill (see APPENDIX A for the 
full data set).  
 
Table 7. CASE STUDIES 
 
Case study  Transcript word 
count  
1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill; 46,923 
1971 Immigration Bill 46,665 
1981 British Nationality Bill 62,102 
1995 Asylum and Immigration Bill 53,596 
2002 Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill 51,404 
2005 Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill 47,132 
2015 Immigration Bill 46,193 
Total                                                                                                                   354, 015 
 
Though this is an artificial boundary to draw, a case study protocol has been 
adopted to keep the research within manageable bounds. The thesis cannot 
possibly engage with the totality of debates surrounding immigration, asylum and 
nationality law – any serious attempt to engage in dialogue with even a small 
proportion of it would result in a hopeless morass of footnotes. For this reason, I 
have also excluded other arenas for examining government policy, such as all-
party groups, backbench committees, written and oral questions, political 
campaigns and press releases.  
To ensure proper coverage, the case studies have been selected using a 
critical case sample (CCS). This is a method where a small number of cases are 
selected and then examined – cases that are likely to “yield the most information 
and have the greatest impact on the development of knowledge” (Patton 2001, 
p.236). To identify ‘critical cases’, I have consulted Kevin Browne’s (2015) 
Immigration Law CLP Legal Practice Guide and Margaret Phelan and James 
Gillespie’s (2015) Immigration Law Handbook. In using this form of sampling, I 
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follow a conceptual hierarchy, systematically lowering the number of Bills that 
are needed to be considered for analysis.24  
 
2.2.2. Unitization (tier i): policy narrative 
After an analyst decides on a sampling plan, the question that naturally follows 
concerns the unit of analysis – what or whom is studied. For example, what type 
of unit is needed to examine, say, ideological bias in the popular press? Do we 
examine words, tropes, themes, or frames?  
However put, this is a rather significant question and one whose answer 
may determine, to a considerable extent, the content of the analysis we are likely 
to engage in and, indeed, what we regard as an adequate explanation. Following 
Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes in Interpreting British Governance (2003) 
and Governance Stories (2006), I have chosen the policy narrative as the unit of 
analysis.  
This approach starts with the insight that to understand actions, practices 
and institutions, we need to grasp how relevant meanings, beliefs, and 
preferences are ‘narrativised’. To explain political choices, therefore, we must 
identify the latticework of stories that led to a particular action; and to understand 
an institution and its processes, we must understand the narratives that inform 
those beliefs and practices. Bevir and Rhodes (2003; 2006) summarise this 
approach as ‘situated agency’. 
The importance of interpreting governance by examining a diverse set of 
narratives about authority and power, which are constructed differently in 
contending traditions, is underscored by the following socio-psychological 
research: 
																																																								
24 As a sampling technique, CCS has gained in popularity with the increasing use of very large 
electronic text databases and the Internet, where irrelevant texts are vast in number. The resulting 
case studies are not meant to be representative of a population of texts; rather, they are the 
population of relevant texts. 
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i. Information processing. First, narrative cognition is the primary means by 
which human beings organise, process, and convey information (Gerrig and 
Egidi 2003; Klein, 2003; Berinksy and Kinder 2006). One can crosscheck facts 
and ideas more readily, and the ‘facts’ are a lot easier to remember if they 
function as elements of a story rather than disconnected pieces of data (Troiani et 
al. 2006).  
ii. Self-identity. Second, narrative cognition is fundamental to the maintenance of 
self-identity and autobiographical memory (Walker 2012). Neuroscience 
research has approximated the neural network in the human brain responsible for 
narrative cognition (Troiani et al. 2006) and determined that brain injuries 
resulting in the loss of narration are more severe than the loss of other cognitive 
functions such as linguistic, mathematical and kinesthetic functions (Young and 
Saver 2001). 
iii. Collective action. Third, stories play an important role for groups of individuals 
and the collective actions in which these groups engage, such as those present in 
the design and implementation of public policy (Tetlock 2005; Schneider and 
Ingram 1988). This is consistent with Thomas Theorem, which states that “if 
men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas and 
Thomas 1928, p.572). 
Seen through this sociolinguistic and cognitive lens, narrative has both an 
internal and external face. On the one hand, narrative serves as the primary 
‘exogenous’ (external) device for undertaking collective tasks within and 
between social groups and networks. On the other, it serves as the primary 





2.2.3. Unitization (tier ii): micro-components 
Proceeding from the policy narrative (PN) as a fundamental unit of political 
analysis, an important question arises: how does one distinguish between a policy 
narrative and other linguistic structures such as lists, chronologies, questions, 
frames, descriptions, memes and so on?  
Here, my focus shifts to the boundaries between narrative and non-
narrative forms of communication. Although Hansard, being ultimately 
composed of speeches/interventions/oral questions, would seem to be naturally 
unitizable, the unitizing of text is potentially problematic. These difficulties 
emerge in the process of interpretation and thus implicate the experience of the 
analyst as a competent reader: e.g., the act of interpretation depends on the 
analyst’s ability to see meaningful conceptual breaks in the continuity of his or 
her reading experiences.  
Among the most important guides in this inquiry is the work of Michael 
D. Jones, Mark K. McBeth and Elizabeth A Shanahan. Together, these scholars 
have furnished a new empirical framework known as The Narrative Policy 
Framework (abbreviated NPF25). The NPF began to develop its ideas in the late 
2000s, in a series of publications which initially set out to bring many 
interpretivist26 accounts of narrative into a more positivist framework capable of 
testing hypotheses.27 At its most basic level, the NPF is an attempt to apply 
objective methodological approaches to the generalisable structural elements of a 																																																								
25 The term NPF appears to have first been used by Jones and McBeth (2010) in an article 
published for the Policy Studies Journal, and was then popularised in Paul Sabatier and 
Christopher Weible’s (2014) influential Theories of The Policy Process (3rd volume). 
26 Narrative theorizing was pioneered by scholars such as Emery Roe (1994), Deborah Stone 
(1989), Frank Fischer and J Forrester (1993), and Maarten Hajer (1995). However, this brand of 
narrative scholarship – termed in the policy field “interpretivist” – is highly descriptive and 
impressionistic. It generally rejects scientific standards of hypothesis testing and falsifiability, and 
thus lacking the clarity to be replicated and allow for generalization.  
27 “Public Opinion for Sale”, by McBeth and Shanahan (2004), and “The Science of Storytelling: 
Measuring Policy Beliefs in Greater Yellowstone”, by McBeth et al. (2005), were important 
works which laid many of the foundations for NPF without using the term itself	
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Together, these structural elements will allow the coder to identify meaningful 
conceptual breaks in the Hansard – thus identifying a policy narrative from other 
linguistic structures such as oral questions, epideictic rhetoric and legal-political 
analysis: 
(i) Setting is the context of a narrative in which a 
local/national/transnational problem or issue resides. It consists of the low-
contestation ‘facts’ that are generally agreed upon by actors in the policy arena, 
various forms of evidence and indicators, unquestioned legal parameters, 
geographic and environmental characteristics, demographics and any other policy 
consequential element that most parties agree on (Ney and Thompson 2000; Ney 
2006; Verweij and Thompson 2006; Verweij et al. 2006; Shanahan et al. 2008; 
2013; Jones 2013).  
(ii) Plot introduces a temporal element (beginning, middle and end), 
providing both the relationships between the setting and characters, and 
structuring causal mechanisms (Roe 1994; Stone 2002; McBeth et al. 2005). The 
plot often contains causal relations such as “x happened because of y” or “if we 
do/don’t do y, then x will happen.”28 To add drama, some plots may contain a 
doomsday scenario showing just how bad things can get if one does not choose a 
certain policy solution.  
(iii) Characters. To date, the NPF defines three general categories of 
socially constructed characters: fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the 																																																								
28 Of particular interest to NPF scholars is Debra Stone’s work on political reasoning and 
storytelling: Stone’s (2012, pp.159-168) typology includes the ‘story of decline’, the ‘story of 
stymied progress’, and the ‘story of helplessness-and-control’. 
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problem (villains), and those harmed by the problem (victims) (Stone 2002; 
McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Jones 2013). A 
characters in a story will consist of individual actors, but they can also consist of 
anthromorphised abstractions such as “the 1%”, “the Military-Industrial 
Complex”, or “the silent majority”.  
(iv) Moral is the takeaway of a narrative and often refers to the ethical 
aspects of a policy solution (Ney 2006; Ney and Thompson, 2000; Stone, 2002; 
Verweij and Thompson 2006; Verweij et al., 2006). For example, a policy 
narrative about the destructiveness of global warming might offer the 
introduction of carbon capture and storage (CCS) as a strategy for cutting 
emissions. In other cases, the moral of the story is quite simply to maintain the 
status quo. The goals of such policy narratives might include focusing on, say, the 
uncertainty of a piece of evidence or the specification a problem to which a 
solution is needed (Jones et al. 2005). 
 
2.2.4. Unitization (tier iii): metadata applications 
Another application of QCA is the common method of coding metadata. The 
prefix ‘meta’, for example, means “beyond” and is used here to denote a concept 
which is an abstraction behind another concept – a story about a story, 
encompassing and explaining all the smaller segments (see Neuendorf 2002, 
p.82).  
Applied to the study of narrative, metadata analysis is possible with the 
coding of ‘metanarrative’ – a concept first brought into prominence by French 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard. According to Lyotard (1984), every enduring 
community, including those formed in the zeal of a revolutionary spirit, must 
meta-narrativise its life to preserve its initial foundations; to guard against 
corruption; to define the structure of the state, the role of leadership, and the 
scope of freedom. Such grand narratives are not only descriptions of ‘things’ but 
also expressions of the determination to act: they are capable of inspiring mass 
political movements. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised 
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by French President Emmanuel Macron, during a recent interview for Der 
Spiegel: 
“I am a strong believer that modern political life must rediscover a sense for 
symbolism. We need to develop a kind of political heroism. I don't mean that I 
want to play the hero. But we need to be amenable once again to creating grand 
narratives. If you like, post-modernism was the worst thing that could have 
happened to our democracy. The idea that you have to deconstruct and destroy all 
grand narratives is not a good one. Since then, trust has evaporated in everything 
and everyone. I am sometimes surprised that it is the media that are the first ones 
to exhibit a lack of trust in grand narratives. They believe that destroying 
something is part of their journalistic purpose because something grand must 
inevitably contain an element of evil. Critique is necessary, but where does this 
hate for the so-called grand narrative come from?” (quoted from Brinkbaumer 
2017) 
In this context, metanarrative is a ‘grand’ story that functions to legitimise 
power, authority and social customs. Notable historical examples of include: the 
doctrine of the Holy Trinity (Christianity), penal substitutionary atonement 
(Calvinism), the divine right of Kings (monarchism), free market capitalism 
(classical liberalism), emancipation of self-conscious spirit through history 
(Hegelianism), and, linked to this, liberating revolutionary praxis (Marxism) (see 
Eagleton 1996). Against this background, an ideology can be defined as “a 
patterned cluster of metanarratives”. In epistemological terms, metanarrative 
is the preferred heuristic employed by all for the purpose of making sense of the 
world.  
This, however, raises a question of considerable importance: how will the 
coder recognise the metanarrative when he or she sees it? Categorising whether a 
legislator is discussing, say, a specific immigration problem (e.g., migration’s 
downward pressure on wages) or commenting on some more general political 
topic (e.g., the lack of enforcement of the minimum wage) may require more 
complex judgment and thereby affect coder reliability. Provision must be made, 
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therefore, for a sufficiently comprehensive coding framework, accounting for all 
the meta (M) and policy narrative (PN) units.  
 
2.2.5. Coding of data 
Sceptics have often accused QCA practitioners of doing “nothing more than what 
everyone does when reading a newspaper, except on a larger scale” (quoted from 
Krippendorff 2018, p.1). Content analysis may have been that way in its early, 
journalistic stage, and its methodology does not rule out such misapplications, but 
this narrow definition is no longer sufficient today. Regardless of whether the text 
is coded by humans or by computers, all QCAs develop a coding framework that 
assesses the degree of attention devoted to certain words, phrases, themes or 
categories.  
In this respect, QCA is consistent with the nomothetic approach to 
scientific investigation (i.e., seeking to generate generalisable conclusions), 
rather than the idiographic approach (i.e., focusing on a full and precise 
conclusion about a particular case). As described in sections 2.2.1-4, ideologies 
possess a generalisable structure: there is a three-tier distinction between 
individual policy narratives (the middle tier), their micro-components (setting, 
plot, characters, moral) and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the 
metanarrative). Using a combination of snowball sampling and document 
analysis, the following metanarratives were identified as being active in the 
debate on migration policy in Europe and thus constitute the thesis’ coding 
framework: 
• Moral cosmopolitanism 
• Internationalism 
• Market globalism 
• Economic patriotism 
• Cultural protectionism 
• Security 
• Public administration. 
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The purpose of the above classification system is didactic rather than 
dogmatic: no one ideology is a slave to any single set of metanarratives.29 As 
described in Tables 8-10 (see below), globalism, populism and managerialism 
contain a number of metanarratives that may be accorded different proportional 
weight in each particular manifestation. Occasionally, distinct metanarrative 
formations are carved out of an area that straddles two already existing 
ideologies. In other cases, a full ideological family may act as host to a less 
developed one. At any rate, ideologies are very rarely defined by the presence or 
absence of concepts, but rather by clusters of associated features which have a 
greater tendency to co-occur (Freeden 1996; 2013).  
 
Table 8. GLOBALISM 
 








“The people that complain about the 
freedom of movement will not be 
satisfied because what they really 
want is to see less foreign looking 
people on their streets.” – Diane 
Abbott MP 
 
• Racial equality 
• Gender equality 
• Human development 
• Integration 





“We are all internationalists now, 
whether we like it or not.” – Tony 
Blair  
 
• Soft power 
• Cross-border social 
capital 
 
(c): Market globalism 
 
 
“The narrative has to be changed: 
refugees help the economy and 
without migrants the economies of 
destination states will suffer.” – Peter 
Sutherland 
 
• Skilled migration  
• Unskilled migration 
• Business efficiency 
• Multiplier effects 






“Why is my constituent being treated 
like an illegal immigrant despite 
providing documentation from 1964? 
"This is an outrageous miscarriage of 
justice. Grant him his citizenship and 
passport.” – David Lammy 
 





29 Recent examples include: “progressive Conservatism” (David Cameron), “One Nation Labour” 
(Ed Miliband) and “British jobs for British workers” (Gordon Brown). In this respect, the 
aforementioned classification system is a ‘fuzzy set’, not a Platonic essence. It distances itself 
from more absolutist accounts of ideological distinctiveness (e.g., the notion of clear/fixed 




Table 9. MANAGERIALISM 
 






“We need to say all the time that 
immigrants make a substantial 
contribution to this country – and not 
simply in economic terms. We will 
always cherish both our 
responsibilities and our record on 
being party to the 1951 convention 
and our treatment of refugees. – Tony 
McNulty 
 
• Racial equality 




(b) Market globalism 
 
“Managed migration allows those 
throughout the world who have a 
contribution to make, and who are 
seeking a better life for themselves, to 
enter this country through a system of 
economic migration that is properly 
organised and trusted by the British 
people.” – David Blunkett 
 
 
• Skilled migration 
• Unskilled migration 






“Some of the most rapid changes have 
been felt in the poorest areas and 
former industrial areas away from the 
big urban centres. In my constituency, 
immigration has had an impact on job 
security, wages, access to housing and 
public services, but Parliament has 
been far too slow to acknowledge and 
act on those concerns.” – Andy 
Burnham 
 
• Impact on public 








“The Immigration Act 2014 put the 
law firmly on the side of those who 
respect it, not of those who break it. 
We made it easier and faster to 
remove those with no right to be here, 
streamlined the appeals process in 
order to curb abuse, and restricted 
access to bank accounts and rental 
properties for people here illegally.” – 
Theresa May 
 
• Efficiency in 
administration 
• Rationalisation of 
law 
• Law enforcement 
• Legislative scrutiny 







Table 10. NATIONAL POPULISM 
 
Metanarrative (M) Example Policy narratives (PN) 
 
(d): Economic patriotism 
 
 
“[A] country that protects itself 
from migratory invasions is much 
better equipped, eventually, in the 
globalized economy. 
Homogeneity, not wild 
heterogeneity, is a strength.” – 
Guillaume Faye 
 
• Job displacement 
• Wage compression 
• Impact on public 
services and housing 
• Impact on public 
spending 
• Transaction costs 






“The immigrationist religion is an 
insult for human beings, whose 
integrity is always bound to one 
national community, one 
language, one culture.” – Marine 
Le Pen  
 
• Preservation of 
language 
• Preservation of social 
norms 
• Spatial management 






“I think perhaps one of the 
reasons the polls show an 
increasing level of concern is 
because people do see a fifth 
column living within our country, 
who hate us and want to kill us.” – 
Nigel Farage  
 
• National unity 
• Immigrant crime 
• Terrorism 
• Public health 
• Assimilation 
 
(g) Public administration 
 
 
“Malta takes in nobody. France 
pushes people back at the border, 
Spain defends its frontier with 
weapons. From today, Italy will 
also start to say no to human 
trafficking, no to the business of 
illegal immigration.” – Matteo 
Salvini 
 
• Efficiency in 
administration 
• Rationalisation of law 




To summarise Tables 8-10 briefly: ideologies do not necessarily contain 
mutually exclusive metanarratives; what differentiates one ideology from another 
is the relative weight and significance assigned to common metanarrative 
families. In some of their notable variants, globalism and managerialism have 
shared components historically (a commitment to human rights and the globalised 
economy), as have managerialism and national populism (economic patriotism) 
or, for that matter, as have globalism, managerialism, and national populism (the 
relative importance of efficiency in public administration). On the other hand, 
average statistical differences do exist; and the search for these differences is a 
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valid aim of the social sciences. The purpose of the above classification system, 
therefore, to create heuristic order without which meaning cannot be bestowed 
on, or extracted from, the raw material of speaking and acting.  
 
2.2.6. Sample coding form 
In common with much of the bibliography on QCA, one can legitimately ask: 
what does this coding look like in practice? For the purposes of illustration, Table 
11 provides a brief sample of such an analysis focusing on the concepts of ‘policy 
narrative’, ‘metanarrative’, ‘setting’, ‘plot’, ‘characters’ and ‘moral’ as analytical 
tools. The coding form consists of speeches from the 1961 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill (Hansard, 16 November 1961). A good reason for choosing 
recording units that are significantly smaller than the sampling unit (Hansard) is 
that sampling units are often too rich or too complex to be described reliably.  
 
Table 11. SAMPLE CODING FORM 
Category Description 
Metanarrative (M) Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative (PN) PN3: Human development 
 
Setting European imperialism imposed a long period of social, political and 
economic domination by whites over peoples of other races.  
 
Plot Britain has benefited greatly from Commonwealth immigration and 
has profited vastly from its connections with the Colonial territories, 
which it exploited economically for more than 200 years. We cannot 
cut off our links and dismiss our responsibilities in a purely selfish 
way.  
 
Characters Commonwealth citizens (narrative victims) 
 
Moral  The Government need to recognise that we have responsibilities for 
people overseas and that this is a multiracial society. Without that 
recognition, the Bill will remain unacceptable. 
 
Frequency C. Davies (Lib) c.728-34; Royle (Lab) c.746-50; Fisher (Con) c.784-
85; Gaitskell (Lab) c.800-01 
 





2.2.7. Inter-coder reliability 
To be clear, this form of coding is labour-intensive, but also leads to much more 
detailed and sophisticated comparisons (Krippendorf 2018). Once assembled, the 
recording units (M/PN) will be presented in line graph form30, with the x-axis 
representing the measure of time, and the y-axis representing the percentage of 
M/PN. In this way, the thesis can provide a visual representation of how the 
immigration debate has evolved over time.  
At this point, however, it is important to deal with a potential flaw in the 
QCA – namely, that the assembling of data involves selection, and this brings 
with it, even at the numeric level, an element of subjectivity. Arguments about the 
trustworthiness of the social scientific method seem to depend on the 
trustworthiness of objective human reason – a conviction that, by proceeding 
cautiously, we are capable of knowing the world in which we ‘find’ ourselves.  
Unfortunately, this idealised view of human rationality has been 
thoroughly rejected in the vast collection of studies on the psychology of 
decision-making (Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan et al. 2007), as well as in 
studies of organisational action and change (Jones 2001). Put simply, the ‘facts’ 
of experience do not present themselves to us in a direct and unmediated fashion: 
all information from the real world is interpreted though a grid of stories, 
memories, expectations and cognitive biases. For example, researchers may 
engage in confirmation bias when they treat congruent evidence as being more 
‘plausible’ than incongruent evidence, while processing congruent stimuli 
quicker than incongruent stimuli (Lodge and Taber 2005). Similarly, researchers 
may engage in disconfirmation bias when evidence that is incongruent with their 
priors is counter-argued and/or takes longer to process than congruent evidence 
(Lodge and Taber 2005). 
																																																								
30 Unlike a comparable ‘grouped bar graph’, multiple line graphs have space-saving 
characteristics, since the data values are identified by small marks (points); these marks can both 
be colour-coded and shape-coded with symbols. 
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To guard against both of these biases, the author has conducted a 
reliability assessment with an academic colleague, Dr Magdalena Nasieniak, at 
the University of Bath.31 In this assessment, the degree of reliability that applies 
to each individual PN/metanarrative was reported with a reliability coefficient – 
or what is commonly known as Holsti’s coefficient. This is a summary statistic 
for how often the coders agree with one another on the classification of content 
units.32 The formula is 
 
PAo = 2A/ (N1+N2) 
 
where PAo represents percentage of agreement between two coders, A is the 
number of  two coders’ consensus decisions, and N1 and N2 are numbers of 
decisions coders have made respectively.  
Readers who must make decisions concerning whether or not to trust the 
findings of this thesis will find the coding instructions (see below) useful as they 
need to weigh the quality of findings and make informed recommendations for 
improvements. Dr Nasieniak was thoroughly trained on this codebook, and 
adjustments were made in the coding scheme before final coding commenced. 
 
 
2.3 Coding instructions 
 
Using a combination of snowball sampling and document analysis, the following 
metanarratives were identified as being active in the debate on migration policy 
in Europe and thus constitute the thesis’ coding framework: 
																																																								
31 Dr Nasieniak’s primary academic research is in the work of the European Council and the role 
of the Council President. She was thoroughly trained on the codebook, and adjustments were 
made in the coding scheme before final coding commenced. 
32 Compared to percentage agreement (PAo = A/n), Holsti’s method (1969) is applicable to 




2.3.1 MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM 
The most basic definition of MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is provided by late 
political philosopher Brian Barry (2001), who breaks it down into three 
constituent elements:  
• that individual human beings have (ultimate) value;  
• that each human being has equal moral value; and  
• that the first two clauses apply to all human beings. 
In most past and present societies, foreigners were routinely considered to be 
moral outsiders: they could not be full members of the national community (Carr 
2012 p.16). Over the past couple of centuries, however, we have seen a dramatic 
reversal of this rule. Nineteenth century Britain was well known for accepting 
political dissidents such as Karl Marx and Giuseppe Mazzini; and larger groups 
of refugees have also been accepted at different times: Huguenots in the 17th 
century, Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 19th century, and then 
again in the 1930s from Germany. As a result, Western European morality has 
moved some distance away from particularist idea of the ethno-national state and 
towards the universalist idea of a cosmopolitan society (Bowser 1995). 
The significance of this can best be appreciated by seeing what MORAL 
COSMOPOLITANISM entails, when expressed as a policy narrative (PN). For 
example, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is consistent with a policy of social justice 
that tells us to not weigh the value of migrants differently according to features 
such as race or gender. It is also consistent with a doctrine of human development 
that tells us simply that the preferences of the host population are of little 
consequence as long as there are global economic and social gains from 
migration. Thirdly, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is consistent with the idea of the 
‘rule of law’. According to this doctrine, immigrants’ applications should be 
judged by objective legal standards, not the arbitrary decisions of government 




PN 1) RACIAL EQUALITY. Human history is filled with examples in which certain 
categories of migrant have been excluded from the moral community because 
they were seen as racially ‘unfit’. From a MORAL COSMOPOLITAN perspective, 
however, it is both unjust and immoral to weigh the value of migrants differently 
according to racial characteristics (e.g., the morphological markers of a 
phenotype such as skin colour).  
PN 2) GENDER EQUALITY. In addition to race, the principle of equality applies mutatis 
mutandis to other features of human diversity such as gender. In contemporary 
migration politics, the influence of sexism can be seen in immigration rules 
which still treat men as the ‘principal’ agents and women as mere ‘dependents’ 
(Castles et al. 2014, p.61).  
PN 3) HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. Another key issue for MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is 
whether immigration facilitates global human development. Moving to a 
richer/safer country may be the only way for an individual to escape poverty33, to 
avoid persecution, or to obtain necessary medical care34. As economist Greg 
Mankiw (2006) puts it, “[socioeconomic systems] often fail to provide people 
the ability to adequately insure themselves against the vicissitudes of life and 
accidents of birth.” The argument being made here is not that immigration will 
lead to perfectly equal outcomes, or even that perfectly equal outcomes are 
desirable. Rather, the PN3 case for freedom of movement rectifies a ‘morally 
problematic’ inequality of opportunity based on birthplace.  
																																																								
33 According to Ruhs (2013), economic migrants from low-income countries can reap huge 
material benefits from employment in higher-income countries, even after all the initial costs have 
been deducted. For example, the increase in migrants’ net earnings will often lead to increases in 
the economic welfare of migrants’ families, either directly (if they are with the migrant in the host 
country) or indirectly (via remittances). 
34 Based on an in-depth analysis of the impact of migration on human development, in 2009 the 
Human Development Report concluded “[…] outcomes in all aspects human development, not 
only income but also education and health, are for the most part positive – some immensely so, 
with people from the poorest places gaining the most” (quoted from Ruhs 2013).  
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PN 4) INTEGRATION. Once an immigrant community is settled, MORAL 
COSMOPOLITANS will often extol policies to promote economic mobility among 
migrant communities and social inclusion for their children. Accordingly, 
INTEGRATION touches upon the institutions and mechanisms that promote 
development and growth within society, including early childhood care, 
workforce development, and provision of government services to communities 
with linguistic diversity (Castles et al. 2014 p.269). From this perspective, 
migrants from poorer, less-developed countries can reasonably demand that 
taxpayers in richer, receiving countries share in bearing the costs of 
accommodation. 
PN 5) RULE OF LAW. Another feature of MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM is the way in 
which migrants (economic or otherwise) are treated by the authorities. 
According to PN5, immigrants’ applications should be judged by objective legal 
standards rather than the arbitrary decisions of government officials. Typically, 
these objective legal standards include the right of appeal when an application is 
rejected; or, more generally, a right to seek asylum from a dangerous regime or 
militia. In particular, the idea of universal “human rights” has become central, 
and among these rights is the “the right of persons to seek asylum from 
persecution in other countries” (1951 UN Refugee Convention). 
PN 6) MULTICULTURALISM. Finally, MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM may sometimes move 
in a more radical direction, seeking not only to extirpate racial prejudice and the 
arbitrary abuse of state power but also to make Britain more “open”, “tolerant” 
and “diverse”. As David Goodhart (2013) and others have pointed out in the case 
of Britain, immigrants were often encouraged to retain the culture of their home 
country, even occasionally encouraged to keep their language. 
MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, as the author describes it here, is a metanarrative 
about global values, or about what is sometimes called ‘the humanitarian 
imperative.’ It says that the fate of human beings everywhere should in some 
sense count equally with us. Politically, this requires that we should establish 
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norms, institutions, and welfare systems that provide people everywhere with 
equal amounts of access – to resources, culture and opportunity.  
 
2.3.2 INTERNATIONALISM 
In addition to MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, globalism in post-war Britain is also 
the product of an interlocking relationship between the feudal basis of British 
nationality and the post-war experience of decolonization. According to political 
commentator Ben Sixsmith (2017): 
“Imperialism helped to make us cosmopolitan. Most obviously, it exposed us to 
different cultures. We absorbed them into our cuisine, our literature, our cinema 
and, above all, our history. Our shared experiences with Commonwealth troops in 
World War II is the most prominent example of our experiences being stitched 
together with those of other peoples. Countries to the East have fewer such 
memories.” 
The history of Empire determined in many important ways the attitude of 
the political elite to the non-white denizens of the New Commonwealth. As 
Hansen (2000, p.17) put it, “Migration controls were… checked by a temporal 
inter-section of ideology and power: the attachment of the Conservative Party to 
the Old Commonwealth mapped on to selective Cabinet-level opposition to racist 
migration control.” Indeed, many of the hesitations ascribed to British 
governments in curbing freedom of movement have been attributed to 
INTERNATIONALISM. Both Randall Hansen (2000) and Frank Furedi (1998) have 
chosen to stress this geopolitical context; the latter arguing that border controls, 
particularly if seen to be racist, would have threatened Britain's status as the 
“mother country”.  
In the face of these geopolitical challenges, post-war Britain came under 
intense pressure from foreign leaders (especially from Indian Prime Ministers 
Nehru and Menon) to tackle racial discrimination – and British diplomats, in turn, 
wanted to secure the loyalty of these newly independent countries. What this 
meant, above all, is that the impact of post-colonial migration could be not be 
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considered solely as a domestic matter, especially if the British government was 
to depend on more than symbolic gestures to maintain Her alliances. 
Conservative ministers during the 1950s, such as Home Secretary David Maxwell 
Fyfe and Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, asserted that freedom of 
movement was essential for the maintenance Britain’s ‘soft power’, and that 
small amounts of colonial migration were part of the great tradition of Civis 
Britannicus sum (‘I am a British citizen’): 
PN 7) SOFT POWER. The vast global Empire which Britain accumulated over 200 years 
was sustained not only by British technological superiority and military power, 
especially sea power; it also rested on a ‘softer’ cultural power (Layton-Henry 
1984). A whole class of soldiers, administrators and officials encouraged beliefs 
in the greatness of British law, language, religion and recreation while stationed 
abroad. Consequently, a belief existed on the part of British establishment that 
the UK possessed a unique obligation, as the centre of the Empire and 
Commonwealth, to maintain an open door for all British subjects. The result was 
a veto throughout the 1950s of restrictions on a Commonwealth migration. 
INTERNATIONALISM provides a snapshot of what Andrew Geddes (2003, 
p.2) has called the “conceptual and geopolitical widening of the migration issue”. 
In conceptual terms, there are new types of migration and new forms of 
governmental response to this movement. In geopolitical terms, the impact of 
migration has widened from Western Europe to include newer immigration 
countries in South East Asia and the Asia Pacific. This explanation speaks most 
directly, but not exclusively, to the examples of historical ties between the former 
colonial powers of Western Europe (most notably Britain, France, and the 
Netherlands) and their respective former Colonies. 
Admittedly, Britain’s geopolitical ties to and trading relationship with its 
former Colonies declined in favour of the European Union; and so, too, did 
support within the Conservative party for a relatively open immigration policy. 
Having said this, INTERNATIONALISM has had a profound impact on British 
millennials studying at UK higher education (HE) institutions. Not only does HE 
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provide a ‘pathway’ into transnational institutions and NGOs; it also confirms a 
kind of ideological bias in which INTERNATIONALISM is part-and-parcel of the 
student experience: 
PN 8) CROSS-BORDER SOCIAL CAPITAL. Under globalization, international students 
embedded within an ethnic community are an important channel for ‘cross-
border social capital’ – improving awareness of new technologies and passing on 
tacit knowledge, both within and across countries (Kerr 2008). International 
students may also provide ‘network externalities’ that accelerate ideas 
transmission as they move between their country of origin and that of their new 
home (Docquier and Lodigiano; Docquier and Rapoport 2012).  
Against this backdrop, the international activities of universities have 
dramatically expanded in scope and scale. Specific initiatives such as branch 
campuses, cross-border collaborative arrangements, English-language programs 
for international students and other initiatives have put into place a process of 
“internationalisation” (Altbach and Knight 2007). More importantly, however, 
the number of foreign students in British universities has increased significantly, 
which means that regardless of starting point most graduates of elite universities 
are likely to have many overseas friends and acquaintances. As a result, British 
millennials studying in HE are less likely than other social groups to favour 
reducing immigration.  
 
2.3.3 MARKET GLOBALISM 
The globalist shift on immigration after 1945 was also facilitated by structural 
changes to the global economy. For many, immigration is an inevitable and 
irreversible consequence of globalisation; and the domestic labour market is no 
longer the optimal unit for organising economic activity. Manfred Steger (2002; 
2005) uses the term MARKET GLOBALISM to describe this schema. It is, according 
to Steger, “the dominant ideology of our time” – codified and disseminated 
worldwide by “global power elites” that include corporate managers, state 
bureaucrats, academic economists, journalists and politicians. According to 
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Steger’s (2002; 2005) typology, market globalism has six core claims that are 
increasingly taken-for-granted as the true meaning of globalization. They include: 
• Globalisation is about the liberalization and global integration of markets 
• Globalisation is inevitable and irreversible 
• Nobody is in charge of globalization 
• Globalisation benefits everyone in the long run 
• Globalisation furthers the spread of democracy in the world 
MARKET GLOBALISM asserts that the traditional self-governing nation-
state is now unnecessary because the important economic decisions are taken at 
the level of the multinational city. Such cities have the ability to ‘plug in’ to the 
global economy in order to source the necessary capital, labour and resources that 
they need to prosper (Glaeser 2011). In effect, such cities are economically 
independent of the nation-states in which they reside. As Labour MP David 
Lammy put it, in an article for the Evening Standard 
“If Scotland can have another referendum on independence, then why can’t we 
have a well-overdue debate about London becoming autonomous and independent 
from the rest of the country? If Brexit was a victory of smalltown conservatism, 
resurgent nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, then London’s status as the 
financial and cultural capital of Europe depends on resisting these shifts” (quoted 
from Powell 2007) 
Lammy’s assertion that the state is losing control of economic activity is backed 
up by a more contentious claim: that the domestic labour market has reached a 
point of diminishing marginal returns (Legrain 2006). On the one hand, labour 
can now be outsourced to countries where wages are much lower: increasing 
numbers of businesses in high-cost countries are looking to relocate their 
manufacturing plants and R&D activities into lower-cost countries (Nathan and 
Lee 2011). On the other hand, employers have the option of insourcing labour 
from outside of the UK. In certain fields such as accounting, finance, law and 
engineering, the number of people recruited is limited but their economic impact 
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may be significant. With these basic introductory issues in place, the specific PNs 
can be stated: 
PN 9) SKILLED MIGRATION. At the higher end of the labour market, the skill level of 
successive migrant workers admitted to the UK has increased precipitously in 
the past two decades (Nathan 2013). The city of London in particular (with its 
unrivalled aggregation of related financial businesses) benefits from a large 
number of talented people who could not realistically have been recruited from 
the pool of domestic British talent (Nathan and Lee 2011). Unlike with other 
forms of capital, there are no diminishing returns for elite migration: The higher 
the cognitive ability, (and the more immigrants at higher cognitive levels), the 
better. 
PN 10) UNSKILLED MIGRATION. A further common argument in favour of migration is 
that the native population are too ‘demanding’ when it comes to low-skill jobs 
and wages. This is the notion that unskilled migrants are needed to do the ‘dirty 
jobs’ that locals will not accept. One recent study estimates that the migrant 
population as a whole generated a fiscal surplus of between -0.5% and +0.2% of 
GDP over the period 2001-2011 (Dustmann and Frattini 2013). Additionally, 
unskilled migrants may possess characteristics that complement the labour of the 
indigenous workforce. These ‘skill complementarities’ may increase the 
productivity and the wages that Britons command (Dustmann et al. 2012). 
PN 11) BUSINESS EFFICIENCY. A less obvious argument in favour of open migration is 
the attendant reduction of red tape. Some businesses may have to spend more 
money on administrative functions, particularly in relation to the checking of 
documentation, in order to establish that all its employees are compliant with 
visa regulations. 
PN 12) MULTIPLIER EFFECTS. Government policy towards non-EU migrants is becoming 
more selective, making it difficult for unskilled workers to enter, but 
encouraging the entry of ‘star performers’ (Martin 2006; Menz 2009). This 
policy has been criticised by globalists, however, because it excludes the 
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possibility of a ‘multiplier effect’ that may arise from, for example, having a 
higher population density (e.g. Glaeser 2011). For example, the creation of 
economies of scale (which happens when cost of per-unit production declines as 
volume increases) can be more easily achieved within a large domestic labour 
market. Moreover, the multiplier effect may be even more pronounced in 
economically-independent cities like London because of the spatial clustering of 
agglomeration economies and a higher demand for new goods and services, 
especially in non-tradable sectors (Nathan 2011; 2013; Glaeser 2011).  
PN 13) ETHNIC INNOVATION. Finally, increasing ethnic heterogeneity may provide the 
impetus for experimentation in industry, creativity in art and literature, 
achievement in sports, and innovation in cuisine (Nathan and Lee 2011). A 
commonly cited figure from the United States is that immigrants account for a 
disproportionate number of patented inventions (Chellaraj et al. 2008; Wadhwa 
et al. 2008). The proposition is that migrants are sufficiently different that they 
‘think outside of the box’, and so accelerate the overall pace of innovation.  
Such strictly economic considerations will surely continue to play a 
prominent role in migration politics, but they may not constitute the principal 
source of contention. As we shall see in section 2.3.4, a possibly even larger 
concern is the distributional impact of such massive immigration on the social 
fabric of the UK, especially when migrants possess similar competencies to 
native workers. For much of the twentieth century, the demand for UK labour 
grew faster than its supply. This, however, was reversed in the 1960’s.  
 
2.3.4 ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM 
Critics of MARKET GLOBALISM argue that the emergence globalised labour 
markets has damaged the economic status of the native population, and that 
steadily rising immigration levels may have led to permanent socioeconomic 
division. In the words of trade unionist Doug Nicholls (2017), chair of Trade 
Unionists Against the EU (TUAEU) 
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“No nation has ever prospered by allowing its workforce to become nomads to suit 
the short-term needs of others. A central right of any worker is to be able to 
prosper and grow in the land of his or her birth and to have meaningful, gainful 
and enjoyable employment. When Norman Tebbit told workers to get on their 
bikes, there was outrage. And yet so-called free movement is now demanded by 
some on the ‘left’.” 
Due to the concentration of migrants in particular regions, locations and 
occupations in the UK, their public service and labour market impacts are likely 
to be concentrated in specific areas of the country. Largely, this is because these 
areas offer greater employment opportunities to migrants, but it can also be 
explained, at least in part, by the fact that immigrant diasporas act as 
“bridgeheads” for new arrivals (Collier 2013). The actual labour market impacts 
of migration are, therefore, an empirical issue and are likely to vary over space 
and time.  
With this in mind, ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM holds that each nation should 
have its own sovereign government and, although this is often left implicit, that 
each state should put the welfare of its own citizens first and foremost, above the 
welfare of non-citizens. The main PNs to consider in assessing ECONOMIC 
PATRIOTISM include: 
PN 14) JOB DISPLACEMENT. The claim that immigrants take jobs from local workers 
may be exaggerated, but it is not always false. In a meta-analysis Longhi et al. 
(2008) collated the results of 45 empirical studies on the job displacement 
impacts of migrant workers. On average most of these effects were fairly small 
but there was quite strong evidence that immigration discourages workless 
natives from entering or remaining in the labour market. As a broad 
generalisation, native workers lose from the inflow of workers who are like 
themselves and against whom they must compete (Rowthorn 2008). 
PN 15) WAGE COMPRESSION. In addition to the impact of migration on native 
unemployment, there is also a downward pressure on wages at the lower end of 
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the labour market (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Recent studies – notably those 
that allow for differences between gradations of skill and expertise in the 
resident labour force – have found that immigration depresses pay for the lower 
quintile (Nickell and Saleheen 2008; Dustmann et al. 2008; Reed and Latorre 
2009). As a result, immigration’s main effect has been to redistribute wealth 
away from low-income British citizens to the migrants themselves and to the 
wealthy businessmen who employ them.35  
PN 16) IMPACT ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND HOUSING. In terms of population size, large-
scale immigration may have benefited sparsely populated countries when they 
needed a certain size of population to develop their resources and achieve 
economies of scale (Corden 2003). However, the reverse is the case in a densely 
populated country like Britain: current levels of migration generate diseconomies 
of congestion (Collier 2013) and increase the cost of land and housing 
(Whitehead et al. 2011). The British taxpayer will often have to bear the cost: 
either by providing tied housing (as the NHS does for nurses) or by hidden 
subsides to make houses more affordable for key workers.36 
PN 17) IMPACT ON PUBLIC SPENDING. Another important fiscal issue is the possible 
impact of immigration on public spending – and, by extension, the link between 
public perceptions of immigrant use of public benefits and support for the 
welfare state. Governments have sometimes taken aggressive steps to cut off 
immigrant consumption of public benefits, as in the case of the UK (Geddes 
2000). Ironically, some of the most serious efforts to limit migrant access to 																																																								
35 It must be borne in mind, however, that the impact of migration on the wages of the least-
skilled is generally small compared to other factors (Dustmann et al. 2005; Manacorda et al. 2006; 
Lemos and Portes 2008; Nathan 2011). Wages have been depressed by many things other than 
immigration, such as austerity, declining trade unions, financialisation, power-biased technical 
change, secular stagnation, and the effects of the 2008 sub-prime crisis. 36	 The efficacy of a large population depends primarily upon “[…] whether the country was 
under- or overpopulated relative to its usable geographic area” (quoted from Collier 2013). Due to 




public largesse have come from the British Labour Party, and have been targeted 
against asylum policies seen as too generous or poorly enforced.  
PN 18) TRANSACTION COSTS. The overall empirical evidence on the benefits of cultural 
diversity is generally positive, though not uniformly so. Ethnic heterogeneity 
may have a negative effect on the economy if it leads to lower trust and poor 
communication between individuals – for example, because of language barriers, 
ethnocentrism and/or cultural differences (Alesina and La Ferrara 2004). 
PN 19) OPPORUNITY COSTS. A further common argument against open borders is that it 
disincentivises companies from investing in more capital-intensive technologies 
(or, conversely, from switching to the production of less labour-intensive 
commodities) (House of Lords 2008, p.38). This was precisely the experience of 
the US tomato-processing industry in the 1950s where growers argued that the 
industry could not survive without illegal immigration. As it turned out, the 
mechanization of tomato-processing plants in the 1960s increased productivity 
and reduced consumer prices (Martin 2006, pp.126-127). 
Together, PNs 14-19 are so prevalent in the migration debate that some 
authors even speak of a methodological nationalism underlying the dominant 
contemporary view on society. Symptomatic of this trend has been the tightening 
of restrictions on foreign spouses and unskilled immigrant workers (Ford and 
Goodwin 2013, p.275). At the same time, however, many countries have 
maintained the generous refugee, asylum and family reunification policies typical 
of cosmopolitan societies. Clearly, in some countries, political rhetoric has 
changed more than political reality.  
 
2.3.5 CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM 
While the distributional consequences of immigration are among the most 
important issues facing the world today, it is also important to know what 
migration means for the cultural substratum of the receiving country. 
Immigration, after all, is not just a movement from one place to another; it is also 
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a movement from one culture to another. Admittedly, many of these cultural 
differences are minor and statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, even small 
differences, when added up over many individuals and many generations, can 
greatly influence the way a society grows and develops. 
One may try to counter this by pointing out how people are increasingly 
caught up in free trade agreements that are global in scale, economic interactions 
that spill across national borders, and transnational institutions that increasingly 
regulate the laws of nations. In other words, cultural difference should be treated 
as morally irrelevant because the world has become increasingly interconnected 
and interdependent. As Philippe Legrain (2006) put it in Immigrants: Your 
Country Needs Them, “Why can computers be imported from China duty-free but 
Chinese people not freely come to make computers here?” 
Despite the advances in transportation and communication technology, 
the view espoused by Legrain (2006) is a gross simplification. When we import a 
manufactured good from China, we import only the materials used to make the 
commodity, such as polymers, metals, dyes or fabrics. These goods are allocated 
a monetary value in a global marketplace to reflect the scarcity of the product vis-
à-vis consumer demand. In contrast, when we import a Chinese worker, we 
import a class of goods that cannot be priced and which economists like to bury 
in appendices under the label non-pecuniary. ‘Non-pecuniary’ goods, like a 
feeling of historical rootedness or a sense of religiosity, cannot be priced in a 
global marketplace. Consequently, the free movement of labour is not in any way 
comparable to the free movement of goods and services.  
This leads on to issue of cultural pluralism. On the positive side, post-war 
immigration to the UK has introduced many positive interactions among workers 
and firms, and exposed Britons to a variety of new products, such as a rich 
variety of ethnic cuisine (Nathan and Lee 2011). The now-familiar political 
nostrum “In diversity is strength” highlights this bold optimism. On the other 
hand, the benefits of post-war immigration have been partly, or perhaps 
substantially, offset by socio-psychological losses to the host population (Collier 
2013; Skey 2014). Thus, while there is an obvious economic case for elite 
		
103	
migration, there is also a strong, non-pecuniary case for immigration control. 
Against this background, CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM can be mapped-out in four 
distinct but interconnected areas of public policy: 
PN 20) PRESERVATION OF LANGUAGE. First, many cultural issues in which the electorate 
is unambiguously interested in have a strong immigration dimension. Take, for 
example, the issue of language. As the Tory MP for Monmouthshire, David 
Davies, articulated it during the 2013 Immigration Bill: “[Anti-immigration] 
concern is too often dismissed as narrow-minded racism when that is not the 
case. It is reasonable for people who live in established communities to get 
nervous when they suddenly find that English – or, indeed, in some parts of 
north Wales, Welsh – is no longer the language they hear on the streets from day 
to day” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, cols.195-227, 13 October 2015). From this 
perspective, it is natural to sympathise with people with whom you can converse 
with than with other people with whom you cannot as readily interchange 
thoughts. 
PN 21) PRESERVATION OF SOCIAL NORMS. Second, there is an internal relationship 
between a nation’s demography and its social norms – e.g., political values such 
as gender equality, freedom of speech, liberty of association and religious 
pluralism. One unexpected side-effect of the growth of the Muslim diaspora in 
Western Europe, for example, has been a growth in “ritualized sexual violence” 
against young girls and women (Zizek 2017, pp.32-33). According to Samuel P. 
Huntington (1993), a former political advisor and academic, the introduction of 
different cultural groups into an existing milieu may well cause a condition of 
unpredictability and a kind of resistance to toleration that ends in a ‘clash of 
civilizations’. 
PN 22) SPATIAL MANAGEMENT. In addition to the impact of demography on social 
norms, there is also an internal relationship between a nation’s demography and 
its physical shape – its public and religious buildings; the way its towns and 
villages are laid out; and the topography of the physical environment. From this 
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perspective, the campaign for immigration control is tightly linked to claims 
about territory or what sociologist Michael Skey (2013) describes as “spatial 
management”: the importance of allowing a self-identified ethnic group to secure 
and manage a given territory.  
PN 23) RACIAL SELF-INTEREST. While few people from the white majority think 
explicitly in racial terms, many feel discomfort about losing their ethnic majority 
status to another ethnic group (Kaufmann 2017). The psychological motivations 
for this are well established in such predispositions as ‘ethnocentrism’ and 
‘ethnic nepotism’ (Salter 2006). To quote the late Conservative MP John Stokes, 
during the second reading of the 1981 British Nationality Bill: “The ordinary 
Englishman still clings obstinately to his Englishness and to the old, known 
ways. He knows only too well that if immigration continues at the present rate 
the indigenous population will in time be supplanted by aliens and British people 
will gradually disappear from these islands. It has already started to happen in 
certain areas” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.988, 28 January 1981). 
Given the histories of racism in both Continental Europe and the United 
Kingdom it is both unsurprising and fully warranted that opposition to ‘majority 
rights’ is so impassioned. The challenge here, however, is to distinguish between 
white supremacism on the one hand, and white identity politics on the other. The 
latter may be misanthropic and insular, but it is not the same as irrational fear or 
hatred for another racial group. As distinguished liberal philosopher David Miller 
(2005) argues, “[people] feel at home in a place in part because they can see that 
their surroundings bear the imprint of past generations whose values were 
recognisably their own.” In this sense, immigration sceptics are deeply concerned 
about the scale and pace of social change; they are worried about whether their 
town still feels ‘authentically’ British or whether immigrants share the same 
values as them. Metaphorically, a nation-state may thus be described as a “home” 
– a site of constancy in the social and material environment, and a spatial context 





Another important development over the last few decades has been the attempt to 
bring refugee and asylum policy under the remit of military, security, and 
policing policy. Recent literature is replete with arguments that states have 
‘criminalized’, ‘securitized’ and ‘militarized’ asylum and undocumented 
migration. There is a common belief, especially among national populist 
movements, that greater global economic integration has made the world more 
vulnerable to the “dark side of globalization” – namely, that some immigrants 
constitute potential a security threat comparable to floods or epidemics. As a 
recent review put it,  
“prisons or immigration removal centres are singularly useful in the management 
of non-citizens because they enable society not only physically to exclude this 
population, but also, symbolically to mark these figures out as threatening and 
dangerous.” (Bosworth 2008, pp.207–8) 
Such real/perceived threats underline just how important it is to think 
clearly, and long-term, about the issue of SECURITY. Several cross-national 
studies suggest that, as immigration becomes ever more psychologically linked to 
physical security, attitudes towards migration tend to coalesce around a more 
restrictive and assimilationist metanarrative (Castles at al. 2014, pp.198-214). 
Securitisation can be mapped-out in four distinct but interconnected areas of 
public policy: 
PN 24) COUNTER-TERRORISM. In recent years, radicalized Muslims have come to be 
regarded as a major security threat by MI5. Recent terrorist attacks, carried 
out on the streets of Woolwich, Westminster, Southwark and Manchester, 
have made it impossible to gloss-over the very real threat posed by radical 
Islamic ideology. Cosmopolitans, such as London Mayor Sadiq Khan, see 
this as the negative part of a trade-off for a more open, equal and diverse 
society; national populists, on the other hand, believe it is a self-inflicted 
wound. As Enoch Powell put it in 1968: “The supreme function of 
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statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it 
encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human nature” (quoted 
from Hansen 2000).  
PN 25) CRIME PREVENTION. Opponents of globalist ideology argue that, under a 
liberal border regime, the number of migrants arriving from failed states 
will increase substantially, leading to higher levels of organised and 
disorganized crime: fraud, murder, smuggling, racketeering, human 
trafficking and bonded labour. From this perspective, globalism endangers 
the physical safety of native-born British citizens.  
PN 26) NATIONAL UNITY. At the national level, ethnic diversity has been associated 
with slowed economic growth, falling social cohesion and foreign aid, as 
well as rising corruption and risk of civil conflict (as discussed in a meta-
analysis by Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Indeed, one of the main themes 
of the Cantle report, commissioned in 2001 in response to a series of violent 
ethnic clashes in the north of England, is that damaging racial polarisation is 
likely to occur when there are no points of contact between different 
communities.  
PN 27) PUBLIC HEALTH. In terms of infectious disease epidemiology, some critics 
of open borders argue that increased global interactions among populations 
will lead to the rapid spread of infectious diseases currently prevalent in 
developing countries. Tuberculosis is a paradigmatic example of this 
situation.  
In contrast to the socioeconomic threats posed by immigration, which 
often polarise public and elite opinion because they spring from prior ‘moral 
foundations’, concern for physical safety is a unifying threat that often results in a 
cross-party consensus (Feldman and Stenner 1997). Moreover, countries that 
have experienced attacks by foreign terrorists are those most likely to impose new 
border restrictions (with regard to the case of Israel, see Bartram 1998, pp. 303–
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25). When confronted with this reality, some of the more nuanced proponents of 
national populism have extolled cultural assimilation as the solution. For example 
PN 28) ASSIMILATION. Assimilation focuses on “the political and public spheres and 
disregards religious and cultural differences in the private sphere, so long as 
these private practices do not conflict with the ideals of liberal democracy” (cited 
from Holbrook 2017). In this vision, all the myriad problems of a multiethnic 
society can be overcome through citizenship tests, education in civics theories, 
monolingualism, and the promotion of so-called ‘British values’. This citizen-
centered policy framework does not rule out cultural change, but it does give a 
reason for wanting to stay in control of the process (Miller 2005).  
According to PN28, successful societies are based on habits of trust and 
reciprocity, underpinned by a common language, common history and common 
culture. As philosopher Samuel Scheffler (2007, p.111) argues, the government 
“cannot avoid coercing citizens into preserving a national culture of some kind”.  
 
2.3.7 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
The real/perceived threats of migration to national security are important aspects 
of the challenges posed by globalisation to the nation state. Another important 
factor, however, is the ability of the state to achieve domestic policy objectives 
through bureaucratic and administrative organs. To this end, PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION is a metanarrative embedded within the institutions that frame, 
shape and transform elite preferences into policy outcomes: 
PN 29) LAW ENFORCEMENT. Home Office and border agency officials often talk of their 
determination to ‘protect the border’ from illicit or illegal people. This is what is 
meant by ‘law enforcement’ – the action or activity of compelling observance of 
and compliance with the law.  
PN 30) EFFICIENCY IN ADMINISTRATION. Another important aspect of public 
administration is the avoidance of inter-agency conflict and bureaucratic 
inefficiency (Rosenblum 2004). Anecdotally, one finds a continual reappearance 
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of the following issues related to efficiency in public administration: 
inadequacies of staffing and budget; mismanagement of time and resources; 
over-centralization; and slow and confusing decision-making vis-à-vis the 
appeals process. 
PN 31) RATIONALISATION OF LAW. The problem of administrative torpor may also 
emerge out of conflicts between central executives concerned about border 
controls and specific organisations responsible for adherence and compliance to 
the rule of law. According to PN31, the only way to resolve this conflict is 
through a ‘rationalisation process’ aimed at restricting the ability of judges/civil 
servants to direct policy toward any particular outcome. 
PN 32) LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY. A similar tension between equity and efficiency 
characterises the role of the House of Commons. Proponents of PN32 claim the 
scrutinizing role of the legislature (including parliamentary committees) should 
take precedence over the efficacy of the executive if it results in more robust and 
watertight legislation.  
PN 33) FORECASTING OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS. Having accurate forecasts of predicted 
future migratory inflows are essential for the design and implementation of 
public policy. There are, however, many social, economic and political drivers 
which can impact migration flows, making forecasting of inflows an extremely 
arduous task. In particular, migration is very susceptible to exogenous ‘shock 
events’ which are, by their very nature, hard to predict, such as economic 
depression and internecine conflict. 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION is a central concept in the social sciences, but it 
did not appear in the migration literature until the late 1990s: Zolberg (1999) was 
among the first to trace the sources of migration to the activities of central 
bureaucracies. In some models, the state is thought to arbitrate among competing 
economic interests (which requires ‘managed migration’) and obligations to the 
rule of law (Hollifield 2004). In later models (e.g. Rudolph 2003), the state is 
thought to approach the prospect of migration from the point of view of 
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diplomatic and security issues, as well as specific ministries responsible for 
labour and industry. Political scientists such as Hammar (1985), Brochmann and 
Hammar (1999), and Massey (1999) on the other hand view the politics of 
migration as issues of performance management, regulation and compliance, 
directed at both controls over the composition of, and interactions between, 
citizens and noncitizens. 
 
 
2.4 Summary  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the dissertation’s conceptual and 
analytical framework – one based on a three-tier distinction between individual 
policy narratives (PN), their micro-components (setting, plot, characters, moral) 
and their macro-conceptual concatenations (the ‘metanarrative’ (M)). (While the 
first two dimensions are commonly used in interpreting political thought, the 
addition of the third dimension of ideology is a special aspect of the approach 
offered in the following chapters.) The analysis of ideologies is not, on this 
understanding, most usefully pursued by projecting a one-size-fits-all model – but 
rather, through locating them within the patterns in which they actually appear. 
Such patterns are most conveniently expressed in metanarratives, those systems 
of political thinking, loose or rigid, through which individuals and groups 
construct an understanding of the political world they inhabit. The purpose of the 
above classification system, therefore, to create heuristic order without which 


















The Politicisation of Migration 	
 “The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In 
seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human 
nature.” 
                                                                                                                   – Enoch Powell37 
 
“Citizenship and immigration in post-war UK are the result of an interlocking, and 
poorly understood, relationship between the feudal basis of British nationality, the 
post-war experience of decolonisation, and the policy instruments to chosen to 
restrict immigration. British migration and nationality legislation has depended on 
a series of measures that appear alternatively bizarre and sinister, and the politics 
of immigration have been punctuated by an exceptional series of crises”. 
                                                                                                                – Randall Hansen38 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a content analysis of parliamentary discourse 
during the 1960s-70s period. It aims to account for the transformation, since 
1945, of the UK from a Commonwealth of Nations into a prototypical nation 
state. It focuses on three features of British and immigration and nationality 
policy since 1945: (i) its exceptional liberality and expansiveness between 1948 
and 1961; (ii) its rapid reversal after 1961, resulting in one of the most restrictive 
immigration regimes in Western Europe; and (iii) the removal in 1971 of 
Commonwealth citizens’ automatic right to remain in the UK. The focus of this 
chapter is on the deliberative processes involved in policy formation; it is not a 
social history of Commonwealth migrants and their experiences in British 
society. It is also not a chapter about the institutional apparatus of the British 
state, or the content of Britons’ attitudes on questions of race. Rather, the chapter 
is about the “narrativisation” of one of the most divisive and partisan issues in 
post-war British politics.  
																																																								
37 Quoted from Hansen (2000), p.183 




3.1. Commonwealth Immigrants Bill 1961 (Case Study 1) 
 
3.1.1. CITIZENSHIP AND POSTWAR IMMIGRATION 
The story of Britain’s early post-war experience with immigration occurred in 
three distinct waves: 
Aliens. The first wave of post-war immigration, which unfolded from the 
end of World War II, was defined and dominated by the mass movement of 
surplus workers from Eastern Europe. The primary catalyst of this wave was the 
onset of the post-WWII economic boom, the greatest economic boom in history, 
which created an acute shortage in the domestic labour market. Government 
initiatives to recruit workers included encouraging Polish former servicemen who 
had served under British command during the war to settle in Britain. European 
volunteer workers were also recruited under a number of government schemes, 
and there was some immigration from Italy.  
Irish immigrants. The second wave of early post-war immigration in 
Britain unfolded after the passage of the British Nationality Act (BNA) in 1948, a 
far-reaching piece of legislation that, among other things, recognised the special 
status of the Republic of Ireland – a status that confirmed the right of Irish 
citizens to enter the UK without restriction. Thus, an important consequence of 
the 1948 BNA was to precipitate an influx of Irish workers into the post-war 
British economy.  
British subjects. Although the BNA’s origins were almost entirely 
unrelated to immigration, its consequences undoubtedly were so related. The 
right to enter Britain – a logical corollary of the status of British subject – led to a 
third wave of immigration from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean. 
Unlike the first two waves, however, the third began spontaneously in 1948 and 
“gathered momentum during the 1950s without the official sanction of or formal 
assistance from the British government” (quoted from Messina 2007, ch.4). This 
wave of unanticipated post-war migration was symbolised by the infamous 
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arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948, and the British government stood by as 
chain migration from the Commonwealth unfolded.  
Counterintuitive though it may sound, the category of British citizen did 
not exist in British law after the passing of the 1945 BNA. Rather, most 
inhabitants of the UK were regarded as Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies (abbreviated ‘CUKC’), although most people in the Colonies had no 
connection, at any stage in their lives, with the socio-political entity of the United 
Kingdom.  
In retrospect, the 1945 BNA was one of the most extraordinary pieces of 
legislation in modern political history: a country of 50 million people remained 
completely open to 400 million citizens from Dhaka to Durban. Although the 
establishment of a multiracial society was neither planned nor anticipated by 
policymakers, a major factor leading to its emergence was the quasi-imperial 
mindset of the British establishment, which manifested itself in the great tradition 
of Civis Britannicus sum. A Conservative policy document published in 1949 
stated: 
“There must be freedom of movement among its members within the British 
Empire and Commonwealth. New opportunities will present themselves not only 
in the countries overseas but in the mother country and must be open to all 
citizens” (quoted from Layton-Henry 1984, p.14) 
Incredibly, during some eight years of intra-imperial migration, the 
Conservative government managed to resist demands for restriction, largely 
because of an unusual alliance between Tory liberals and the Traditional Right 
(Foot 1965, pp.156-57). Even Sir Thomas Moore, a hard-right Conservative MP, 
abstained on the immigration question because he regarded it as discriminating 
against the Commonwealth (Foot 1965, p.155). As a consequence of this 
bipartisan consensus, there was substantial colonial migration during the 1950s. 
There was also unrestricted immigration from Ireland, which left the 
Commonwealth in 1948 but was a traditional source of blue-collar labour to 
Britain. The immigration of non-British subjects (i.e., Poles, Italians) was 
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controlled, but the acute post-war labour shortage meant that ‘alien’ immigration 
was encouraged immediately following the war.  
 
3.1.2. THE ORIGINS OF MIGRATION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE 
This pre-political state of affairs was eventually disturbed by the violent racial 
clashes which occurred in the cities of Nottingham and Notting Hill (London) in 
the summer of 1958. These were not, of course, the first incidents of inter-racial 
violence in post-war Britain (for a book-length treatment see Layton-Henry 
1984). However, the scale of the violence in 1958 forcibly brought the issue of 
non-white immigration to the attention of the national press, politicians and the 
wider public. As British journalist and author David Goodhart (2013, ch.3) 
observed: 
“[For] ordinary white Britons the riots underlined the racial anxiety that black 
meant trouble. Historic European racial stereotypes of the childlike, animalistic 
African man fused with more contemporary fears about pressure on jobs and 
housing and a sense of losing control of historic working-class neighbourhoods. 
Newspaper stories about the immigrants that had started out friendly and curious 
quickly came to focus on black people as a source of disruption or criminality.” 
In both Nottingham and Notting Hill the disturbances lasted several days 
and involved many hundreds of people. Hostile crowds of 1,500 and 4,000 were 
reported to be involved in the Nottingham disturbances and crowds of 200, 400 
and 700 participated in some of the Notting Hill attacks (Layton-Henry 1984, 
p.35). A political outcry ensued, not just in Britain but across the New 
Commonwealth. For example, in the immediate aftermath Jamaican Prime 
Minister Norman Manley flew to London for consultations and a tour of the riot 
areas. 
The effect of the riots was paradoxical. On the one hand, the liberal wing 
of the Conservative Party would not accept a knee-jerk response to racist 
violence, and Colonial Secretary Alex Lennox-Boyd remained strongly opposed 
to restrictions.  
		
115	
On the other hand, press coverage of the riots propelled the issue to the 
forefront of the national political conversation. This had two important 
consequences: 
Political realignment. First, the riots provided political ammunition for a 
handful of Conservative MPs then campaigning for immigration controls. The 
campaign, initiated by Louth MP Sir Cyril Osborne, attempted to galvanise 
public opinion by achieving maximum publicity for his views and the views of 
other Tory nationalists such as Harold Gurden (Sell Oak), Martin Lindsey 
(Solihull) and Norman Pannell (Kirkdale). Articulating the concerns of the Tory 
professional middle-class, this group was poorly represented in Parliament and, 
until the early 1960s, not very influential. The political base of the neo-nationalist 
Right was located in constituencies with immigrant diasporas; and, through its 
efforts, numerous anti-immigration resolutions were forwarded to the 1961 and 
1965 Conservative Party Conferences (Foot 1965). 
Economic protectionism. Second, public anxiety over colonial migration 
contributed to a climate of scepticism within the Ministry of Labour (MoL). As 
documented by the writer and historian of immigration Randall Hansen, senior 
civil servants in the MoL believed that the post-WWII economic boom had come 
to an end. Three developments, in particular, were believed to bode poorly for the 
economic prospects of immigrant workers: the process of automation; the 
abolition of National Service; and the continued arrival of unskilled workers from 
the Irish Republic, estimated at 60,000 per annum (Hansen 2000, p.93).  
Taken together, these centrifugal forces become overwhelming by the 
early 1960s – both from ordinary citizens as channelled through MPs and from 
party activists (especially Tory) and from within Whitehall itself. As a 
consequence of these events, a decision to restrict colonial migration was 
announced on 31 October 1961, and Conservative Home Secretary R.A. Butler 
moved the second reading of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill (CIB) on 16 
November. The purpose of this legislation was to distinguish between citizens of 
the UK/Ireland and citizens of the Commonwealth. The latter became subject to 
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immigration controls via the issue of employment vouchers. These vouchers were 
divided into three categories  
• Category A for people promised a specific job by a specific employer 
• Category B for individuals with training, skill, or educational attainments 
deemed to useful to Britain; and 
• Category C for all unskilled workers without a job in the UK. These vouchers 
were subject to a variable limit and administrated on a “first-come first-serve” 
basis.39 
When immigrant policies are considered, the key point is the centrality of 
ideas surrounding social cohesion and the supply of housing. As argued in 
sections 3.1.2-3, policy responses to issues understood in terms of SECURITY and 
ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM became a paradigmatic feature of the politics of 
migration. During the first six months after the CIB was passed (in 1962), 
immigration from the Commonwealth dropped below 10,000 – from 
approximately 86,700 (Foot 1965, p.141).  
Yet, whatever credit the Tories may have taken for the Act later in the 
decade, the legislation was viewed by Butler as a “distasteful necessity” of which 
he was not proud (Hansen 2000, p.111). To make matters worse, Labour’s 
opposition to the CIB was powerful and persuasive, both at the Second Reading 
and through the early part of the Committee stage, which was held on the floor of 
the House. Throughout the period before the Christmas recess, both Hugh 
Gaitskell (Labour Party leader) and Patrick Gordon Walker (Shadow Foreign 
Secretary) made devastating speeches against the CIB. The Opposition argued 
that the Bill’s application gave preference to some races over others.  
																																																								
39 The first quota for Category C was set at 10,000 vouchers per year, while the quota for A and B 
together was 20,000. Initially vouchers were available for both skilled and unskilled workers, but 
after 1965 only qualified workers could apply, which mostly consisted of doctors (Salt and 




3.1.3. NATIONAL UNITY 
Few phenomena affecting the United Kingdom as a whole have been more far-
reaching than the accumulative effects of post-WWII immigration. As the above 
suggests, the introduction of the CIB was in large measure a response to the 
Ministry of Labour’s anti-immigration stance, and this opposition was canalised 
in some measure by public anti-immigrant sentiment (see Table 12). One 
Conservative MP referred to a division in the parliamentary party between 
‘restrictionists’ (who accepted the need for controls in practice), ‘last ditchers’ 
(who opposed any control of Commonwealth immigration) and ‘hedgers’ (who 
agreed with the last ditchers in principle, but were swayed to the restrictionist 
cause because of numbers) (see Hansen 2000, p.106).  
 
Table 12. Coding form #1 
 
Category Description 
Metanarrative  Security 
 
Policy narrative PN26: National unity 
 
Setting The enactment of the 1961 bill was in large measure a response to 
public opposition to immigration, and this opposition was influenced in 
some measure by racism. 
 
Plot The process of assimilation cannot be hurried: interethnic conflict is a 
universal social problem. Restrictions on migration are therefore a 
necessary pre-condition for good race relations, and the ability to 
enforce those restrictions will allay the fears of the native population. 
 
Characters British government (narrative hero) 
 
Moral  The CIB is necessary to reassure the public about the size and 
consequences of New Commonwealth immigration. 
 
Frequency Butler (Con) cols.693-94; Gurden (Con) cols.738-39 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961 
 
The Conservative Home Secretary of the time, R.A. Butler, claimed in his 
opening speech that the 1961 bill had been introduced as a method of dealing 




“It cannot be denied that the immigrants who have come to this country in such 
large numbers have presented the country with an intensified social problem. They 
tend to settle in communities of their own, with their own mode of life, in big 
cities. The greater the numbers coming into this country the larger will these 
communities become and the more difficult will it be to integrate them into our 
national life.” (Butler c.694) 
A less charitable interpretation of Butler’s position was provided by liberal Tory 
MP Mark Fisher: 
 “The first [reason for this Immigration Bill] is “the social strains and stresses.” In 
simpler and rather cruder language, that phrase really means colour prejudice. It is 
strange, that if one accuses someone of not having a sense of humour he is furious, 
and regards it as the most insulting thing of which one can accuse him. It is the 
same if he is accused of having a colour prejudice; he will vehemently deny it. 
But, I fear, in fact, that is the state of mind of many of our fellow countrymen.” 
(Fisher col.780) 
From 1961 to 1997, discussions of migration policy in the UK were often 
tied to discussions of NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). There was a communalist 
assumption, derived from the experience of colonialism, that minorities would 
want to live in their own areas – much as Britain’s social classes did – with a 
sense of what the economist Amartya Sen (2006) calls “plural monoculturalism”. 
The Labour MP George Pargiter, for example, compared unassimilated migrant 
communities in Britain to the unassimilated English diasporas of continental 
Europe. The tendency to cluster, in Pargiter’s view, is inscribed in our nature as 
human beings, rooted in a deep affection for both friends and family, as well as a 




The political and policy origins of the aforementioned phenomena are 
generally not in dispute. First, there was the issue of institutional ‘path 
dependency’.40 Neither political nor intellectual elites foresaw the long-term 
repercussions of imperial citizenship – as formalised by the 1945 BNA (Hansen 
2000). Second, when mass immigration commenced in the 1950s, there was a 
tacit assumption that this surge was temporary and could be efficiently regulated 
by the impersonal mechanisms of the labour market. This assumption was 
misplaced, however, since the vast majority of migrants chose to stay (Geddes 
2005). The immigrant population, as such, remained spatially concentrated in 
parts of London, the industrial Midlands, and the Pennine towns of the North 
West. Over time, this pattern of settlement triggered a series of racial 
disturbances that prompted demands from sections of the British electorate that 
restrictions be applied to Commonwealth citizens. This point was articulated by 
Conservative MP Harold Gurden:  
“[Racial] prejudice has existed for as far back as we can trace—community 
prejudice, national and international prejudice between peoples. In our civilisation 
we expect it slowly to disappear, and it is disappearing. This process cannot be 
hurried. The situation in the affected areas was all right even eight or ten years 
ago, but this setback is due to the vast numbers who have suddenly come in.” 
(Gurden c.738) 
PN26 emphasises the unexpected difficulties immigrant-receiving states encounter 
in preventing the permanent settlement of migrants in their societies, as well as 
the difficulties that grow and continue to result from uneven geographical 
settlement. 
																																																								
40 Path dependency advances the view that the contemporary state's inadequate control of 
immigration and immigrant policy is a consequence of long-established policy decisions, 
decisions that have precluded the pursuit of some policy options while making other alternatives 





In addition to concerns about the impact of the immigrant population on 
NATIONAL UNITY (PN26), discussions of immigration restriction in 1961 were 
almost always tied to concerns about HOUSING (PN16). Such problems were 
linked primarily to the physical decaying of inner city areas, wherein 
environmental degradation was increasingly regarded as a process accelerated by 
the presence of new arrivals (Hansen 2000, ch.3). In particular, the cause of 
greatest concern was overcrowded accommodation, combined with the 
unscrupulous actions of slum landlords such as Peter Rachman. Rachman, a 
Notting Hill landlord and part-time brothel-keeper, was notorious for subdividing 
his properties into several smaller flats so as to gradually increase the number of 
tenancies without rent controls (hence the term “Rachmanism”). Those native 
residents that remained in these areas associated its continued decay with Afro-
Caribbean tenants, while the conditions in which the latter group was forced to 
live (most houses had a single toilet and bathroom) intensified racist assumptions 
about foreigners and poor living standards. According to Selly Oak MP Harold 
Gurden: 
“Opponents of the Bill say that the housing problem was with us before the 
immigrants arrived, but Birmingham's problem has been aggravated to an extent 
never before known. Slums now exist in hundreds, or perhaps even thousands, 
where previously they could be measured in dozens. Never was there such filth 
and such obscenity. The humiliation and degradation of these people are dreadful. 
That is why I say that it is not only socially but morally right to have this Bill.” 
Depicted as a problematic corollary of racism, the clustering of 
Commonwealth immigrants in overcrowded accommodation provided an 
important rationale for restrictionist legislation (Hansen 2000, p.81). As Table 13 
suggests, the political and social tensions post-WWII immigration precipitated 
were founded not simply in the size of the immigrant population but also in its 
uneven geographical distribution. Slum landlords were accused of using 
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immigrants to push out older white residents, in order to achieve higher rents and 
property values (Deakin 1965). This problem was exacerbated, in turn, by the 
failure of central government to provide local authorities with additional funds to 
alleviate the shortage of housing and accommodation in areas of immigrant 
settlement.  
 
Table 13. Coding form #2 
 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Economic patriotism 
 
Policy narrative PN16: Impact on housing and public services 
 
Setting Urban decay 
 
Plot There is a practical limit to the number of people the UK can 
comfortably absorb, and the speed with which local authorities can 
accommodate them. Furthermore, unrestricted migration fuels the 
activities of slum landlords, who subdivide their properties into smaller 
flats, which gradually increase the number of tenancies without rent 
controls.  
 
Characters Slum landlords (narrative villains) 
 
Moral  “Given a too rapid rise in the size of the immigrant population, there is 
a real risk that the drive for improved housing conditions will be 




Osborne (Con) cols.721-28; Gurden (Con) cols.741-42; Lucas-Tooth 
(Con) cols.769-71; Fisher (Con) cols.782-83; Hare (Con) cols.807-10 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961 
 
Negative reaction to New Commonwealth immigration was originally 
confined to the employment sector, where there were attempts to exclude black 
workers from certain occupations or to restrict them to the lowest grades 
(Beetham 1970). Over time, however, many of these early inter-racial difficulties 
were overcome as the labour shortage continued and as employers and workers 
grew accustomed to working with black colleagues. Outside of the work situation 
there was considerable resentment towards black immigrants, often associated 
with housing problems (Glass 1960; Patterson 1965; Deakin 1965). As Butler 
explained in his opening speech 
“Given a too rapid increase in the number of immigrants, there is a real risk that 
the drive for improved conditions will be defeated by the sheer weight of numbers, 
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and the immigrants will be among those to benefit most if the new powers in fact 
prove, as we hope, to be effective. (Butler cols.694-95) 
This narrative exemplifies a pattern that is widely observed in the politics 
of migration, namely, that there is a perceived limit to the number of people the 
UK can comfortably absorb. Framed through a metanarrative of ECONOMIC 
PATRIOTISM, immigration policy is relatively uncontroversial when the 
population density is low and increased building brings amenities like parks, 
restaurants, boutique shops and well-integrated public transport. Beyond a certain 
point, however, a tipping point is surpassed, when more population density is 
increasingly seen as a corollary of more traffic, more noise, and other undesirable 
side effects. 	
3.1.5. DISCURSIVE DEPOLITICISATION AND ‘THE GLOBAL ECONOMY’ 
While the government felt that the CIB would command general support in 
Parliament, Butler was astonished at the level of opposition the Bill received. In 
concluding the Opposition’s case, Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell drew on the full 
power of his rhetorical skill in a hostile rebuke of government policy, leading to 
what Paul Foot described as Gaitskell’s “finest moment” (1965, p.175). This 
opposition brought the Labour Party its rewards, both in votes and concessions 
throughout the length of the Bill’s passage: 
“It has been said that the test of a civilised country is how it treats its Jews. I 
would extend that and say that the test of a civilised country is how it behaves to 
all its citizens of different race, religion and colour. By that test this Bill fails, and 
that is fundamentally why we deplore it.” (Gaitskell, col.802) 
Three features in Gaitskell’s political make-up had combined to drive him 
into opposition to the CIB. The first had been a personal loathing of racial 
prejudice. The Opposition argued that the Bill’s application, which favoured 




In addition to this, Gaitskell was a firm believer in the British 
Commonwealth, partly through a desire to see a “world-wide multi-racial 
community network” (Foot 1965, p.175). The CIB’s damage to the British 
Commonwealth was said to result from the fact of control itself, and it was 
believed by Labour to be exacerbated by the failure to ensure proper 
intergovernmental consultation.  
Thirdly, Gaitskell understood much better than his colleagues the general 
principles behind international migration of labour. The crucial dynamic initiating 
migration to Britain was the level of poverty, unemployment and lack of 
opportunities abroad (‘push’ factors) and the high number of vacancies in 
Britain’s post-war economy (‘pull’ factors) (see Table 14). 
 
Table 14. Coding form #3 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Market globalism 
 
Policy narrative PN10: Unskilled migration 
 
Setting Unfilled vacancies; dualities in the global economy 
 
Plot There is a direct relationship between labour demand in the UK and 
current levels of international migration. Freedom of movement 
promotes economic growth by filling labour shortages, staffing public 
services and boosting the public finances.  
 
Characters Economic migrants (heroes), protectionist Tory politicians (villains) 
 
Moral  The large rise in recorded met migration is almost precisely correlated 
with the number of unfulfilled vacancies in the UK labour market. If 
the Conservatives try to cut off that labour, the public and private 
sectors will face considerable difficulty. 
 
Frequency Walker (Lab) cols.709-711; Royle (Lab) cols.750-51; Turton (Con) 
cols.754-55; Howell (Lab) cols.761-64; MacColl (Lab) cols.774-76; 
Fisher (Con) cols.780-81; Pargiter (Lab) cols.788-91; Gaitskell (Lab) 
cols.793-99 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961 
 
Gaitskell’s attack on the Bill, which he described the “most crazy kind” of 
economic planning (col.799), stunned the government. The Labour opposition at 
this time appeared demoralised and divided after their 1959 electoral defeat and 
racked by internal difficulties over NATO and unilateral nuclear disarmament. 
Butler had failed to anticipate the extent to which the CIB presented the 
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Opposition with a great moral issue with which Gaitskell could unite the PLP. 
The West Indian economy, in particular, had been shaped to serve Britain’s 
convenience and controls would seriously worsen unemployment there. As 
Patrick Gordon Walker (col.710), the shadow Foreign Secretary, remarked, 
global economic conditions played an important part in mediating the relationship 
between migrants and the receiving country: 
“[An] expanding economy, even one expanding at the rate laid down by this 
Government, produces labour scarcity. We have to accept this as a fact of life. 
There is a direct relation between labour demand and immigration.” 
The above excerpt is a classic example of what Matt Wood and Matthew 
Flinders (2014) term discursive depoliticisation. Words such as “scarcity”, 
“expanding” and “the economy” were a big part of the pro-migrant vernacular, 
framing debates about international migration, and prompting the perception of 
international migration as a “fact of life”. Gordon Walker’s economic argument, 
in a nutshell, was that the flow of immigration had already been regulated by the 
invisible hand of the global economy: 
“Many people talk about millions of people coming here; he talked about a quarter 
of the population of the world coming here. But a limit is set on the numbers 
coming here by the economy itself, by the need of the economy for labour. It is the 
net figure that matters whether of immigration or migration. I think that the figure 
is not very great. Some years it is negative; some years it is positive.” (Gordon 
Walker col.710) 
It is important to note that, historically, the recruitment of foreign workers 
was relatively disorganised rather than the result of structured relations between 
government and business (Geddes 2003). Unlike France and Germany, the UK 
did not actively encourage large-scale immigration.41 On the other hand, strong 																																																								
41 The reasons for this were twofold: first, British economic performance was lacklustre compared 
to continental Europe and labour shortages were never so severe; and second, Ireland served as an 
industrial reserve army within easy reach of the UK. 
		
125	
‘pull’ factors were at work in the 1950s with the active recruitment of migrant 
labour in the textile and construction industries. Furthermore, some forms of 
labour migration were often encouraged in a bid to overcome bottlenecks in the 
public sector and to counter the effects of ‘militant’ trade unionism.42 As Gaitskell 
put it 
“As the number of unfilled vacancies goes down, the immigration figures go 
down, and as the number of unfilled vacancies rises, the immigration figures go 
up.” (Gaitskell col.794) 
The term “unfilled vacancy” loomed large in this narrative. It suggested 
strong associations between the politics of migration, on the one hand, and the 
exigencies of the British economy on the other. Put another way, these “unfilled 
vacancies” – while obviously not static and unchanging – depersonalised the 
debate over SOCIAL COHESION. The ideal of technocratic government emerged 
from this mindset, based, as it is, on the conviction that economic growth can 
lead the way to peace.  
 
3.1.6. INTEGRATION 
Another contentious issue was the policy of INTEGRATION (PN4).43 According to 
Labour, the governmental response to colonial migration was hesitant and 
ambiguous and little positive was done to assist their settlement, integration and 
acceptance. There were, for example, no government arrangements for meeting 
the immigrants and dispersing them to their destinations in Britain. There were 
also no arrangements made for health inspection on arrival or on departure; and 
no Government arrangements were made for the teaching of English. In the 
words of Gordon Walker,  																																																								
42 In the early 1960s (1960-63), Conservative Health Minister Enoch Powell recruited nurses from 
the Caribbean to work in the NHS. According to Edward Heath (cited from Hansen 2000), Powell 
told the Macmillan Cabinet that it could face down British nurses in a pay dispute “because I can 
bring in all the nurses we need from the West Indies”. 




“The Government are to blame for this situation. The Government have totally 
failed to relate the increase in the number of jobs to housing. They have totally 
failed to disperse industry. They have contributed to homelessness and 
overcrowding by their Rent Act and by cutting back local authority house 
building.” (Walker, col.715) 
Accordingly, no government encouragement was made given to voluntary 
organisations struggling to solve the numerous social problems caused inevitably 
by a large influx of men and women of different cultures. Worst of all, no 
provision was made by the central government for housing and accommodation. 
All these problems were left to the local authorities. Charles Royle, a British 
businessman and Labour MP for Salford West, argued that residential 
overcrowding could only be solved by constant dedication on the part of central 
government: 
“The immigrants are not responsible for it. The Government are responsible for it 
because they have failed to provide sufficient housing for the people. If the people 
from the Commonwealth are assisting us—as they are—in our economic situation 
and by the places they occupy in our economy, they have a right to expect from 
the Government that they will be properly housed and accommodated in this 
country.” (Royle, col.749) 
Those who held this view pointed to a ‘shopping list’ of big changes in 
public policy that could have the potential to radically overturn the status quo. 
For example, Labour politicians urged the British Government to make much 
greater efforts to disperse the immigrant population; they were also encouraged to 
support local authorities in their use of anti-overcrowding measures. Similarly, in 
his speech to House Gordon Walker mentioned the possibility of using public 
funds to improve the living conditions of immigrants already resident in Britain. 
According to Labour MP Denis Howell (cols.764-65), a more positive early lead 




“When one meets constituents and argues with them, one finds time and time 
again that they do not object to people coming because of their colour. Their 
objection is that the immigrants have preference in getting houses, which, of 
course, is not the case. Most of the immigrants buy the houses. The problem of 
bad landlordism, too, applies just as much to immigrants as to the native British 
population.”  
Influenced by a materialist conception of ideology, a number of MPs remained 
wedded to the view that interracial conflict is a by-product of competition over 
scarce economic resources. 
 
3.1.7. POLITICISATION OF ANTI-RACISM 
Behind the many ideological differences between the two major parties lay a 
fundamental agreement: both Conservative and Labour MPs acknowledged the 
existence of “stresses” and “strains” arising from the uneven geographical 
settlement of immigrant populations. For Conservative ‘realists’ such as R.A. 
Butler (col.688), restricting numbers was the obvious and self-evident solution. 
For Gaitskell and Walker, on the other hand, the Government was responsible for 
the race ‘problem’ because it had failed to provide sufficient housing, amenities 
and infrastructure. Beyond that, the numbers themselves were a technical 
question to be worked out efficiently and dispassionately by the push-pull of the 
global economy.  
 In parallel and intersecting with the above argument, Gaitskell and 
Gordon Walker made devastating speeches against the alleged racialism of the 
Bill. That the Irish were exempt from the CIB was considered by many to reflect 
the racist motives behind this legislation (Hampshire 2005). In the words of 
Patrick Gordon Walker 
“The net effect of the Bill is that a negligible number of white people will be kept 
out and almost all those kept out by the Bill will be coloured people. That is why I 
say that this is a hypothetical Bill, because that is the intention of it. The exclusion 
of the Irish makes all this blatant, obvious and undeniable” (Walker, col.709) 
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The reasons for this departure from the proposed CIB rules were that the Irish 
were useful workers who spoke the language, and that no one wanted to 
antagonize the strong pro-Irish element in Northern Ireland. Still, this legal 
anomaly provoked many Conservatives to speak out against the Bill in its various 
stages. These included: Nigel Fisher, Humphrey Berkeley, Sir Thomas Moore, 
Robin Turton, Lord Balniel, Lord Colyton (in the Lords) and John Biggs-
Davidson.  
 
Table 15. Coding form #4 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN1: Racial equality 
 
Setting Christian universalism 
 
Plot The Bill, in keeping with its most prejudiced supporters, limits its 
restrictions almost entirely to coloured immigrants, although white 
immigration has recently been at large. The Conservative Party, having 
once resisted demands for immigration control, has moved further and 
further to the Right against the counsel of its own intelligent economists, 
and out of all proportion to the actual figures of immigration.  
 
Characters Norman Manley (hero), Iain McCleod (hero), Harold Gurden (villain), 
Sir Cyril Osborne (villain), National Party of South Africa (villain) 
 
Moral  In a Christian society, we should take up this challenge in a morally 
universalist way, by welcoming foreigners who are coming into the 
country and bringing together all members of the community in ‘one 
body’. 
 
Frequency Walker (Lab) cols.706-09; Royle (Lab) cols.744-53; Howell (Lab) 
cols.757-65; MacColl (Lab) cols.772-79; Fisher (Con) cols779-88; 
Gaitskell (Lab) cols.801-02 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961 
 
In academia, the debate on the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was 
quickly lumped together in scholarly debates about the ‘normalisation’ of racism. 
But a closer look at the evidence, as we will see in this chapter, reveals how these 
simplistic conclusions are wide of the mark, ignoring numerous contradicting 
instances in which a principled stand was made against racism (see Table 15). 
Consider, for example, the speech of Widnes MP James MacColl. After warning 
the House about the already fragile state of the Commonwealth, MacColl 
speculated about the impact of the Bill in Africa: 
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“Dr. Verwoerd [Leader of South Africa’s National Party] and Sir Roy Welensky 
[2nd Prime Minister of Rhodesia] must be laughing their heads off. We preach to 
them about the monstrousness of discrimination against coloured people. But we 
have 1 per cent. coloured people in our population and they have perhaps 75 
million to 2 million. We have the impertinence to point the finger at them and say, 
"You should learn to live with your brown brothers."” (MacColl, col.777) 
More damningly still, Sir Cyril Osborne (a Tory nationalist) was alleged 
by some MPs to be a ‘fascist’ – a harbinger of a dangerous revival of white 
supremacism.  Labour MP Sydney Scholefield Allen, for example, compared 
Osborne’s choreographed campaign to that of Oswald Moseley (cols.716-17). 
Similarly, Charles Royle, ruthless in opposition to growing nationalist sentiment, 
asked the Home Secretary whether “[he] is proud that he has been moved by this 
combination of Tory reactionaries and Fascist thugs” (col.744). Note, too, the 
way in which – rather than announcing a simple defence of his policy position, 
effectively taking a passive role – Osborne defended himself and his ideological 
allies against the claim that their rhetoric bore any responsibility for racial 
prejudice: 
“I say with certainty, and I do nor apologise for saying it, that this control which I 
think is inevitable, and I think ought to have come much earlier, has nothing to do 
with coloured skin at all. It is due entirely to poverty and to numbers… In my 
opinion, had they faces as white as snow, their great numbers and their great 
poverty would have made control of their coming into this country inevitable.” 
(Osborne col.721) 
This does not mean to say that racism was absent from the Second 
Reading. On the contrary, there are a few examples in which racism reared its 
head in the Commons – most notably in the 1961 speech of Selly Oak MP Harold 
Gurden. Gurden’s main arguments were that Britain should not import the 
criminals, the sick or the feckless of the underdeveloped countries; that the 
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Welfare State was a ‘honey pot’ to people of poorer lands; and that Britain should 
not turn itself into a multiracial society. For example: 
“This flood of immigrants has set us back considerably. We hear all sorts of 
stories about how, in the coloured countries, the white man is told to go home, but 
we here are not allowed to tell the black man to go home… Crimes are not 
committed only by coloured immigrants, but those that are out of all proportion to 
the number of immigrants, and are of the worst kind—murder, rape, bloodshed, 
theft, dope peddling, sex crimes, and so on.” (Gurden, col.739) 
In view of this sort of comment, it is difficult to accept Sir Cyril Osborne’s 
assertion that race never entered into the equation. Despite all protests to the 
contrary, Gurden could never disguise his bias against black immigrants. Having 
said this, Gurden was fairly isolated in his campaign, shunned by the modernising 
Tories on his own side of the House, and snubbed by own Front Bench (Hansen 
2000). Osborne received similar treatment from the two Ministers of the Colonial 
Office: Henry Hopkinson and Alan Lennox-Boyd (Foot 1965, p.130) 
The 1960s had a definite transformational effect on race-relations in 
Britain. First, there was the geopolitical context: as documented by Frank Furedi 
(1998) in The Silent War, post-war Britain came under intense pressure from its 
former Colonies to tackle racism – and British diplomats, in turn, wanted to 
secure the allegiances of the newly independent Commonwealth countries. With 
the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, the Soviet Union renewed its long dormant 
interest in the revolutionary potential of the developing world. Nikita 
Khrushchev, leader of the USSR from 1953, was determined to mobilise the 
newly emerging and decolonialising nations against the West, intending to 
exploit the end of colonial empires. In the face of this geostrategic challenge, the 
West had to respond by suppressing its anti-immigration critics – even as a 
hegemonic pro-white identity and consciousness remained underneath. This point 
was made with pellucid clarity by Gaitskell (col.801), 
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“Perhaps the main reason why we hope [that the Commonwealth will survive] is 
that it is a multi-racial society and its first principle is non-discrimination in race 
relations. We think that is important, because when we look back for a moment it 
is fair to say that the whole of the future of the world will probably depend on 
whether people of different colours can live in harmony with each other. 
Therefore, this Measure as now put forward strikes at the very root of this 
principle.” 
Charles Royle (col.747) went even further than Gaitskell, arguing that “world 
peace will not be assured until everybody in the world is coffee-coloured”.  
In addition to the geopolitical context, there was the ideological context: 
the legacy of European fascism convinced many Church leaders of the need to 
fight racism in all its forms (Taguieff 2015). Ecumenists on both sides of the 
Atlantic were consistent in their demands for RACIAL EQUALITY (PN1). It is 
noteworthy that many Labour MPs in 1961 were influenced by ecumenical 
Protestantism of the Pauline “there is neither Jew nor Greek” variety. The 
statement of James MacColl (col.772) is typical in this respect: 
“I am not criticising the Bill from an ivory tower. I am not thinking that all 
immigrants are good, virtuous people and all the people who have difficulty with 
immigrants are bad, intolerant and racially prejudiced. I think that the present 
situation creates a challenge which in a Christian country should be taken up in a 
Christian way, by welcoming people who are coming into the area and bringing 
together all members of the community in one body. One's duty is not to try to 
keep them out but to make some effort to try to bring them together in harmony.” 
The term “universal brotherhood” loomed large in this narrative. Christian 
universalism dovetailed with the progressive desire for people to shed their 
national identities and unite in a pan-European or universal civilization. As 
Howell (co.765) explained, 
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“The question that was asked 2,000 years ago, which has been ignored on the 
benches opposite, is as relevant in this context today as when it was asked—"Am I 
my brother's keeper?"” 
Similarly: 
“In a Christian country… it is not the job of political leadership to decide its first 
priority on the basis of electoral advantage. The only decent basis for decisions by 
the Government is that of ethics and morality.” 
Stepping back and taking in the broader view allows us to see that, contrary to 
popular claims, the anti-racist movement won over fairly loyal support from MPs 
who shared coherent, deeply felt and in many cases legitimate concerns about 
how their governments and the West more generally had marginalised ethnic 
minority groups.   
  
3.1.8 POLITICS OF DECOLONISATION  
Given the histories of racism in both continental Europe and the British Empire it 
is perhaps unsurprising that opposition to the CIB was so impassioned. Most 
migrants from the former Colonies were racially distinct from the native 
population of the UK, and so opposition to immigration skated precariously close 
to racism. In Parliament, Gaitskell (cols.801-02) declared that the Bill was “a 
plain anti-Commonwealth Measure in theory and … a plain anti-colour Measure 
in practice”. 
Another major factor was the broader geopolitical and foreign policy 
interest. Attachment to Commonwealth, and a belief in Britain’s unique 
obligation as head of the largest Empire in the world, exercised a considerable 
influence on Tory and Labour thinking in the 1960s (PN7: SOFT POWER). As 
explained by Gordon Walker (cols.707-714), the essence of the Commonwealth 
was that the UK did not terminate its ties to her former Colonies but translated 
them into a continuing partnership. It was said in various speeches, for example, 
that Great Britain was the “mother country”, and that her position within the 
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Commonwealth was a matter of immense strategic importance. For example, the 
old Dominions were central to the UK’s economic and foreign policy; they 
contributed to its international prestige and influence; and they ensured the 
flourishing of the English language in an international arena (see Layton-Henry 
1984). The robustness of these privileged historical relationships is clearly 
evident in Table 16. 
 




Policy narrative PN7: Soft Power 
 
Setting Intergovernmental consultation; the European Economic Community 
(EEC) 
 
Plot The essence of the Commonwealth is that the UK continues to engage 
with its former Colonies in a mutually beneficial partnership. The 
damage – emotional, economic and political – that this Bill is likely to 
do to the already fragile fabric of Commonwealth can hardly be 
exaggerated. The extinction of the right of Commonwealth free entry 
will undermine Britain’s status as the ‘mother country’.  
 
Characters The Mother Country (hero), London Times (hero), Conservative Party 
(villain) 
 
Moral  “Soon we shall have to have new notices at our parts. One will say: 
"British, Irish, German, Italian and French—this way"; and the other 
will say: "All other aliens and Commonwealth citizens this way.” 
(Walker col.708) 
 
Frequency Walker (Lab) cols.707-714; C. Davies (Lib) cols.730-31; Lucas-Tooth 
(Con) cols.768-69; Fisher (Con) cols.778-87 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.649, cols.687-819, 16 November 1961 
 
Against this backdrop, Labour vigorously exploited the mishandling of 
the Irish provisions and the lack of consultation with Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers, and accused the government of capitulating to racial prejudice. At first 
the Irish were to be subject to controls so the government would be able to claim 
that the provisions of the Bill were colourblind. However, in the Second Reading 
debate the Home Secretary said that it was not practicable to include the Irish in 
the Bill and the Opposition gleefully argued that this undermined the “life-blood” 
of the Commonwealth. 
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Closely connected to this was the creeping Europeanisation of British 
politics, and the potential for similar distinctions among members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and citizens of the UK and 
Commonwealth (CUKC). According to Gordon Walker (col.711), “Australians, 
Canadians, West Indians and Indians will find that for the first time they are 
being investigated, detained and having to get vouchers under the discretion of 
the immigration officers”. The net effect of all this, Walker (col.711) 
hypothesised, would be the introduction of a “two-tier” immigration system: 
“Soon we shall have to have new notices at our parts. One will say: "British, Irish, 
German, Italian and French—this way"; and the other will say: "All other aliens 
and Commonwealth citizens this way.” 
In retrospect, Labour’s fury at the betrayal of a hitherto sacred principle 
seems largely symbolic, although it was extremely damaging to the government 
at the time. Labour’s amendment to the CIB criticised the government for giving 
excessive discretionary powers to the executive without adequate 
intergovernmental consultation. According to Randall Hansen (2000, pp.112-
113), Labour’s criticism was a legitimate one: “the colonies were not informed 
until early October, a few weeks before the bill was announced in the Queen’s 
Speech, and the government was not prepared to countenance changes.” On this 
matter, Walker (col.708) accused the Colonial Secretary of reducing the doctrine 
of Commonwealth consultation to “a nullity”: 
“I say this to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. This is an 
extraordinary and dangerous doctrine about Commonwealth consultation. The 
doctrine is, "If you are frightened of criticism, do not consult. Just inform, and 
give them no time to comment". It is the same thing as was done over Suez. This 
reduces Commonwealth consultation to a nullity. Yet it is the life-blood of the 
Commonwealth.” 
In other cases, MPs spoke of the UK’s moral responsibility, as a rich 
industrialised nation and former Colonial power, to protect and harbour those 
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fleeing from poverty (PN: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT).44 In Parliament, Hugh 
Gaitskell (col.800) declared that “[t]hey are still our Colonies. We are responsible 
for them”. Clement Davies, a Welsh politician and former Liberal Party leader, 
sought to corral the Commons into understanding what followed as being of the 
utmost gravity: 
“That has been said at the Dispatch Box by a representative of the "mother" of all 
these Commonwealth countries. It has been our proud claim that we have been in 
the position of the "mother country" towards all these others. Now that their 
people are driven from their homes because they cannot earn a decent living, the 
"mother" is prepared for the first time to close the door in their faces.” (Clement 
Davies col.729) 
The above excerpt is a classic example of a “redress for historical injustice” 
argument. According to this view, a generous immigration policy on behalf of 
persons from former Colonies is an appropriate means for the European nations 
and former colonial powers to compensate for colonial injustices. Accordingly, 
then, the UK has a moral obligation to try to do what it can to help 
Commonwealth citizens rather than to trying to restrict their entry. 
 
 3.1.9. THE END OF AN IDEAL  
The Third Reading in the Commons took place on 27 February, and became law 
on 1 June 1962. Although the Bill commended itself to the rank and file in the 
consistency parties, the strange bungling of the Irish question caused grave 
misgivings among the Conservatives in Parliament. Such anomalies played havoc 
with a group of liberal Tory MPs, who told Iain McLeod (the Leader of the 
House) that they would vote against the Bill on its Third Reading unless the Irish 
were included in the control provisions. Because of this, the Government 
eventually came up with a compromise: the Irish would be allowed in free, but 
Irish criminals would be subject to deportation procedure.  																																																								





3.2. Immigration Bill 1971 (Case study 2) 
 
3.2.1. BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS 1965-77 
Politically, the impact of Gaitskell’s intervention was enormous: the Labour Party 
was united for the first time since 1959 and this moved the party onto the front 
foot. The ferocity of the Opposition attack on the Second Reading, combined 
with the hard work of a few Labour MPs at the Committee stage, succeeded in 
achieving substantial concessions.45  
By the mid-1960s, however, the leaders of the Labour party did not 
sustain their opposition to immigration controls. In August 1965 the Labour 
government abandoned its commitment to MARKET GLOBALISM by abolishing 
‘Category C’ vouchers and imposing a quota of 8,500 a year on the recruitment 
of immigrant workers (Layton-Henry 1984, p.302). This cap was then followed 
by the introduction of a Second Commonwealth Immigrants Act in February 
1968, which placed British immigration policy on an overtly racial footing. The 
Act enabled a quota system to be imposed on Asian immigrants from East Africa 
who had retained British citizenship when Kenya became independent and were 
migrating to Britain as a result of racist attacks by the Kenyatta government.  
Although this policy reversal was tempered by manifesto commitments to 
legislate against racial discrimination, there is little doubt that the Labour party 
had effectively endorsed the entry restrictions it opposed so vigorously less than 
three years earlier. The two policies – a moratorium on further immigration and 
measures to combat racism – although logically distinct, can be seen as elements 
of a “twin-track strategy”. For every piece of anti-racist legislation adopted 
between 1965 and 1976, an accompanying immigration act either preceded or 
shortly followed its passage (see Table 17).  
 																																																								
45 For example, to placate the pro-Commonwealth lobby in Parliament, the 1962 Act permitted 
the entry of the dependents of workers, hence unintentionally transforming a migration pattern of 
mostly temporary workers into a permanent settlement of families. 
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Table 17. Immigration and race-relations record of both major parties, 1962-
1976 
Labour (in power) Conservatives (in power) 
Immigration White Paper 1965* 
Race Relations Act 1965 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 
Race Relations Act 1968 
Race Relations Act 1976 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 
Immigration Act 1971 
Ugandan Asian Act 1972** 
*Proposed both immigration controls and integrative measures. 
**Allowed the entry of British passport holding Asians who had been expelled from Uganda by Idi 
Amin. 
 
3.2.2. THE EVOLUTION OF LABOUR THOUGHT ON IMMIGRATION 
Why, then, did the Labour party suddenly reverse its stance on Commonwealth 
free entry? Why, with so few exceptions, did Labour candidates, many of them 
not averse to mentioning the issue in the past, abandon the globalist ideology so 
forcefully articulated in 1961? 
The reasons for this about-face are twofold. First, there was the 
unexpected death of Hugh Gaitskell in January 1963, which had a fundamental 
impact on Labour’s perception of the issue (Katznelson 1973, p.144). Gaitskell 
had been Labour’s principal advocate of unfettered immigration, and, with his 
death, the “main driving force of the Labour opposition to immigration controls 
disappeared”, creating the opportunity for a shift in policy under the new 
‘pragmatic’ leadership of Harold Wilson (Deakin 1965).46  
The second reason, however, is probably more relevant: political self-
preservation. Labour’s enthusiasm for Commonwealth free entry diminished 
after the traumatic events which occurred in the Midlands borough of Smethwick 
in 1964. During the General Election campaign, Labour’s shadow foreign 
secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker MP, lost his seat to Peter Griffiths, a 																																																								
46 Wilson, like Gaitskell, had sincere commitments to the Commonwealth and to overseas aid. He 
had always been keen to promote international development which, indeed, became a token of 
Labour’s commitment to moral cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, Wilson’s ideological allies – 
led by MPs Richard Crossman, Roy Hattersley and Frank Soskice – supported entry restrictions to 
allay the fears of the indigenous majority. 
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Conservative candidate who explicitly courted racist voters by raising the spectre 
of “voters in their turbans and saris” deciding the future of Smethwick (quoted 
from Telegraph 2013). With 7,000 immigrants out of a population of 68,000 and 
a worsening housing shortage, Smethwick was one of the first towns in Britain to 
come under strain through immigration. Sensing that a sharp turn to the “right” 
could win him the seat, Griffiths gained a political advantage by highlighting 
Gordon Walker’s outspoken opposition to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 
and his apparent indifference to the impact of immigration on Swethwick’s local 
economy. In the words of one political commentator (Telegraph 2013): 
“With a tight outcome expected nationally and locally, Smethwick attracted a 
media circus. As the scholarly Gordon Walker endeavoured to make up for having 
neglected his constituency, Griffiths exploited his own ability to galvanise an 
audience. While his campaigning embarrassed some Conservatives, embattled 
Tory MPs across the West Midlands saw it as a lifeline. On the day Griffiths 
ousted Gordon Walker by 1,774 votes. The “white backlash” also won the 
Conservatives Perry Barr and held several marginals, but a national swing to 
Labour installed Wilson with a majority of six.” 
The extent to which the outcome at Swethwick altered the Labour party’s 
perception of the immigration issue cannot be overstated. Opening the debate on 
the Queen’s Speech on November 3 1964, Wilson accused Griffiths of an “utterly 
squalid” campaign and castigated Sir Alec Douglas-Home for refusing to disown 
him. Then he provoked uproar by declaring:  
“If Sir Alec does not take what I am sure is the right course, and what the country 
will regard as the right course, Smethwick Conservatives can have the satisfaction 
of having sent a Member who, until another election returns him to oblivion, will 
serve his time here as a parliamentary leper.” 
The determination of the Labour government to avoid ‘another 
Smethwick’ grew as it became apparent that anti-immigration sentiment was 
growing in various parts of the country, notably the West Midlands, the West 
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Riding of Yorkshire and the Home Counties (Crossman, 1975 pp.270-1). 
Although Wilson had sincere commitments to the Commonwealth and to 
overseas aid, immigration restrictionism was accepted by him as a reasonable 
principle – and Labour identified itself more closely with the Tories’ basic 
position. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by the Labour 
politician Roy Hattersley who declared in a 1965 parliamentary address: 
“We are all in favour of some sort of limitation. We all wholeheartedly oppose any 
sort of discrimination. We all wholeheartedly agree that there should be 
assimilation or adjustment, whichever word one prefers to use. Those three points 
of view characterise the view and principles of both major parties” (quoted from 
Messina 1989, p.38) 
The apotheosis of this bipartisan consensus was the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act of 1968. The legislation prevented Kenyan refugees of Asian descent, who 
had been persecuted and expelled by a racist Kenyatta government, from entering 
Britain. Labour’s then-Home Secretary, James Callaghan, argued that it was 
“both urgent and essential” to extend controls to those who 
“did not belong to this country in the sense of having any direct family connection 
with it or having been naturalized or adopted here” (quoted from Consterdine 
2018a, ch.3) 
To his critics, Callaghan was clearly a racist who had ruthlessly exploited 
the issue for his own self-advancement. The London Times called it "probably 
the most shameful measure that Labour members have ever been asked by their 
whips to support". To his admirers, however, Callaghan took on a British 
establishment dominated by an ‘out of touch’ elite who had contempt for the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people. His cabinet colleague Richard 
Crossman recorded in his diaries: “Jim arrived with the air of a man whose mind 
was made up. He wasn’t going to tolerate any of this bloody liberalism.” Having 
achieved success in its strategy of creating a bipartisan consensus on 
immigration, the Labour government then proceeded to build on this in the sphere 
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of family reunification. Callaghan introduced a measure preventing British 
women living with their foreign or Commonwealth-born husbands in the UK. 
 
3.2.3. THE IMPACT OF POWELLISM 
Another highly significant development was the intervention of Conservative MP 
Enoch Powell, when he infamously made his ‘rivers of blood’ speech. Through 
apocalyptic warnings of interracial conflict, Powell tapped into and channelled 
powerful anti-immigrant sentiment which had not previously been given 
expression in mainstream politics. In April 1968 Powell declared: 
“Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, 
literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 
dependents who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the 
immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in 
heaping up its own funeral pyre.” (quoted from Hansen 2000, pp.183-85) 
A particular feature of Powell’s statements in 1968 was the use of 
personal anecdotes which suggested that the rate of immigration was out of 
control. He famously spoke about an elderly woman living on a Wolverhampton 
street where she was the only white resident. According to Powell, this 
constituent faced racial abuse from the predominant black community: she 
complained about ‘piccaninnies’ pushing excrement through her letterbox. The 
explicit language employed by Powell, in many ways more extreme than other 
speeches made by him in later years, served as a catalyst for a more wide-ranging 
attack on the political consensus. Even making allowances for the different time 
period and different historical context, Powell’s rhetoric was clearly designed to 
alarm and, when combined with his warning that there would be interracial 
conflict, became explosive: 
“As I look ahead I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the 
River Tiber foaming with much blood’” (quoted from Hansen 2000, p.185) 
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A common misconception about Powell’s attitudes towards immigration 
is that he picked up the issue when it appeared to be electorally profitable, and 
used it to his advantage, although he, personally, had no racial prejudice.47 In 
particular, Powell is accused of using his speeches to settle scores with 
Conservative leader Ted Heath, who won the 1965 leadership contest with Powell 
finishing a poor third. There is, however, a difficulty with this assumption: 
although he had a long-standing, hostile personal relationship with Heath, Powell 
instinctively favoured strict immigration control long before the issue ever 
dominated the agenda. The real source of the ‘rivers of blood’ came in Powell’s 
Walsall speech when he warned against ‘communalism’, describing it as ‘the 
curse of India’. As documented by Powell biographer Robert Shephard (2008): 
“Powell’s wartime military service had taken him to India in 1943, and there he 
developed a burning ambition to be viceroy. The word ‘communalism’ often 
sprang from the lips of British sahibs in justification of the Raj. Peter Brooke’s 
research finds Powell echoing this imperialist rationale in Delhi in 1945, when he 
noted that each Indian party was dominated by a communal group – Hindu, 
Muslim, Sikh, Untouchable and other minorities. Powell concluded that 
‘communalism’ ruled out self-government for India in the foreseeable future 
because individuals would not behave as rational voters or accept majority 
decisions if they were in a minority.” 
Although Powell abandoned imperialism, he never discarded his fear that 
immigration would introduce communalism, thereby undermining the UK’s 
commitment to constitutional order and liberty on which, he believed, its 
parliamentary system depended. For Powell, India’s caste system confirmed 
where communalism led.  
Politically, the effect of the speech was paradoxical. Overnight Powell 
was transformed into a folk-hero for many and a hate-figure for others. The 																																																								
47 The charge that Powell himself was racist cannot be reconciled with his parliamentary 
onslaught against a Conservative government in 1959 for having failed the Africans beaten and 
murdered at the Hola detention camp in British-ruled Kenya. 
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Conservative Party disassociated itself from Powell’s rhetoric while 
simultaneously identifying itself more closely with Powell’s basic position, 
pledging in their manifesto to give the Home Secretary “complete control over 
the entry of individuals into Britain”, promising that “there will be no further 
large scale permanent immigration” (Craig 1990, p.127).  
 
3.2.4. 1970 GENERAL ELECTION 
On the whole, Powell’s intervention hurt the Labour Party. The public rewarded 
the Conservatives at the 1970 General Election with an unexpected victory, 
gaining an estimated increment of 6.7 per cent in votes because many “perceived 
them to be the party more likely to keep immigrants out” (Studlar 1978, p.46). 
Despite his celebrity status, Powell spent the rest of his career as a back-bench 
MP – having been dismissed by Heath from the Shadow Cabinet. Nevertheless, 
Heath proceeded to fulfil the above manifesto commitment by introducing the 
Immigration Bill of 1971, which came into force as an Act on 1 January 1973. 
The extension of control over Commonwealth citizens applied to those who were 
seeking permanent admission on a working basis, as well as those who were 
already subject to some form of control. The main provisions of the Bill can be 
summarised as follows: 
i. First, work permits replaced employment vouchers, and ‘patrials’ (that is, 
people with close connections with the UK through birth or descent) were freed 
from all controls. 
ii. Second, the Bill repealed an automatic right for family dependents to join their 
husbands and fathers in the UK.  
iii. Third, family dependants could only be admitted if the husband/father was able 
to satisfy a ‘means test’ about his ability to provide accommodation and financial 
support. 
iv. Fourth, Commonwealth immigrants who had been resident in the UK for five or 
more years were liable to deportation if they committed a crime 
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v. Finally, the Bill included a number of modest provisions for voluntary 
repatriation.  
As shall be seen below, the motion was supported by Reginald Maudling 
(Home Secretary), John Hunt (Bromley), Harold Gurden (Selly Oak), W.F. 
Deedes (Ashford) and Patricia Hornsby-Smith (Chislehurst). Eight MPs spoke 
powerfully against the motion – including David Steel (Peebles), Roy Jenkins 
(Birmingham Stechford) and Renée Short (Wolverhampton North-East) The 
Shadow Home Secretary, James Callaghan (col.57), seemed to agree with the 
mover’s basic argument: “I am still of the opinion that we should avoid as far as 
possible political controversy between the parties on this issue”. What worried 
Callaghan was whether this single new system of immigration control was an 
improvement on existing arrangements.  
 
3.2.5. PATRIALITY 
Shortly after their victory in the 1970 General Election, the Conservative 
government sought to avoid a repeat of the Kenyan Asians crisis by placing 
migration control on a firmer, more circumscribed footing. The 1970 
Conservative manifesto, A Better Tomorrow (narrative setting), stated that 
“We will establish a new single system of control over all immigration from 
overseas. The Home Secretary of the day will have complete control, subject to 
the machinery of appeal, over the entry of individuals into Britain (quoted from 
Hansen 2000, p.192).  
Although the obsolescence of the British Nationality Act was recognised, 
the government felt unable to replace it with a new definition of British 
nationality. As Hansen (2000, p.193) discovered: “the legal complexities 
involved in the massive redefinition of the various citizenships created by the 
1948 scheme would incur the hostility of the Commonwealth governments”. 
Instead, the principle of patriality (right of abode) eventually provided the 
foundation for additional immigration controls. ‘Patrials’ – that is, people with 
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close connections with the UK through birth or descent – fell into one of three 
categories:  
i. citizens of the UK and Colonies whose parents or grandparents were born in the 
UK;  
ii. citizens of the UK and Colonies who, at any time, had been settled in Britain for 
a minimum of five years; and  
iii. any Commonwealth citizen who had a father or mother or grandparent born in 
Britain (the so-called ‘grandfather clause’) 
In the debate on the new rules, held on 8 March 1971, some MPs declined 
to support the Bill on the grounds that it secured more access for Old 
Commonwealth countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand while 
denying it to New Commonwealth countries such as India, Pakistan and Jamaica. 
Because of this, the ‘grandfather clause’ was knocked out of the Bill at its 
Commons committee stage by the combined opposition of the Labour party – 
which said it was ‘racist’ – and Enoch Powell who likened it to a Nazi law 
disqualifying Germans with a Jewish grandparent (‘Grossmutter nicht in 
Ordnung,’ ‘Grandmother not in order’). Still, the political incentives for 
supporting additional control (combined with the anticipated political and 
electoral costs associated with the failure to do so) impelled a majority of MPs to 









Policy narrative PN26: National unity 
 
Setting The 1971 Immigration Bill had its origins in the 1970 Conservative 
party manifesto, A Better Tomorrow, which promised a new 
conditional entry system.  
 
Plot Commonwealth immigrants who want to settle permanently in the UK 
come overwhelmingly from a different cultural background. The main 
motive behind this Bill is to avoid the risk of renewed racial tensions; 
and that such a resurgence would inflame community relations in 
Britain. 
 
Characters Conservative Party (hero), racism (villain) 
 
Moral  The Immigration Bill will make a positive contribution to race 
relations by allaying the fears of the white majority and thereby 
contributing to the acceptance and settlement of immigrants. 
 
Frequency Maudling (Con) cols.42-44; Powell (Con) cols.83-85; Hunt (Con) 
cols.92-96; Clarke (Con) cols.126-28 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971 
 
In future, the control of people coming to the UK for permanent 
settlement would be in the hands of the Department of Employment, as it had 
been for anyone not from the Commonwealth. The Department would continue to 
administer control on the basis of giving work permits to those people who, by 
and large, “can be seen to be making a contribution to the economic and social 
life of the country” (quoted from Maudling, col.56). The Home Secretary, 
Reginald Maudling, had made it clear that the main motive behind the Bill was to 
avoid the risk of interracial conflict (PN26: NATIONAL UNITY); and that such a 
resurgence would inflame community relations in Britain: 
 “I should start by stating that as a matter of general principle I believe that the 
most important problem that any Government have to face in this whole context is 
the problem of community relations and that the question of immigration policy in 
a sense is secondary or ancillary to that basic problem. We have a problem of 
community relations, as everyone knows. I believe that we in this country have 
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handled it as an example to the rest of the world, and I believe that we can and 
shall continue to do so.” (Maudling, col.42) 
A similar view was expressed by Enoch Powell, who framed the government’s 
policy as one of ‘responsible issue management’: 
“I wish to conclude precisely on that word "responsibility". Violent, bitter and 
personal though the differences of judgment may be in this House both about the 
nature and the future of the underlying problem, in this at any rate I believe we are 
at one, in recognising that what we do in legislation of this sort, in what we do on 
this whole matter, we are responsible not just for a Parliament, not just to the 
present, but to future generations.” (Powell, col.85) 
The previous bulwark against immigration control – a bipartisan commitment to 
the Civis Britannicus Sum – was no longer sufficient to resist the logic and force 
of the restrictionist argument. Frequently, NATIONAL UNITY was explicitly related 
to other problems such as a JOB DISPLACEMENT (PN14)48 and the impact of 
population growth on PUBLIC SERVICES AND HOUSING (PN16)49. According to 
John Hunt, a longstanding MP for the constituency of Bromley, the UK 
government was forced by a hostile and frightened public to impose immigration 
controls on citizens of colour:  
“My final and fervent hope… is that this Bill will be the last of its kind to be 
placed before the House for many years. I believe that it will succeed in its aim of 
controlling and containing the problem of coloured immigrants. I hope that from 
now on Parliament and politicians alike will devote their energies to more 
constructive tasks, to the building of bridges rather than to the construction of 
check-points and control posts. There is no doubt in my mind that the poison of 
race hatred can undermine and infect the very fabric of our national life and of our 
nation. (Hunt cols.95-96)” 
																																																								
48 See Gurden (Con) cols.109-112; 
49 See Deedes (Con) cols.101-04; Hornsby-Smith (Con) col.118 
		
147	
Piecing some of these speeches together equips the student of migration 
politics with two valuable insights. First, ideologies are importantly attached to 
social groups, not necessarily classes – and the vast majority of immigrants who 
wanted to settle in the UK came from different cultural backgrounds, so the task 
of assimilation was predicated on a collective right to shape the resident 
population. Second, British nationality law is generally based on a mix of ius soli 
(citizenship by territory) and ius sanguinis (citizenship by descent), and the right 
to pass one’s citizenship to descendents born abroad is generally accepted. 
 
3.2.6. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION 
A secondary consideration was the policy of voluntary repatriation. This 
commitment was dealt with in Clause 29 of the Immigration Bill, which allowed 
the British government to contribute toward the expenses of people returning 
abroad. Reginald Maudling (cols. 53-54) went on the record as stating quite 
clearly that voluntary repatriation would not be encouraged on a “large scale” and 
that any attempt to do so might in itself be damaging to race-relations: 
“Let me make clear what the Government intend to do. I do not believe in large-
scale repatriation. It is wrong because it would not work and the attempt to make it 
work would be enormously damaging to what I see as the real objective of our 
policy, namely, to improve community relations among people already here. That 
is why we do not intend to embark on a large scale programme of repatriation… 
How can we reconcile that with our desire to make one single community in this 
country?” (Maudling, cols 53-54) 
Maudling reiterated this point during a press conference accompanying the 
presentation of the Bill, and repeated it substantially during the debate: that the 
disposition to administer Clause 29 would be severely restricted; it would not 
apply to the overwhelming proportion of migrants in Britain. Maudling’s 
approach to the policy of repatriation had been a humanitarian one – that there 
may be instances of immigrant families who wanted to go home but could not 
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afford to do so (Maudling, col.54). That, essentially, was the government's 
thinking behind Clause 29.  
 Arguing against the Home Secretary’s watered-down interpretation of 
assisted repatriation, Enoch Powell told the House that without a fully funded 
repatriation scheme whole areas of Britain would be taken over by an alien 
population. Like many of Powell’s interventions, he skilfully exploited each of 
Heath’s speeches on immigration with a further (and more restrictionist) 
intervention chastising Heath for his betrayal of a serious manifesto commitment. 
In so doing, Powell could claim that he was simply articulating and explaining 
official policy. For example: 
“My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said at Ipswich in 1967:  Those 
immigrants and their families who wish to return home should be given every 
assistance to do so’.   
At Walsall in January, 1969, describing problems of immigrants disappointed in 
their expectations of life in Britain, he said: ‘They will wish to return to their 
countries of origin. We promise them generous assistance if they wish to do so.’ 
Nobody who listened to what the Conservative Party has said on this subject… 
could have supposed that there was any intention to limit the availability of 
assistance for any immigrant who voluntarily applied for it.”  (Powell, col.84) 
In sum, Powell regarded the restricted application of voluntary repatriation as a 
serious breach of what was understood to be a serious manifesto commitment. It 
was Powell’s belief that this aspect of government policy contained “a seed and 
germ of hope for the future” (Powell, col.85). Taking this metaphor a step further, 
Powell urged Maudling “not to tread down that seed and not to extinguish that 





The apparent absence of overt partisan conflict did not mean, of course, that there 
were no differences between the parties on immigration between 1964 and 1971. 
On the contrary, as we shall see below, it was precisely the persistence of these 
differences – albeit beneath the surface of electoral politics – which eventually 
guided the parties into a more adversarial position on issues of race and 
immigration.  
 
Table 19. Coding form #7 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN1: Racial equality 
 
Setting (i) Clause 29; (ii) evidence taken by the Select Committee on race 
relations and immigration (1969-70)  
 
Plot The terms of entry for white immigrants are considerably more 
generous than those for coloured immigrants. The partiality provisions 
grant rights to the grandchildren of persons who left the UK 150 years 
ago while denying them to the East African CUKCs. This exposes the 
racist intentions of the Bill. 
 
Characters Enoch Powell and Harold Gurden (villains) 
 
Moral  The Bill will make some nonwhite people feel, whether it be true or 
not, that they are second-class citizens. 
 
Frequency Powell (Con) cols.79-81; Bottomley (Lab) cols.89-91; Bidwell (Lab) 
cols. 96-100; Steele (Lib) cols.113-115; J. Fraser (Lab) cols.121-24; 
Torney (Lab) cols.143-44; Jenkins (Lab) cols.147-53 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971 
 
The Bill, as promised, placed Commonwealth citizens on the same legal 
footing as aliens. Non-patrial Commonwealth citizens were only allowed to enter 
the UK for six months and could only work with permission. The Bill would have 
no effect, however, on visitors to the UK; no effect on those who could support 
themselves financially; and no effect on Commonwealth students. The only effect 
would be on those who came to work permanently – immigrants who were 
already subject to some form of control. 
Yet, despite this liberality the Bill none the less contained a racial 
element. By sharpening the distinction between patrials and nonpatrials, for 
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example – and by tearing down the barrier between categories of alien and 
Commonwealth citizen – the I971 Bill eliminated all preferential treatment for 
the latter group. It also further distanced Britain from the normative principles of 
the 1948 BNA – the attachment to the traditional rights of British subjects. At the 
same time, however, the patrial clause was also criticised for its excessive 
generosity, particularly the possibility that one million Anglo-Indians could 
legitimately apply for British citizenship vis-à-vis the grandfather Clause 
(Callaghan, col.64).  
Put another way, the provisions of the Bill did not restrict numbers in an 
absolute sense; rather, it greatly extended the number of potential migrants by at 
least one million, but it did so in a highly discriminatory fashion. One could 
legitimately argue that the patriality provisions were designed to secure access for 
Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders while denying it to the rest of the 
Commonwealth. This underlying antithesis was captured well in the speech of 
John Fraser, a Labour MP for the London constituency of Norwood from 1966 to 
1997: 
“[The Home Secretary] must realise that race relations are very much a matter of 
confidence, understanding, trust and psychology. If he allows the Bill to proceed 
with these blatantly racial provisions, even though they are not intended to be 
racial, if he disregards the feelings of ordinary men and women, he will do a great 
disservice to race relations.” (J. Fraser, col.124) 
Although the provisions of the ‘grandfather clause’ would apply equally 
to all Commonwealth immigrant groups, the internationalist element in the party 
instilled in Labour a powerful opposition to anything suggesting racial prejudice; 
immigration control was associated, though briefly with such sentiment. This 
phenomenon – the stigmatisation, exclusion and marginalisation of certain 
themes as ‘racist’ – was an important part of the political process. Consider, for 





“I paid rapt attention throughout [Enoch Powell’s] speech, but it was only in his 
concluding remarks that he turned, in a fundamental way, to the theme which he 
first expressed in demagogic speeches outside the House but seldom expresses in 
speeches inside the House. Whatever we might say about this quaint old place, we 
cannot get away with demagogy, or lurid stories about wide-grinning piccanninies 
or human excreta through the letter boxes, because that is now old hat and racialist 
folk-lore piffle, and the whole nation realises it.” (Bidwell, col.96) 
The tone and language of Bidwell’s speech was exceptional, and the anger behind 
it reflected a general distaste on part for racial prejudice, one that was widely held 
within the party. If Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech signalled the potential for 
right-wing populists to exploit latent (and not so latent) public hostility to non-
white immigration, it equally affirmed in Labour minds the necessity of 
stigmatizating a certain narrower (or broader) range of anti-immigration 
arguments. Put simply, the boundaries of legitimate discussion were one of the 
crucial stakes of the debate, and that these boundaries changed over time in 
response to broader developments in the environing culture. 
 
3.2.8. SELF-RESTRICTED SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-
CONSENSUS FORCES 
Tough immigration controls, as discussed in Chapter 1, command widespread 
popular support but strict enforcement of the immigration laws may generate 
opposition from organisations, pressure groups and politicians concerned with 
protecting civil liberties – and, in addition, from the press and public opinion who 
may be concerned with the treatment of individuals on compassionate grounds 




Table 20. Coding form #8 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 








The 1971 Bill will adversely affect the lives of people who are already 
here for permanent settlement. Such persons will become subject to the 
new deportation clauses of the legislation; the deportation clause 
affecting family members is particularly objectionable.  
 
Characters Immigrant families (victims), race-relations (victim), excessive 
discretionary state power (villain)  
 
Moral  “Any attempt, such as the attempt in the Bill, to take things out of the 
hands of the courts, is an attempt to give power to make secret 
decisions, and is against the essence of democracy and the strength of 
this Parliament.” (Fraser, cols-141-42) 
 
Frequency Callaghan (Lab) cols.66-72; Steele (Lib) cols.114-15; Short (Lab) 
cols.135-38; H. Fraser (Con) cols.140-42; Jenkins (Lab) cols.150-53 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, cols.42-173, 08 March 1971 
 
The political hazards of tough enforcement were made dramatically 
apparent by the parliamentary response to Clause 3, which removed the automatic 
right for family dependents to join their husbands/fathers in the UK. Clause 
3(5)(c) was especially controversial because it allowed for the deportation of an 
immigrant’s family if this person committed a crime. Clause 3(5)(c) was 
contested by the trade unionist and former government Minister Roy Jenkins, 
who voiced concern that 
“In the hands of a Home Secretary more ruthless or more energetic than himself, 
this procedure could be used most dangerously and most damagingly. It is a totally 
unacceptable provision as it stands.” (Jenkins, cols.150-53) 
According to Hunt, such a power would fall most heavily on West Indian 
mothers:  
“One aspect which disturbs me is the proposal to ensure that when a man is 
deported, his wife and children under 18 should go with him. I ask the Home 
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Secretary to be flexible with this provision. We should remember that with West 
Indian families it is often the mother who is the dominant figure in the household. 
She is likely to have a greater influence over the family than the father. If the 
father goes off the rails, it is unfair to deport mother and children when she may 
very well be capable of maintaining a home for herself and her children.” (Hunt, 
col.94) 
In addition to this, the original Bill contained the requirement that 
Commonwealth citizens would have to register with the police. A number of 
backbenchers expressed reservations about the effect of registration on black-
white relations. Sceptics argued that the requirement would make it harder for the 
police and the leaders of ethnic minority communities to overcome their mutual 
feelings of distrust. This, in turn, would hinder the basic crime prevention duties 
of the police. In the words of Wolverhampton North-East MP Renee Short  
“[The registration proposal] will lead to some unpleasantness and some harassing 
and bullying of some immigrants in some areas by a minority of police. Some 
policemen will assume that any coloured person may well be here illegally, and in 
some areas a minority of the police may create difficulties for those who may have 
been here for 10, 15, or even 20 years…” (Short, cols.135) 
Many of these provisions, particularly those relating to deportation, were 
far stronger than those encompassed by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act ten 
years earlier. The liberal wing of the Tory Party – represented by the Bow Group 
and Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism – had been unhappy with the Bill 
from the outset, particularly its failure to uphold the checks and balances of a 
liberal democracy. This position was summarised by Tory moderniser Hugh 
Fraser, who argued for “more open government” and “greater certainty of the 
individual's rights” (cols.140-42). In Fraser’s assessment, the Bill was overly 
statist and authoritarian: 
“It is impossible for a Minister, surrounded by millions of decisions taken by 
growing myriads of civil servants, to be certain that he is taking the right step… It 
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is nonsense for my right hon. Friend to say that abuses of this sort can be rectified 
by Parliament; they cannot. They cannot be rectified by the "Nonbudsman" who 
lives in some mysterious office, with no powers whatsoever.” (H. Fraser, col.141) 
This was conjoined with the responsible exercise of power:  
“Any attempt… to take things out of the hands of the courts, is an attempt to give 
power to make secret decisions, and is against the essence of democracy and the 
strength of this Parliament” (H. Fraser, cols.141-42).  
This statement, in many ways more radical than others made by Fraser in later 
years, sought to address the complex balance between the centralisation of power 
and the decentralisation of competing checks and balances. That would be 
achieved by securing “the two lanterns that shine for democracy apart from this 
House – the lantern of the courts and the lantern of the Press” (H. Fraser, 
cols.141-42). Much of the argument in PN5 was therefore directed at constructing 






The issues discussed so far have been rather diffuse, but there are certain facts 
that emerge from the discussion, and I want to make them fully explicit: 
For many years after the introduction of the British Nationality Act in 
1945, the UK maintained an open border, and both political parties were reluctant 
to bring that situation to an end. David Maxwell-Fyfe, a former Home Secretary 
and Solicitor General, had declaimed for the Conservatives that “we are proud 
that we impose no colour bar restrictions… we must maintain our great 
metropolitan tradition of hospitality to everyone from every part of the Empire” 
(quoted from Joppke 1998). 
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By the late 1950s, this bipartisan consensus began to unravel. A campaign 
for immigration control gathered considerable momentum, because of the scale at 
which immigration took place, and because of the powerful and hostile reaction it 
elicited. The ‘new’ politics of immigration, at least in the years since 1961, has 
produced fundamentally incremental, piecemeal policy changes to restrictionist 
legislation. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in this chapter supports the 
claim that the campaign for control was driven by a political logic – a logic that 
superseded economic, imperial and humanitarian imperatives whenever these 
imperatives conflicted with SECURITY or ECONOMIC PATRIOTISM. Furthermore, 
in the process of becoming politicised, a new bipartisan consensus was forged as 
early as 1964. This consensus not only included an increasingly restrictive, anti-
New Commonwealth immigration policy, but also a series of progressively 
liberal race relations acts that accelerated the process of immigrant incorporation 





Toward Adversarial Politics: Migration Policy in 
the 1980s and 1990s 	
“The real problem is numbers. The British people never wanted a multiracial 
society. The bitterness is caused because they were never consulted. It was 
imposed on them by the political establishment.” 
                                                                                                               – Anonymous MP50 
 
“It is one thing for a well-heeled politician to preach the merits of tolerance on a 
public platform before returning to a comfortable home in a tranquil road in one of 
the more respectable suburbs.... It is quite another for poorer people, who cannot 
afford to move, to watch their neighbourhoods changing and the value of their 
house falling.” 
                                                                                                            – Margaret Thatcher51 
 
Between 1964 and 1975 the Conservative and Labour leaders followed an 
informal twin-track strategy. On the one hand, successive parliaments enacted a 
small mountain of restrictive legislation in an effort to discourage the arrival of 
new immigrants. On the other, positive measures were taken to punish 
discrimination and incitement to racial hatred. While this agreement endured, the 
party in government – whether Conservative or Labour – could expect a level of 
cooperation rarely enjoyed on other issues. In this chapter, we will examine the 
collapse of that bipartisan consensus. By 1978, the twin-track strategy began to 
unravel on three fronts: (i) first, immigration emerged as a partisan electoral 
issue, attracting considerable media attention; (ii) second, ideological 
disagreements between the major parties widened, provoking vituperative attacks 
from MPs; and (iii) third, for the first time since 1961 the major parties staked out 
divergent positions on immigration when changing electoral circumstances 
coincided with pressures from within the parties themselves.  
																																																								
50 Quoted from Messina (1989) p.130 




4.1. British Nationality Bill 1981 (Case Study 3) 
 
 
4.1.1 CROSS-PARTY CONSENSUS 1971-77 
The response of the major parties to the politicisation of migration in 1961 was to 
extricate the subject from the party-political arena. By the early-1970s the outline 
of a bipartisan consensus could be seen resting on two pillars:  
• tight restriction of New Commonwealth immigrants; coupled with 
• anti-discrimination legislation introduced in three ‘race relations’ acts of 
1965, 1968 and 1976 
This two-pronged approach was neatly encapsulated in Roy Hattersley’s 
formulation: “Without integration limitation is inexcusable, without limitation 
integration is impossible” (quoted from Hansen, 2000, p.26). First, there would 
be positive policies to aid in the assimilation and acceptance of migrant 
communities. Second, there were to be strict controls on entry, supposedly to 
match Britain’s capacity to absorb immigrants. This dual approach of 
restrictionism whilst challenging discrimination is what Shamit Saggar (1992) 
coined the ‘Hattersley equation’. 
Yet, despite the ordering of Hattersley’s equation, the resultant policy mix 
flowed in the opposite direction: cultural assimilation was predicated on the tight 
control of immigration. In this view, greater public tolerance flowed more or less 
automatically from the secure knowledge that large-scale immigration had ended. 
As Richard Crossman explained in Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Labour feared 
a rebellion from its working class ‘base’ if it persisted in a strongly pro-
immigrant policy: 
“Ever since the Smethwick election it has been quite clear that immigration can be 
the greatest potential vote-loser for the Labour party if we are seen to be 
permitting a flood of immigrants to come in and blight the central areas in all our 
cities” (quoted from Messina, 1989 p.36). 
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On the Conservative side, party leaders appeared to be adopting a softer 
approach to race relations within Britain, recognising that ethnic minorities were 
an established part of Britain’s future. Edward Heath’s compassionate response to 
the Ugandan Asian crisis of 197252, for example, compared well with the negative 
treatment of Kenyan Asians by James Callaghan in 1968. This was particularly so 
as the Heath government had substantially increased the number of vouchers 
available for Kenyan Asians (Hansard, 26 May 1971, cols 380-5). Meanwhile, 
the decision of the Conservatives not to oppose the Race Relations Act in 1976 
showed an awareness of the extent of racial discrimination and the need for tough 
measures to combat it. The Shadow Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, 
personally gave strong support to the Federation of Conservative Students’ 
campaign against racism in the autumn of 1977 and this, in turn, was buttressed 
by the party’s involvement in the Joint Committee Against Racialism (JCAR).53  
 
4.1.2 REPOLITICSATION OF MIGRATION, 1978-1981 
By 1978, the twin-track strategy began to unravel. The Conservatives’ more 
conciliatory approach toward ethnic minorities54 was accompanied by moves 
towards even tougher immigration restrictions than those envisaged in the 1971 
Immigration Act. Demands for an immediate reduction in immigration, for a 
register of family dependents, and for a new Nationality Act were symptomatic of 
																																																								
52 Idi Amin, the President of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, expelled approximately 80,000 Gujarati 
Indians from Uganda. Most of the expellees were accused of disloyalty, non-integration and 
commercial malpractice. 
53 The JCAR was formed in the autumn of 1977 and included the Board of Deputies of British 
Jews, the National Union of Students, the British Youth Council and leading immigrant 
organisations (Layton-Henry 1984. P.149). 
54 On the party-activist side, Conservative Central Office established an Ethnic Minorities Unit 
whose role was to educate party members about the growing electoral importance of Asian and 
West Indian voters and to influence party policy so that a more favourable party image could be 
presented to these voters. One of the first initiatives of the new unit was to create an Anglo-Asian 
Conservative Society and an Anglo-West Indian Conservative Society in order to recruit Asians 




this trend (Layton-Henry 1984, p.149). As discussed by Anthony Messina (1989) 
in Race and Party Competition In Britain, Conservative MPs began to abandon 
the bipartisan consensus around 1975 when Willie Whitelaw delivered a series of 
speeches over an eighteen-month period catapulting race to the forefront of 
British politics. In an address to the Conservative Party Annual Conference in 
1976, Whitelaw declared: 
“There will be those voices raised… condemning any rational discussion of 
immigration voices as racist… [However] no one is going to accuse us of any 
conspiracy of silence” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.127). 
Fifteen months later, the Conservative leader, Margaret Thatcher, expanded upon 
Whitelaw’s remarks in 1978, saying: 
“I think there is a feeling that the big political parties have not been talking about 
this [immigration] and sometimes… we are falsely accused of racial prejudice… 
Now we are a big political party. If we do not want people to go to extremes – and 
I do not – we ourselves must talk about this problem and we must show we are 
prepared to deal with it” (quoted from Messina 1989, p.128). 
Though she rarely spoke about the subject, Thatcher professed to be 
concerned that working-class voters might be attracted by the openly racist 
message of the National Front (NF) and that it was her duty to allay these voters’ 
concerns. Seen through this lens, Mrs. Thatcher’s reappropriation of Powellite 
themes could be construed as an attempt to reassert democratic political control 
over domains of life that were seen, plausibly enough, as having been 
depoliticized and de-democratized (that is, removed from the realm of democratic 
decision-making). As suggested in the above quotations, that may involve 
opposition to the stifling of debate – or what Willie Whitelaw called a 
“conspiracy of silence”. To be sure, Thatcher’s own views on immigration, as 
spelt out in her memoirs, appear to confirm this:  
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“It was part of my credo that individuals were worthy of respect as individuals, not 
as members of classes or races … I felt no sympathy for rabble rousers, like the 
National Front, who sought to exploit race … at the same time, large scale New 
Commonwealth immigration over the years had transformed large areas of Britain 
in a way which the indigenous population	found hard to accept.” (Thatcher 1995, 
pp.405-06) 
On its own, however, this explanation implies an unrealistic and highly 
magnanimous view of the political environment to which Thatcher was 
accustomed. The NF acquired some notoriety and a lot of publicity in the 1970s, 
but never won a seat on a local council never mind in the House of Commons. 
The UK’s ‘first past the post’ electoral system played a key part in this. Despite 
its massive increase in candidates from 90 to 303, the NF won only 0.6 percent of 
the total vote in 1979 compared with 0.4 percent in October 1974 (Layton-Henry 
1984, p.106). Left-wing countermobilisations by the Anti-Nazi League were 
particularly effective in their use of popular protest to spread the anti-racist and 
anti-fascist message among young people.  
Ultimately, Mrs. Thatcher was determined to impress the electorate that 
she was responsive to popular anxieties over immigration and that the 
Conservative Party would bring an end to Civis Britannicus sum. Moreover, 
Thatcher’s instinct on race relations was to reject existing policy consensuses. 
Whereas Labour MPs supported either reinforcing or more zealously enforcing 
the 1976 Race Relations Act, a majority of Conservatives advocated repeal or 
weakening of its implementation.  
The efforts of the major parties to repoliticise the campaign for control 
were at least partly responsible for the renewed attention paid to the subject 
during the 1979 GE campaign.55 Although much of the increased political 																																																								55	In contrast to February 1974, for example, when only 6 per cent of all Conservative candidates 
cited immigration as a campaign issue in their election addresses, fully one-quarter mentioned the 
issue five years later. In the case of Labour, from a mere 2 per cent of prospective MPs 
establishing race-relations as a campaign theme in 1970, this number escalated to 27 per cent in 
1979 and 28 per cent in 1983 (Messina 1989, p.128)	
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sensitivity of the candidates can be attributed to cues received from party 
headquarters, there is little question that MPs had opted independently to 
reconsider the migration issue both during and between election periods.  
 
4.1.3 1979 GENERAL ELECTION 
The Conservative victory in the General Election of May 1979 was won by a 
party committed to tough policies on immigration and more anxious to appeal to 
anti-immigrant voters. The number of work permits was reduced further (they 
averaged 10,000 to 20,000 a year from 1973 to 1989), and even the automatic 
right to bring in a foreign spouse was curtailed by the ‘primary purpose rule’, in 
which the prospective husband or wife had to prove that the main purpose of the 
marriage was not to gain access to Britain.   
Another indication of the emergence of adversarial politics was the low 
priority given by the government to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). 
In April 1980, five CRE commissioners were replaced: four of the seven black 
commissioners, and one of the eight white commissioners. No matter what the 
merits of the individual cases, the impression was created that “something of a 
purge of black commissioners was taking place and there were calls for potential 
black nominees not to accept places on the Commission” (Layton-Henry 1984, 
p.143).  
Thatcher’s personal instincts on race, as on several other issues, were to 
disavow existing policy consensuses. Her departure from the bipartisan consensus 
on immigration was evident in a pre-election interview she granted to Granada 
television in January 1978. Her reference to the ‘swamping’ of British culture by 
Pakistani immigrants was, as her related comments during the interview clearly 
demonstrated, a transparent effort to reappropriate Powellite themes: 
“If we went on as we are then by the end of this century there would be four 
million people of the New Commonwealth of Pakistan here… I think that is an 
awful lot and I think it means that people are rather afraid that this country might 
be rather swamped by people with a different culture… So if you want good race 
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relations, you have to allay people’s fears on numbers” (quoted from Goodhart 
2013) 
Allaying people’s fears meant, specifically, that the Conservatives would 
adopt a new Nationality Act – with the resultant Bill being published in 1981. 
Willie Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, hoped that by tying the right of abode 
and settlement in the UK to a clear definition of citizenship it would be able to 
make immigration control less arbitrary and less vulnerable to misinterpretation 
or legal challenge.  
 
4.1.4 THE ETHICS OF CITIZENSHIP: WHO BELONGS? 
To its detractors, the 1945 British Nationality Act (BNA) had become unduly 
expansive in granting citizenship to hundreds of millions of people with no 
territorial links to the UK. According to this policy narrative (PN31: 
RATIONALISATION OF LAW) the 1945 BNA prevented the British government 
from basing its immigration policy on an objective legal standard (see Table 21).  
 
Table 21. Coding form #9 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Public administration 
 
Policy narrative PN31: Rationalisation of law 
 
Setting Labour’s Green Paper (1977) on nationality 
 
Plot From 1948 onwards, the configuration of British nationality law 
reflected a colonial idea in a post-colonial era: it promoted the idea of a 
common citizenship with freedom of movement from the British 
Colonies. While this arrangement may have been laudable in 1948, it 
was disastrous in its long-term effect, because it removed any logical 
basis for the process of immigration control.  
 
Characters British government (hero), Roy Hattersley (villain) 
 
Moral  After the British Nationality Bill becomes law, it should be possible to 
say that most residents share a common legal identity that will in turn 




Whitelaw (Con) cols.935-45; Gardner (Con) cols.961-64; Powell 
(Con) cols.964-65; Lyon (Lab) cols.977-980; Stanbrook (Con) 
cols.983-85; Wilkinson (Con) cols.991-992; Marlow (Con) cols.1015-
17; Whitney (Con) cols.1020; Raison (Con) cols.1034-44 




Under the new British Nationality Bill (BNB), a British citizen would be a 
person who had a close personal connection with the UK either because their 
parents or grandparents were born, adopted, naturalised or registered as citizens 
of the UK. One of the most powerful arguments for this reform had been a legal-
rational one, and Sir Edward Gardner (Fylde South) had put it superbly in the 
1981 Second Reading debate: 
“One of the reasons why we must have a new nationality Bill lies in the 
extraordinary fact that there are so few people in this country, born here and living 
here, who would be capable of answering the simple question, "What is your 
nationality?" I suppose that most of us, because nationality depends upon 
citizenship, would be tempted to answer, "Well, we are British citizens, aren't 
we?" But we are not. We never have been.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 
28 January 1981) 
Seen through this lens, the privileges accorded to Commonwealth immigrants 
were a historic relic, an anachronism, which had lost their relevance in a world 
changed so dramatically by the fall of Empire. The remarks of one Conservative 
backbencher (Alexander Lyon) sum up the dissatisfaction of these MPs with the 
status quo: 
 “We have no duty – moral or legal – to the inhabitants of those countries that 
were formerly in the British Empire, and which threw off our sovereignty and 
repudiated their allegiance to the Queen. It was their choice. They were entitled to 
do so.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981) 
Although the Labour government in 1977 had already proposed such 
changes in its Green Paper, British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible 
Changes, the Bill the government presented proved to be highly controversial. It 




i. Full British citizenship for those with close ties, i.e., that were partial 
ii. British Dependent Territories Citizenship (BDTC) for people living in 
dependent territories i.e., Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and Hong Kong.  
iii. British Overseas Citizenship, a residual category to which almost no rights 
were attached. This category was designed to encourage East African Asians and 
Malaysians to acquire citizenship in their country of residence.  
One controversial proposal was that as a general rule British citizenship would 
descend only to the first generation of children born abroad to British citizens 
born in the UK. The Bill also proposed that children born in Britain whose 
parents were of uncertain status – for example, because of illegal entry or 
overstaying their period of residence – should not automatically be entitled to 
citizenship. These proposals attracted considerable opprobrium from legal 
groups, the churches and civil rights organisations like the Joint Council for the 
Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI).  
Yet, despite this liberal backlash the parliamentary Conservative party 
remained defiant. Tony Marlow’s remarks on the Nationality Bill were peppered 
with attacks on “socialist activists” and “woolly-minded clerics” (narrative 
villains), for example: 
“Socialist activists—the minnows that follow the whale that opened the debate on 
behalf of the Opposition—will also misrepresent the Bill and use whatever 
distortion or inaccuracy comes to hand as they unscrupulously trawl for support 
and for votes among the ethnic minorities… We have [also] heard quite a lot about 
woolly minded clerics whose adherence to impractical posturing is inclined, on 
occasions, to overcome their powers of rational analysis.” (Hansard HC Deb. 
vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981) 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Conservative MP John Stokes, a 
longstanding member of the far-right Monday Club: 
		
165	
“Those of us who wish that this Bill were much stronger in defence of the nation's 
vital interests will not look to the intellectuals, nor to the media, and certainly not 
to the churches, for help—particularly not the churches, because they have failed 
or given up the idea of trying to convert the heathen immigrant to Christianity” 
(Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981) 
In language which may astonish readers 30 years on, Marlow accused “racial” 
politicians of undermining the political process: 
“The racial politicians—I do not use the word pejoratively—of the community 
relations councils and, to a certain extent, of the [Commission for Racial Equality] 
—tend to make an enemy of the Government, no matter which Government are in 
power, in order to sustain their own interests and influence among those whom 
they seek to represent.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, col.1016, 28 January 1981) 
Why, then, did the Conservatives move in a more populist direction? 
Were there any arguments – used so forcefully in 1961 and 1968 – which were 
over-taken by events in 1981? In Anthony Messina’s (1989, p.144) view, the 
populist drift on immigration after 1975 was facilitated by the “political eclipse or 
generational replacement of those most responsible for the bipartisan consensus 
on race.” Messina is referring here to that segment of the party, especially in 
Parliament, that had lived, worked, or governed in Britain’s former Colonies and 
whose opposition had moderated the Conservative party’s movement toward 
restrictive entry policies. As Messina (ibid) observed, “By 1981 only nine 
Conservative MPs remained in the House of Commons of the rebellious faction 
which had voted against Labour’s 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.”  
 
4.1.5 INTERNAL PARTY DIVISIONS  
To summarise briefly, the main purpose of the Nationality Bill was to remove 
many of the lingering ambiguities in British nationality law and immigration 
rules so that both became less vulnerable to misinterpretation or legal challenge. 
Even Roy Hattersley, who took a principled stand against the Bill, recognised the 
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absurdity of offering British nationality to a large minority of the world’s 
population: 
“I do not suggest for one moment that a new nationality Act is not needed. The 
world has changed considerably since 1948, not least because of the wholly 
welcome process of colonies becoming independent nations. That process, as the 
Labour Government's Green Paper said, has left the law of nationality complicated 
and obscure.” (Hattersley, col.946) 
Perhaps most interesting in this regard had been the disagreements among 
Conservative MPs about the essence of British citizenship – and its links to 
NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). As already mentioned, the BNA proposed three 
categories of citizenship: British citizenship, citizenship of the Dependent 
Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. The aforementioned categories 
retained what Enoch Powell called a “rag-bag principle”: he described these 
categories as “a residuum that has been lumped together for purposes of 
convenience and designated as a citizenship” (Powell, cols.963-98). Sir Charles 
Fletcher-Cooke, a Tory MP for Darwen, concluded that: 
“There can be loyalty to Anguilla. There can be loyalty to Hong Kong. There can 
be loyalty to Britain. But to create a second class of British citizenship over this 
amorphous area is to deprive people of the kind of loyalty to which they are 
entitled – the feeling that they belong (Fletcher-Cooke, col.977). 
The issue of allegiance played an important role in intra-party debates 
about access to citizenship for immigrants and their descendants. The refusal to 
grant birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants was often justified on 
the grounds that these children will gain another citizenship at birth – citizenship 




“[Allegiance] is the very essence of nationhood, there is no meaning in nationhood 
without allegiance. Nationhood means that a man stands to one nation, to one 
loyalty, against all others—that is what it is about.” (Powell, col.967) 
Framed through a metanarrative of SECURITY, the plot of PN26 is consistent with 
the following statements:  
• The duty of allegiance should be inherent in the notion of nationality, and no 
society can remain cohesive in the long-term unless that proposition is accepted; 
• The BNB proposes three categories of citizenship that spread all over the world, 
and into countries which vary in size, structure and cultural makeup; and  
• Such an amorphous area is not compatible with the inherent obligations of 
allegiance that lie at the foundation of national status. 
As illustrated in Table 22, neo-nationalist MPs feared that a threefold definition 
of nationality would create divisions, even conflicts, in the UK. On this view, the 
state is entitled to the citizen’s complete loyalty, allegiance and emotional 
attachment. 
 




Policy narrative PN26: National Unity 
 
Setting The United Kingdom is one of the few countries that does not directly 
link nationality law with citizens’ rights and responsibilities. 
 
Plot Nationality law is concerned with the full relationship of the individual 
with the state – duties and responsibilities balanced by rights and 
privileges. The existence of those rights, however, should at least be 
derived from and founded upon some notion of allegiance. 
 
Characters Dual citizenship (villain), social cohesion (victim) 
 
Moral  The duty of allegiance should be inherent in the notion of nationality. 
No society can remain cohesive in the long-term unless that 




Powell (Con) cols.964-68; Fletcher-Cooke (Con) cols.975-77; 
Stanbrook (Con) cols.983-54; Proctor (Con) cols.996-999; Budgen 
(Con) cols.1003-1005 
 




A secondary consideration was the right to dual citizenship. In Powell’s 
view, dual citizenship “erodes a sense of allegiance to a common sovereign”, and 
“enables people to travel on two passports and, thereby, to evade immigration 
controls” (cols.963-98).  Discussions of dual citizenship were almost always tied 
to discussions about migrant workers from the Republic of Ireland. Irish 
immigrants were not regarded as British subjects but were nevertheless accorded 
the right of settlement. As noted in Chapter 3, the Irish exemption had powerful 
political and economic considerations on its side, chief of which was substantial 
support from the Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland. Some MPs on the Tory 
Right, however, demanded exclusivity and attachment to a single state, which 
was readily linked to a military context. “If we are to retain our cohesion”, 
Harvey Proctor warned, “…it would be unwise to create in the Army 
circumstances similar to those that existed at the time of the Curragh mutiny in 
1914” (cols. 996-999). Proctor, a member of the right-wing Monday Club, took it 
as self-evident that the citizen-soldier should be committed to a single state. 
 
4.1.6 CIVIC NATIONALISM 
Throughout the twisting and turning over the allegiance issue, two aspects of the 
Conservative attitude to citizenship and race offered liberals some 
encouragement. The first was the party’s constant insistence on coordinated 
Government measures for assisting immigrants in the UK, and for special 
Government funds to further that purpose. 
The second aspect concerned racial identity and national belonging. This 
theme was underlined in a speech from Sir Edward Gardner, the Conservative 
MP for Fylde South. ‘Britishness’, in Gardner’s view, is defined by a dense 
network of relationships and associations. What is at stake is a person’s ability to 
maintain and develop a rich and highly particular set of human ties. For 
Gardener, therefore, national identity is shaped by cultural traditions, not on 
concepts of common ancestry or race: 
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“Nationality and race are not two sides of the same coin. They are two different 
coins altogether. Those who try to introduce race into a debate on nationality are 
producing a dangerous mixture. They are like people who are prepared to risk 
pouring petrol into an oil stove. There is likely to be an explosion. Race is 
something that can be poisonous, harmful and damaging to a country. Nationality, 
with which we are now dealing, is a subject that can be of undoubted advantage to 
everyone living in this country.” (Gardner, col.961) 
Although the very idea of nationality implies exclusion of those not 
entitled to it, there is no sense in which the British Nationality Bill, as entrenched 
in naturalisation policy, is an ethnically exclusivist one. All immigrants from the 
Colonies arrived with full citizenship rights; all immigrants from independent 
Commonwealth countries who arrived before 1962 acquired citizenship 
automatically after one year; and all immigrants since 1971 have been able to 
acquire it after five years. The underlying principle here is that British citizenship 
cannot be tied to ascribed characteristics like race and/or ethnicity. 
Still, no political system is without its dissenters and this has been true for 
Britain as for any other political system despite her reputation as a stable 
parliamentary democracy with an emphasis on moderation and consensus. Sir 
John Stokes, who was MP for the Midlands seat of Oldbury and Halesowen, used 
his allotted speaking time to genuflect on the glories of bygone days. Stokes (his 
hero was Disraeli, and he was a prominent member of the Primrose League) 
entertained a vision of Britain in which “ordinary Englishman still clings 
obstinately to his Englishness and to the old, known ways” (col.988). Unlike 
Gardner, Stokes wanted a Nationality Bill nested in a discourse of blood, family, 
kith and kin (PN35: RACIAL SELF-INTEREST):  
“The Bill seems to suppose that all or a large part of the human race is much the 
same in thoughts, habits, customs, religious beliefs and ideals as those who have 
lived here for centuries and have shaped their destiny on the world's stage. I do not 
believe that people are digits or are all the same to be dealt with in this way. 
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That great English Jew, Disraeli, said that race was everything, and he was right. 
But race and racial origin are not mentioned in the Bill, and John Bull becomes a 
very shadowy figure indeed” (Stokes col.989) 
It must be borne in mind that, politically speaking, Stokes is an extreme 
example. Although he admired Mrs Thatcher personally, he had become 
increasingly disturbed by the new ‘meritocratic’ style of the modern Conservative 
Party. Among other things, Stokes urged Mrs Thatcher to start creating hereditary 
peerages ranging from dukes to barons “to remind the public of the glorious part 
the nobility has played in the history of England.” This rival thesis placed Stokes, 
unsurprisingly, in a small minority of MPs. 
 
4.1.7 THE RE-EMERGENCE OF PARTISAN DIVISIONS 
The British Nationality Bill marked a turning-point in another sense. Labour 
politicians and CSO organisations reacted, in the main, antagonistically to the 
Bill. Although the Labour party was itself committed to a revision of the 
nationality law, Hattersley gave the Bill a very hostile reception: 
“[The Bill] has nothing to do with the principles of nationality. It has simply to do 
with numbers, with the size of the pool. We are even back to the same pathetic, 
watery metaphors, to "swamping", in the Prime Minister's phrase—talk about 
pools, about numbers, about size, about immigration control, and nothing to do 
with principle” (Hattersley, col.950) 
The opening section of Hattersley’s speech also went on the attack, fulfilling Ad 
Herennium’s injunction to ‘make our adversaries unpopular’: 
“I have spent the past 15 years telling my black constituents that they were equal 
before the law. I must now tell them that, if the Bill is passed, the law will 
discriminate against them.” (Hattersley, col.951) 
Despite the fact that many of the Conservatives’ proposals were 
foreshadowed in Labour’s 1977 Green Paper, Hattersley’s response to the BNB 
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was one of condemnation of the Conservative government (narrative villain) and 
support for various civil society organisations, including legal groups, the 
churches, ethnic minority organisations and civil rights groups (narrative heroes). 
Hattersley had decided that an adversarial approach should be adopted by the 
Labour opposition against the Conservatives on all issues which related to race-
relations and immigration.  	








PN1: Racial equality 
 
Setting Race relations 
 
Plot The Bill represents the final victory for racists because it attaches a 
higher priority to excluding people from countries of non-European 
origin while at the same time opening the doors wide to six million 
patrials from the white Commonwealth. 
 
Characters Commission for Racial Equality and Church of England (heroes), 
Timothy Raison (villain) 
 
Moral  The British Nationality Bill should be drastically amended to provide a 
citizenship based on equal rights and objectively defined principles. 
From that statement of nationality, a non-discriminatory immigration 




Hattersley (Lab) cols.946-54; Steel (Lib) cols.958-61; Freeson (Lab) 
cols.971-75; Bidwell (Lab) cols.987-88; Thorne (Lab) c.990-91; Morton 
(Lab) cols.996; McTaggart (Lab) cols.1007-1008; Ennals (Lab) 
cols.1011-13; Marshall (Lab) cols.1013-14; Sever (Lab) cols.1017-18; 
Richardson (Lab) cols.1018-20; Dubs (Lab) cols.1024; Tilley (Lab) 
cols.1027-33 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, cols.935-1047, 28 January 1981 
 
This was first major parliamentary test for Hattersley since becoming 
Shadow Home Secretary in 1980. Together with John Tilley, the opposition 
spokesman for race, immigration and nationality, Labour’s frontbench had 
considerable experience of the problems facing immigrant families, since both 
MPs represented inner city constituencies with substantial numbers of immigrant 
electors (Mr. Hattersley represented Birmingham Sparkbrook and Mr. Tilley 
Lambeth Central). In addition to being more liberal then their immediate 
predecessors, both men quickly evinced a predilection for speaking out against 
the “numbers game”. As Tilley articulated it: 
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“We must stop playing the numbers game. We believe that racial tension in this 
country is not caused by the number of black faces; it is caused by the number of 
racists.” (Tilley, col.1032) 
Tilley’s verdict was echoed by Liberal Party leader David Steel, who claimed that 
the Nationality Bill was an attempt “to massage our nationality legislation to suit 
immigration policy” (cols.958-61). Similarly, David Marshall, a former MP for 
Glasgow East, claimed that despite assurances to the contrary “the Bill seeks to 
marry citizenship to the needs of immigration control” (Marshall, col.1013). In a 
pithy formulation that married pathos with Atticism, Steel put the nub of his 
argument in Biblical terms: 
“The Prime Minister is fond of quoting St. Francis of Assisi and misrepresenting 
the parable of the Good Samaritan. I would commend to her an older text in the 
Book of Leviticus: When an alien settles with you in your land, you shall not 
oppress him. He shall be treated as a native born among you, and you shall love 
him as a man like yourself". Because the Bill falls far short of that standard, we 
shall oppose it.”  (Steel, col.961) 
Reginald Freeson, a former editor of the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight, went 
further than Steel, arguing that the new classification system would disadvantage 
the black community and give corresponding advantages to the indigenous white 
population: 
 “As the years go by, we seem to sink lower as we try to accommodate prejudice 
instead of standing foursquare against it, exposing it for what it is. Instead, racial 
discrimination is tolerated and legitimised by successive immigration laws and 
practices. We speak of good race relations but then proceed to damage them by 
such legislation as this.” (Freeson, col.974) 
 These verbal commitments were reinforced in Labour’s 1982 Programme 
and in its 1983 and 1987 election manifestos, which offered: (i) the repeal of the 
1981 Nationality Act; (ii) the repeal of the 1971 Immigration Act; (iii) the 
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introduction of ‘contract compliance’; (iv) the establishment of independent and 
balanced adjudication panels to hear immigration appeals; and (v) extension of 
the investigatory powers of the CRE (Messina 1989, p.136). Such, indeed, was 
the level of dissensus that Whitelaw’s outline of a comparatively liberal 
Nationality Bill prompted David Marshall (col.1014) to reply that “the Bill 
represents the final victory for racists in this country.”  
Taking in a broader, diachronic view allows us to see that, contrary to the 
popular claims of the racialisation scholars, the anti-racist movement had won 
over fairly loyal support from MPs who shared coherent, deeply felt and in many 
cases legitimate concerns about anti-immigrant racism. As summarised by 
McTaggart (col.1008): “The notion of belongers and non-belongers… has been 
seen throughout the world as an attempt to discriminate among British subjects 




Another controversial area was the relationship of the BNB to the RULE OF LAW 
(PN5). From the beginning of the Thatcher administration in 1979 there was 
unanimous agreement in the House of Commons that British nationality law had 
become increasingly complicated and obscure, not least because of the process of 
decolonization.  
Yet, despite this cross-party consensus, Labour attacked Whitelaw for 
increasing the powers of the state and for withdrawing the right of abode to 
would-be British citizens. As coded in Table 24, MPs on both sides of the House 
talked about the rights of British citizens, and whether or not all British citizens 




Table 24. Coding form #12 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN5: Rule of law 
 
Setting Human rights 
 
Plot The British Nationality Bill confers on dependents the right to live 
nowhere except at the discretion of the host Government in the country 
in which they happen to be at present. It is also a citizenship that 
cannot be transmitted to children born overseas except at the discretion 
of the Home Secretary.  
 
Characters Home Secretary (villain), non-citizen spouses (potential victims), 
children born overseas (potential victims), aged dependents (potential 
victims) 
 
Moral  It is quite wrong that a person’s future – and, by extension, the future 
of that person’s family – should be decided by a civil servant's 





Hattersley (Lab) cols.951-53; Steel (Lib) cols.958-59; Freeson (Lab) 
cols.972-73; Lyon (Lab) cols.980-82; Wilkinson (Con) cols.992-94; 
Morton (Lab) cols.994-96; Lyons (Lab) cols.1000-02; Lestor (Lab) 
cols.1005-06; Marshall (Lab) cols.1014-15; Tilley (Lab) cols.1028-29;  
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.997, cols.935-1047, 28 January 1981 
 
Perhaps the most controversial proposal in the Bill was the so-called 
character test, which built in more discretionary powers for the Home Secretary.  
Despite the BNB’s comparative normalcy (the requirement of ‘good’ behaviour is 
interpreted essentially as obeying the law, and exists everywhere in Europe), 
defenders of automatic inclusion, such as Hattersley, spoke ominously about 
investigations into each immigrant’s ‘contribution’ and how well integrated they 
were into their local community. This process, Hattersley feared, would likely to 
lead to the persecution of migrants from minority ethnic or religious 
backgrounds. Using a reductio ad absurdum, Hattersley argued that the ‘good 





“For my part, I do not believe that a West Indian in my constituency, unemployed 
and poor, who has smashed open the gas meter is necessarily of worse character 
than the Minister of State, who stopped that man's family joining him in this 
country.” (Hattersley col.952) 
Although much of the movement of the Labour party on immigration after 
1979 was a consequence of the highly partisan, combative style of Thatcher’s 
leadership, there is little question that Labour headquarters had been under 
pressure for some time to break with the ‘Hattersley equation’. These pressures 
primarily emanated from party-linked pressure groups such as the Labour Party 
Race Action Group (LPRAG) (Messina 1989).  
Important, too, was the rise of the belief that the Bill was racist and in 
reality an immigration control bill dressed up as a Nationality Bill. The latter 
critique was a legitimate one; the former, less so. Unlike in a majority of 
European states, the implementation of the BNB’s naturalisation process would 
not involve lengthy interviews or evidence-gathering procedures. Nevertheless, 
Labour’s opposition to the Bill was unrelenting, both at the Second Reading and 
through the early part of the Committee stage. Reginald Freeson accused the 
Government are seeking to confer massive executive powers on Ministers: 
“The Government are supposed to be committed to reducing the power of the 
State, but the Bill gives the Home Secretary more power, not less, over the lives of 
individuals. It helps to destroy the myth. No doubt the Government, supported by 
their Back Benchers, will introduce other legislation to confer more executive 
powers on Ministers so that they will not have to refer their actions and decisions 
to Parliament. The myth has gone” (Freeson cols.972-73). 
Other criticisms levelled at the Bill concerned the removal of the 
automatic right to citizenship by birth in the UK. Tilley was of the firm view – 
and it is one entirely in line with what legal philosophers call ius soli (‘the right 
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of the soil’) – that all individuals born in the UK to someone legally resident in 
the country should register automatically as a British citizen: 
“The full horror of the measure is illustrated in clause 1(2)… It says that an 
abandoned new-born baby will be deemed to be a British citizen. That means that 
parents who have any doubt about the nationality of their new baby can resolve 
that doubt only by leaving the child in a basket on the doorstep of the registrar of 
births, marriages and deaths.” (Tilley, col.1027) 
The Bill also proposed that children born in Britain whose parents were of 
uncertain status – for example, because of illegal entry or overstaying their 
period of residence – should not automatically be entitled to citizenship. 
Although the UK government had been a signatory to the UN Convention on the 
reduction of statelessness, the ever-widening definition by the courts of ‘illegal 
entry’ meant that a child who was eligible for citizenship at birth could later lose 
that citizenship if his or her parents were judged, retrospectively, to have entered 
illegally.  
 
4.1.9 COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRATION AND LABOUR 
Through the 1979 election the Labour Party kept scrupulously quiet over the 
immigration issue, and, after the election, occupied itself with arguments over 
defence and public ownership. It was not until Whitelaw’s motion in January 
1981 that Labour re-thought its basic position and came to the same conclusions 
as Hugh Gaitskell in 1961. Against this backdrop of political re-alignment, 
Labour proposed five amendments to the Nationality Bill:  
i. Use of objective criteria for the granting nationality and a right of appeal against 
refusal;   
ii. A guarantee that no child could be born stateless as a result of the Bill;  
iii. A commitment to continue the existing civic rights of Commonwealth and Irish 
citizens resident in the UK;  
iv. A citizen’s right to a passport; and 
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v. A guarantee that all children born in Britain should automatically be British.  
Outside of Parliament Hattersley promised that an elected Labour 
government would make amends for the ‘mistake’ of the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act which restricted the immigration of British passport-holders 
resident in East Africa. In addition, Hattersley made a number of other 
commitments, including the repeal the 1971 Immigration Act. Taken together, 
these proposals were the most expansive posture either major political party had 
ever adopted on immigration since 1961 (Messina 1989). 
There is no record of any explanation for this departure from the 
‘Hattersley equation’. One might argue that the transition from government to 
Opposition had a dramatic effect on policy: e.g., gone are the practical constraints 
on policy implementation, such as the need to maintain a parliamentary majority. 
Furthermore, in Opposition, the mass Labour party (and especially the NEC) no 
longer had to compete with civil servants for the major influence on frontbench 
policy.  
Having said this, the postulation of a one-to-one relationship between 
ideology and institution has produced considerable blindness to the relative 
autonomy of political actors. As briefly noted in section 4.1.8, the Labour Party 
Race Action Group (LPRAG) contributed to increased public visibility of race-
related issues and placed these on the national agenda (Messina 1989, pp.141-42). 
Like the Conservative Monday Club, the LPRAG advocated throughout the 
1970s that the bipartisan consensus on immigration had to be terminated. 




4.2. Asylum and Immigration Bill 1995 (Case Study 4) 
 
As with the disintegration of most policy consensuses, the breakup of the 
Conservative and Labour parties’ understanding on migration yielded political 
winners as well as losers. Perhaps the chief beneficiary of renewed party 
competition has been Labour’s ethnic minority constituency (Messina 1989). The 
political advantages gained by non-whites as a consequence of Labour’s 
commitment to implement less restrictive immigration rules are clear and require 
little further comment. Two less obvious consequences of party competition, the 
greater globalist ethos within the PLP and the political mobilisation of anti-
asylum forces within the Conservatives, will be analysed in this section.  
 
4.2.1. POLITICISATION OF ASYLUM 
With the 1990s came a new dilemma for the political elite: the so-called ‘asylum 
crisis’. As a result of inter- and intra-state conflicts worldwide, people across 
many nations were fleeing their countries in fear of persecution, and subsequent 
asylum applications to Britain challenged the very system upon which it 
depended. It did so for three reasons:  
i. first, because it is one of the few areas in which national sovereignty is still 
meaningfully restricted;  
ii. second, because most Convention signatory states have articulated lengthy legal 
procedures that make subsequent appeals procedures time consuming and 
expensive; and  
iii. third, because deportation is extremely difficult.  
In a cycle that mirrored the experience of several other European 
countries, the British asylum system developed a huge backlog: displaced 
refugees were coming directly to Europe from conflict zones in Somalia, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Sri Lanka and the Balkans. As the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees commented: “in our view, the rise in asylum claims may be more 
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rationally seen as a consequence of the unprecedented scale of global conflict 
which produces refugee flows” (quoted from Straw, col.717). Similarly, the 
Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw claimed that 
“The end of the cold war was of huge importance in reducing the prospect of 
thermo-nuclear conflict, but since its end, the world has in many ways become a 
much more dangerous place. Let us look at the areas of internal disruption and 
civil war, and consider the trend in the figures. Look at Algeria, the Sudan, 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and, of course, Nigeria. As conflicts develop, so 
the number of applications for asylum shoots up.” (Straw, col.717) 
What can be called the ‘asylum crisis’ of the 1990s marked the collapse of 
the legal-bureaucratic reforms pursued by each party controlling the centre after 
the early 1960s. Only a minority of those whose asylum applications were 
rejected got deported; tracking down and deporting individuals was expensive 
(often, asylum seekers destroyed documentation in order to prevent their return); 
and source countries were reluctant to take individuals back without 
documentation. Furthermore, whatever difficulties asylum seekers may have had 
in reaching a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention, once they arrived and 
claimed asylum they were entitled to certain rights: to the processing of the claim 
and, in Britain, to housing, social support, and legal advice. 
As the political saliency of asylum seeking increased, so, too, did the 
government’s efforts to restrict it. Three (major) parliamentary acts on asylum 
and immigration were established under British governments of the 1990s. These 
included: 
i. Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 
ii. Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 
iii. Immigration and Asylum Act 1999  
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to examining the major ideological 
themes of the 1995 Asylum and Immigration Bill, and some related boundary 
areas. To do full justice to the legislative framework would require an 
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investigation beyond the capacities of any one scholar. Unavoidably, the author's 
guiding hand in that selection is in quotations and, as with any scholarly 
interpretation, other viewings of the same transcript might well result in different 
examples.  
 
4.2.2. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
The study of asylum policy is both simple and complex. It is simple because the 
1951 Convention on Refugees is a pre-eminent treaty in International Relations, 
extensively articulated and amplified, and a familiar component within the legal 
framework of the UNHCR. It is complex because its permeation into binary 
categories, both ‘bogus’ and ‘legitimate’, ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, makes its 
unravelling difficult, and because its diffusion has led to an extraordinary range 
of policy tools.  
Britain is perhaps the most complex and fascinating European case study 
in asylum policy. The core contradiction of the contemporary European asylum 
scene is nowhere more evident than in the Second Reading of the Asylum Bill: 
against the legal-humanitarian imperative for accepting refugees stood a political 
process under the sway of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION and SECURITY, which 
commanded increasingly tough and exclusive stances toward asylum applicants. 
The most controversial and far-reaching of the Clauses included: 
• Clause 1 permitted an accelerated appeals process if the grounds for a claim did 
not fall within the remit of the 1951 Refugees Convention. 
• Provisions in schedule 2 established a time-limited window for rejected to 
appeal against deportation. 
• Clause 8 disincentivised illegal economic migration to the UK. Employers had 
to ensure that their workers produced one of a range of documents before their 
employment could begin.  
• Clause 9 restricted entitlement to social housing.  




Naturally, those distinctions between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ 
refugees are far from clear-cut. Economic migrants from poorer countries, in 
particular, may appear indistinguishable from their refugee counterparts. The 
permutations of distinguishing a ‘genuine’ asylum seeker from a bogus one in 
these philosophical terms are intriguing, but also legion, and there is insufficient 
space in this work to do so. Suffice it to say, however, the methodological 
adherence to dichotomous presentation is itself a common feature of the debate 
on asylum. As coded in Table 25, much of the discussion during the Second 
Reading bore upon the legislative proposals contained in Clauses 1, 9 and 10: the 
extension of the accelerated appeals procedure; removal of certain in-country 
appeal rights; and withdrawal of social security benefits.  	
Table 25. Coding form #13 
 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Public administration 
 
Policy narrative PN29: Law enforcement 
 
Setting Rise in asylum applications 
 
Plot The Asylum and Immigration Bill is a firm but fair response to the 
problem of illegal immigration. Powers of search and arrest will be 
expanded to include unauthorised workers and those who overstay 
their visas. It will also increase the powers available to immigration 
officers, while denying social security benefits to fraudulent asylum 
seekers.  
 
Characters Genuine asylum seekers (victims), bogus asylum seekers and human 
traffickers (villains) 
 
Moral  A firm but fair asylum system will involve a readiness to identify 




Howard (Con) cols.699-711; Lawrence (Con) cols.732-33; Baker 
(Con) cols.741-42; Wardle (Con) cols.747-50; Carlisle (Con) cols.759; 
Deva (Con) cols.768-70 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995 
 
Accompanying the aforementioned measures, the Bill erected a wide 
variety of institutional and legal barriers designed to keep asylum seekers away 
from Britain’s labour market. These included: employer sanctions, the 
introduction of new immigration offences and the ‘fast-tracking’ of manifestly 
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unfounded applications (which included applications by people arriving from 
third-safe countries and applications based on forged or destroyed documents). 
For Michael Howard, the Conservative Home Secretary, traditional mechanisms 
distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate refugees were failing: 
“[The AIB will] enable us to certify a claim openly based on poverty rather than 
persecution; or fraudulent claims, such as that by the Ethiopian teenager claiming 
that his mother had disappeared after arrest, but whose parents turned out to be 
living safely at home and in well-paid state employment; or that by the large group 
of Pakistanis who claimed asylum because of membership of the Pakistan People's 
party and who appealed against refusal of their applications even though that party 
had since become the Government of Pakistan.” (Howard, cols.699-71) 
Many of the instances cited in the evidence above appear to be minor, but no 
doubt irritating, examples of asylum applicants ‘pushing their luck’ or ‘gaming 
the system’.  
Laid against these restrictions were measures designed to make life as a 
refugee in Britain less attractive: the Bill removed access to welfare benefits for 
‘in-country’ asylum applicants, as opposed to applications made at the point of 
entry such as an airport. Under Howard’s leadership, the influence of 
communitarian thinking allowed greater emphasis on the moral relevance of 
communities and the rights and responsibilities of individuals within them – in 
comparison with Labour’s emphasis on MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM. In such 
terms, failed asylum seekers are ‘illegitimate’ members of the community of 
legitimate receivers of state benefits. As Howard put it: 
 “Some have suggested that this is an immoral Bill. I reject that utterly. It is not 
immoral to protect our asylum procedures against the current massive level of 
abuse. It is not immoral to declare that, in our judgment, the conditions in some 
countries do not give rise to a serious risk of persecution. It is not immoral to insist 
that people arriving from other safe countries should return to pursue their claims 
there. It is not immoral to seek to protect employment opportunities for those 
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entitled to live and work here, and it is not immoral to combat racketeering.” 
(Howard, cols.699-71) 
The most dominant political tendency by the Conservative government 
had been the pursuit of the political ‘centre ground’. When dealing with a divisive 
issue which had to be addressed in order to demonstrate the party’s 
responsiveness, these had to be given a positive, humanitarian spin. For example, 
the Howard administration’s response to the ‘asylum crisis’ was to adopt a more 
welcoming attitude to genuine refugees. As Carlisle (col.759) put it, “Having 
been granted UK passports, [refugees] see others waltzing in on an illegal ticket, 
overstaying their welcome and staying here for many years.” The essence of this 
position was perhaps best summarised by Nirj Deva, the former Tory MP for 
Brentford and Isleworth:  
“The Bill protects the interests of one particular group about whom we have heard 
not a word from Labour Members—those who are genuine asylum seekers. 
Genuine asylum seekers are stuck in a huge queue of people who are not genuine 
asylum seekers. They are in a state of limbo. They are left hanging around and no 
consideration is given to their prosperity or their prospects. That is the Bill's first 
consideration.” (Deva col.768) 
The administrative managerialism which had gained an important influence in 
Conservative discourse in the early 1990s thus acted as a considerable ideological 
brake on the emergence of a full-blown Tory organicism (see below) which, 
allied to a policy of economic protectionism, would have taken the party’s 
intellectual Right a good way towards national populism.  
 
4.2.3. SOCIAL COHESION 
In addition to concerns about the impact of asylum seekers on LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, discussions of asylum in 1996 were also tied to concerns about 
NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). As a ‘social justice’ doctrine, immigration 
restrictionism is by no means coherent or comprehensive. Nevertheless, in its 
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British context, and especially in the hands of Michael Howard, it could be 
approximated to a new Welfare State nationalism, stressing the necessity to be 
‘firm but fair’. 
 





Policy narrative PN26: National unity 
 
Setting Rise in asylum applications 
 
Plot The operation of good race relations involves the rooting out of bogus 
asylum seekers and the deportation of unauthorised workers. If illegal 
immigrants and fraudulent asylum seekers are tolerated – and even 
encouraged – race relations will be jeopardised, and ethnic minority 
communities will suffer. 
 
Characters Michael Howard (hero) 
 
Moral  Far from endangering good race relations, the 1995 Asylum and 
Immigration Bill will help ethnic minority communities by tackling 




Brooke (Con) cols.723-24; Baker (Con) cols.739-40; Wolfson (Con) 
cols.773; Marlow (Con) col.778 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995 
 
The assumptions underlying the government’s approach at this time were 
similar to those of previous Tory governments. The first assumption is that states 
have an absolute right to determine which noncitizens should be allowed to enter 
and remain within the state’s territory. 
A second assumption is that Britain is relatively prosperous in world 
terms, so it is very attractive to asylum seekers, particularly those from the 
developing world. 
A third assumption underlying immigration and asylum policy is the 
importance and effectiveness of border controls. Immigration restriction is thus 
necessary to manage ‘diversity’ in the national interest, and, in particular, to 
prevent the rise of popular opposition to immigration due to fears of threats to the 
hard-won benefits of the Welfare State. Nicholas Baker, a junior minister at the 
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Home Office, claimed that the failure to enforce these rules would have serious 
‘repercussions’ for community relations in Britain: 
 “As means of communication, travel and information spread, more people seek to 
go to countries where there is stability, prosperity and the rule of law. The 
Government would be irresponsible not to address these issues and tackle the 
magnetic package of social security benefits, housing and jobs which is exerting a 
strong pull today on economic migrants from countries in east Europe, Africa and 
elsewhere in the third world.” (Baker col.740) 
It was this dual dynamic – the activation of social security benefits by the 
liberal democratic polity, combined with severe constraints on deportation – that 
led Howard to impose restrictions on the “magnetic package of social security 
benefits”. As hypothesized by Baker, these measures would go some way toward 
improving community relations: 
“Differences in race and colour matter a great deal less in Britain than they did, 
but numbers matter very much indeed. They matter regardless of race and colour; 
they matter because this is a relatively crowded island; they matter because of the 
pressure on the British taxpayer; they matter because of the importance of keeping 
our communities, diverse as they are, together as Britons.” (Baker col.740) 
By seeing the ‘racial threat’ in more generalised economistic terms, however, the 
Tory philosophy of restrictionism became divorced from the more overt racism 
employed in the rhetoric of Enoch Powell: 
“Changes in population put a strain on that task. There is no escaping the fact that 
those strains threaten good race relations. Any responsible politician who cares 
about our country and our people—of all ethnic groups—must accept that numbers 
have to be restrained, and firm and fair immigration controls are essential. Leaders 
of ethnic minorities understand that and, privately, say so.” (Baker col.740) 
A more striking contribution to this discussion came from an unexpected 
source: Tony Marlow, a former Chairman of the UK Palestine All Party Group. 
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Marlow made the argument that good community relations are linked inexorably 
to policies that restrict immigrant numbers. Marlow went further than his 
colleagues, however, by arguing that politicians needed to revaluate their simple 
belief in human progress. Out of fear of adding fuel to anti-immigrant sentiment, 
politicians were refraining from mentioning the negative features of 
multiculturalism, singling out only the positive ones as if there was no connection 
between a culture and the assimilability of a diaspora. In Marlow’s (col.778) 
words, 
“We may succeed in developing an adequately integrated coherent and tolerant 
society for 10 years or for 20 years, but in perpetuity? For our grandchildren's sake 
it is wise to assume that we may not succeed. The only safe course is to pursue 
today what will doubtless appear to be cruel and ruthless policies, otherwise there 
is a real risk that this country will face several urban Yugoslavias. The alternative, 
if we do not take strong action, could yet be undreamt of and unimaginable 
barbarism.” 
Marlow’s awareness of this possible failure of the assimilationist model was 
linked thereafter to “dangerous divides in our cities”:  
“I have one further point and I do not know how to describe it other than to say 
that it is racist. The dangerous divides in our cities will be between the white 
British and the Asians, not the West Indian community. The time must come to 
stop immigration from the sub-continent. Quite properly, families will wish to 
reunite but it must he done at the place of original family origin and not here 
because it is too dangerous for all of us. I know that that must sound monstrous 
and cruel, but sometimes it is necessary to take strong action. Sometimes it is 
necessary to be cruel in order to be kind. Frankly, the alternative is terrifying. 
(Marlow col.778)” 
In the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, therefore, the Powellite warning 
of impending racial conflict appeared increasingly pertinent to populist MPs such 





To develop a point already made in Chapter 2, Britain has a long and 
distinguished tradition of receiving refugees, which long pre-dates the 1951 
Geneva Convention. Nineteenth century Britain was well known for accepting 
political dissidents such as Karl Marx and Giuseppe Mazzini; and larger groups 
of refugees have also been accepted at different times: Huguenots in the 17th 
century, Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe in the late 19th century, and then 
again in the 1930s from Germany. 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, Britain’s tradition of hospitality 
and asylum fell victim to the zero-immigration imperative (see Table 27). As 
noted above, the Asylum and Immigration Bill 1995 set out to remove appeal 
rights for those deemed to have come through a ‘safe-third country’, and it 
expanded the number of cases that could be dealt with through fast-track 
procedures. In such cases, applicants have one opportunity to appeal to an 
adjudicator within ten days of the appeal’s filing.  	
Table 27. Coding form #15 
 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN3: Human development 
 
Setting Internecine conflicts in Somalia, Sudan, the Balkans and Niger Delta 
 
Plot  Long before the UN came into being, the UK had a proud and 
honourable tradition of asylum. Tragically, this Government has 
abandoned its special responsibility to the protection of human life. 
Britain must honour its own history and retain an asylum system that is 
just and humane.  
 
Characters Conservative Party (villain), failed asylum seekers (victims) 
 
Moral  Restriction on the right to appeal, the removal of asylum seekers to 
safe-third countries, and the denial of social security benefits will cause 




Straw (Lab) cols.711-12; Alton (LD) cols.737-39; Lester (Lab) 
col.754; Grant (Lab) cols.755-56; Cunningham (SNP) cols.760-62; 
Abbott (Lab) col.766; Corbyn (Lab) cols.770-72; Henderson (Lab) 
cols.789 




In view of the diffuse character of recent population displacements, one 
could legitimately argue that the introduction of the Bill was necessary. Yet, the 
removal of the automatic right of appeal was vehemently opposed by Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats. Other criticisms of the Bill related to the removal of 
asylum seekers to safe-third countries; the denial of social security benefits; the 
introduction of new immigration offences; and employee sanctions. For Labour, a 
major dilemma of refugee policy was how to reconcile popular demands for 
restriction with a parallel, inherently unpopular, mandate to protect the human 
rights of refugees. 
Accordingly, a key characteristic of the Second Reading debate was its 
rhetorical and structural conflation with immigration policy. In a demonstration 
of this, Islington MP Jeremy Corbyn rejected the distinction between “economic” 
and “political” asylum seekers, stating 
“Conservative Members ask why so many people seek asylum here. They 
continually draw a distinction between economic and political asylum seekers, but 
that distinction is difficult to draw in many cases. Anyone who stands up against a 
regime that imposes a structural adjustment programme that means cutting 
education, health, social services and rural development in favour of export-led 
growth automatically becomes a target for political oppression by that regime and 
is often forced to seek asylum.” (Corbyn, col. 771) 
Since the mid-1960s the Labour party, both in government and in 
Opposition, had generally espoused immigration policies as tough as those of the 
Conservatives. Between 1981 and 1996, however, there were influential voices 
pressing for a reassessment of immigration and asylum policy. Commenting on 
the ‘white list’ of third-safe countries, Corbyn argued that it is not always easy to 
differentiate between ‘migrants’ and ‘asylum seekers’. Armed conflict, political 
instability and state persecution often overlap with, or may be provoked or 
aggravated by, economic marginalisation and cuts to public spending. In other 
words, the distinction between voluntary and involuntary population movements 
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is not always as clear and definite as it may appear to be. Surveying the 
development of British asylum discourse, Hackney MP Dianne Abbott accused 
Conservative Members of ‘sneering’ at economic migrants: 
“People come here because they are driven by poverty and economic instability of 
a sort which, fortunately, no one in this country has to face. So let us take the 
issues seriously and not sneer at people for short-term political advantage.” 
(Abbott, col.766) 
Another criticism levelled at the Bill concerned the withdrawal of social 
security benefits from failed asylum seekers. These benefits included child 
welfare, social housing, council tax relief and income support. In opposing the 
Measure, children’s rights campaigner Joan Lester raised the spectre of a new 
“sub-culture of dispossessed people” (Lester, co.754). Similarly, Labour MP Jack 
Cunningham opposed the Bill because it would lead to increased homelessness, 
insecurity and impoverishment: “In effect, it appears that the Government intend 
to starve people out of the country” (Cunningham, cols. 761-62). Attacking the 
political elite’s kowtow to illiberal opinion, David Alton, a devout Catholic, 
exclaimed:   
“The Bill should be judged against those Judaeo-Christian principles, which were 
designed for the whole of humanity. It fails to uphold an ancient duty that 
stretches back 3,500 years. It looks tawdry and disreputable. It deserves not to 
succeed. I and my right hon. and hon. Friends will be in the Lobby tonight to vote 
against the Bill and in favour of the amendment.” (Alton, col.739) 
Many asylum seekers who had arrived in Europe since the early 1990s 
had come not simply to escape poverty, but frequently to flee from danger. 
Notable examples included: political repression in Nigeria and Zimbabwe; civil 
war and insurgency in Sri Lanka; conflict and persecution in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; and, most vividly, the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991 and 
subsequent civil war. There is therefore a deep-lying tension within the politics of 
asylum between a ‘Judeo-Christian’ logic, which seeks to transcend geography, 
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culture and political difference, and a more contingent, ‘communitarian’ logic 
that seeks to draw on the role of hierarchy, relationships and belonging.  
 
4.2.5 PROBLEMATISING ASYLUM SEEKERS	
A broader issue involved the relationship between the politicisation of asylum 
and racism. It is not possible in the last few pages to establish whether asylum 
legislation ‘normalised’ racism or, as the government claimed, improved race-
relations. The issue is likely to be contestable. It is worth noting, however, that 
for all the arguments made about the State’s role in legitimising racism, attitudes 
to ethnic minorities in Britain have improved considerably since restrictions were 
first applied in 1961. Having said this, the claim that the Asylum Bill is formally 
racist was taken as self-evidently true by a number of Labour back-benchers (see 
Table 28). 
 
Table 28. Coding form #16 
 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN1: Racial equality 
 
Setting Clauses 8, 9 and 10 of the Asylum and Immigration Bill 
 
Plot The Bill is not what we need to foster strong community relations; nor 
does it constitute the kind of approach that will stand the test of time. 
The Bill's employment provisions will have a disproportionately 
negative impact on the black and Asian community, including non-
asylum seekers.	
 
Characters Andrew Lansley (villain), Conservative Central Office (villain) 
 
Moral  The best way to tackle the problem of illegal immigration is not by 
enacting inhuman and potentially racist legislation, but by tackling the 





Straw (Lab) cols. 721-23; Hattersley (Lab) cols.726-29; Kaufman (Lab) 
cols.742-47; Grant (Lab) cols.756-57; Abbott (Lab) cols.766-67; 
Corston (Lab) cols.775-77; Khabra (Lab) cols.778-80 
 
Source: Hansard HC Deb. vol.268, cols.699-808, 11 December 1995 
 
The argument presented here is that the Bill has racial prejudice built right 
into it; there is discrimination in the social security provision; there is 
discrimination in the treatment of applicants; there is discrimination in the 
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consideration of documentation, and there is discrimination in the interviewing 
procedures. Attacking the Tories’ alleged opportunism, Jeremy Corbyn 
exclaimed:   
 “I oppose the Bill as a dreadful piece of legislation guided by xenophobia and 
appealing to some backward populism which the Conservatives think will win 
them an election in 15 months' time. It smacks of the classic Conservative 
approach—if there is a problem, blame the victim. The Bill blames people for 
seeking asylum in Britain.” (Corbyn col.770) 
Accusations of “xenophobia” and “backward populism” revealed a 
dilemma at the heart of asylum-control policy: if controls are imposed, they have 
to be directed against the major sources of political instability and armed conflict, 
which happen to be (predominantly) in non-white and non-European countries. 
Jack Straw (cols.721-23) took a similar view when he argued that 
“As the Prime Minister said, huge numbers—especially of Asian and Afro-
Caribbean British citizens and residents—are bound to feel "unsettled" by this 
measure—by its gratuitous breadth and by the extravagance of its powers.” 
References to asylum by Labour politicians were inescapably influenced by their 
reaction to the negative experience of World War II. Post-nationalist MPs 
interpreted this global catastrophe as an experience that finally, and irrevocably, 
morally negated the legitimacy of populist discourse and of exclusionary policies 
forged around national identity. The statement of British Labour politician Gerald 
Kaufman, who served as an MP from 1970 until his death in 2017, was 
paradigmatic in this respect: 
“Let me also say to the hon. Gentleman [Michael Howard], in every good spirit, 
that he reminds me of the Germans in the late 1930s who believed that racial 
discrimination would never hit them… He is like the German Jews in Berlin who 
thought that they were all right, but in the end they came for all the Jews, and in 
the end they will come for everybody in ethnic minorities.” (Kaufman, col.749) 
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The above example is an instance of the ‘slippery-slope’ argument, in 
which a certain position is established, which through the inexorable application 
of logic will transform itself into another (often undesirable) position. From this 
Niemöllerian position, a moral emerges that interprets race relations in a 
particular idea-environment. By legislating policies against asylum seekers, it is 





To summarise, the Conservative government of 1979-1996 was firmly in 
command of both its immigration and asylum policies. Even with respect to the 
latter, the government’s high rate of application refusals (see Messina 2007, ch.4) 
coupled with the fact that Britain accepted fewer asylum seekers than the 
European average, confirms Gary Freeman's (1994, p.97) argument that “the 
British experience demonstrates that it is possible to limit unwanted 
immigration.”  
As discussed in chapter 3, the mixture of immigration control and anti-
discrimination legislation (the so-called Hattersley equation) was maintained in 
the 1960s and 1970s so that the acts of controlling immigration in 1968 and 1971 
were followed by anti-discrimination acts in 1965, 1968 and 1976. The 
restrictionist demands of opponents of multiculturalism were met by tough 
immigration control policies, and the demands of liberals and the Left for racial 
equality and the outlawing of racism were met by the anti-discrimination laws.  
Ultimately, however, both sides were left dissatisfied. The Right’s 
opposition to Britain becoming a multicultural society was frustrated, as high 
total fertility rates, family reunion and the right of asylum led to rapid 
ethnocultural change despite tough immigration controls. This, in turn, led to a 
‘populist moment’ in the parliamentary Conservative party, facilitated by the 
support of this stance among a majority of Conservative members and their newly 
elected leader, Margaret Thatcher.  
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In contrast, the liberal inclinations of the PLP influenced the party to 
adopt globalist policies on immigration, race and asylum – policies which often 
repudiated its past record. By 1981 the eclipse of the Conservative party’s liberal 
wing on immigration, combined with Labour’s interest in securing the ethnic 
minority vote, induced each party to recast its immigration policies in the light of 
these changed political circumstances. The major parties, for the first time since 





Consensus Without Consent: The Depoliticisation 
of Migration 	
“[The] 21st century will not be about the battle between capitalism and socialism 
but between the forces of progress and the forces of conservatism… The old 
prejudices, where foreign means bad. Where multi-culturalism is not something to 
celebrate, but a left-wing conspiracy to destroy their way of life.”   
                                                                                                                  – Tony Blair56 
 
“Part by accident, part by design, the Government had created its longed-for 
immigration boom. But ministers wouldn’t talk about it. In part they probably 
realised the conservatism of their core voters: while ministers might have been 
passionately in favour of a more diverse society, it wasn’t necessarily a debate 
they wanted to have in working men’s clubs in Sheffield or Sunderland.” 
                                                                                                               – Andrew Neather57 		
The election of New Labour in 1997 marked a dramatic shift in British political 
discourse and policy practice relating to immigration. Historically for Britain, and 
comparatively across Europe, Labour’s reforms were an unprecedented policy 
reversal – moving from “severe restriction” in 1997 to active “encouragement” of 
immigration in 2002. Couched in a narrative of migration management, these 
policy reforms signified a new approach to immigration based on the supply and 
demand of skills, and above all embracing the value-added contribution of 
international students. Put simply, 1997-2010 was an unprecedented period of 
immigration policy-making, which both broke with the past and set the stage for a 
fully-fledged ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 2004). More tellingly, perhaps, the co-
operation of the Conservative party and its acceptance of the general outlines of 
‘managed migration’ visibly reflected a new bipartisan consensus.  
																																																								
56 Quoted from Guardian (1999) 
57 Neather (2009) 
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5.2. Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill 2002 
(Case Study 5) 
 
5.2.1 POLICY AFTER 1997: THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE YEARS	
Writing in 1994, Gary P. Freeman famously described Britain as a ‘deviant case’ 
in Western European migration policy. For over three decades, successive British 
governments had managed to combine a neoliberal approach to the flow of goods 
and capital with effective limits on the flow of migrants. As outlined in Chapter 
3, policy-makers imposed increasingly restrictive controls on the movement of 
non-EU migrants while, on the other, creating a legislative framework to outlaw 
racism. 
Since then, both policy and policy outcomes have reversed sharply. The 
Labour government of 1997-2010 increased the number of work permits issued 
(see Table 5.1), quintupled the number of international student visas, increased 
the uptake of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and changed the default 
position of many categories of applicant. More striking, asylum applications 
exploded, rising from 28,000 in 1993 to just under 100,000 in 2000 (Hansen 
2004). 
 
Figure 3. Work permits issued per year 1947-2005  
 




By the time Labour left office in 2010, a reluctant country of immigration 
had been transformed into a fully-fledged ‘migration state’ (Hollifield 2004). 
This was the defining breakpoint between Britain’s post-war bipartisan consensus 
of ‘zero immigration’ (Freeman 1994) and today’s political framework of 
managed migration.  
In explaining the UK’s new openness to immigration, Professor James 
Hollifield (2004) emphasises the country’s economic strength in the 1990s, the 
emergence of sector-based skills shortages, and the fear of international 
competition from the US and the rest of Europe. This emphasis is important 
because it is a story about national ‘competitiveness’ rather than human rights. 
Notable policies included: 
• The trebling of working permits from 47,000 in 1997 to 156,000 in 2004; 
• Fast-tracking of work permits in 90% of cases – removing the possibility of any 
serious examination of the application; 
• Allowing anyone with sufficient points to enter the UK to look for work without 
being sponsored by an employer under the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme 
(HSMP); 
• Increased uptake of the HSMP via a reduction in the points threshold; 
• Introducing two new quotas for unskilled migrant workers: 9,000 for Hospitality 
and 6,000 for Food Processing; 
• Extending the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) all year round, 
and changing the SAWS quota from 10,000 in the 1990s to 25,000 in 2003; 
• Promoting the Holiday Workers Scheme, which was designed for the old 
Dominions, to New Commonwealth countries; and allowing participants to 
switch into work permit employment; 
• Changing the default position for many categories of applicant from “refuse 
unless they can prove a good case” to “accept unless it can be shown that they 
are ineligible” (cited from Lilley 2005, pp.7-8). 
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Taking these factors in reverse order, the last is unquestionably relevant. 
While the British tendency to focus on the management of race relations has not 
disappeared, Labour’s commitment to “evidence-based policy” led to a decidedly 
technocratic turn and an attempt to depoliticise decisions over admissions. For 
example, the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) was set up in 1998; the 
Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS) was set up in 1999; and the 
Prime Minister’s Forward Strategy Unit (FSU) was set up in 2001 (see Balch 
2005, p.111).  
Eventually, all of these bodies were centralised within the Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit (SU) after it was given the dual responsibility for both 
innovation and management in 2002. However, the stress on applied social 
research as a ‘politics-free’ basis for enlightened policy-making has frequently 
recurred, for instance in the foundation of the Migration Advisory Committee 
(MAC) in 2007. The stress on what would now be called ‘governmental 
depoliticisation’, and on the importance of professional expertise in public 
management also links to themes which have come into prominence in the New 
Public Management era.  
Having said this, even before Labour was returned to office in 1997, there 
were influential voices pressing for a reassessment of the ‘zero migration’ policy 
consensus. Inside the think tank community, the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) was arguing for an approach to immigration that would 
maximize growth and economic competitiveness. Furthermore, PR campaigns 
were initiated by business groups such as the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), the Computing Services and Software Association (CSSA) and 
multinational companies via law firms such as Cameron McKenna (Balch 2010). 
Once in government, Labour Minister Barbara Roche made it clear in 2000 that 





5.2.2 FROM IMMIGRATION CONTROL TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT	
In parallel and intersecting with the above policy, New Labour also claimed to be 
against open borders, and periodically announced crackdowns against illegal 
immigrants. The daily ritual of migrant men, women and even children from 
Sangatte camp near Calais in France, risking injury and death as they attempted 
to cross the channel by jumping from bridges onto passing trains (or hiding 
underneath them), propelled the issue to the forefront of the national political 
conversation.58  
More striking, asylum applications grew rapidly in the mid 1990s and 
dramatically in the 2000s. The fact that these asylum seekers had come to Britain 
instead of remaining in the nearest safe country or refugee camp was sufficient 
proof for many that they must be economic migrants rather than genuine 
refugees. 
The reaction of successive New Labour governments to the rise in 
applications was to reaffirm refugee rights to asylum while at the same time 
doing everything possible to prevent asylum seekers from arriving at the borders 
and registering a claim. The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act removed access 
to benefits (with the exception of small stipends) from asylum seekers, giving 
them vouchers instead. The Act also replaced the entire appeals process with a 
‘one-stop’ comprehensive appeal for those in the country lawfully. The Act 
constituted a significant restriction, and once again proved that policy evolution is 
rarely unidirectional. 
Against this backdrop, a new policy framework was announced under the 
banner of ‘managed migration’ in November 2000, culminating in the 
introduction of the Nationality, Asylum and immigration Bill (Case Study 5) 
(NAIB) on 12 April 2002. This doctrine stands for both a passionate rhetorical 
defence of large-scale economic and student migration as well as for a schematic, 																																																								
58 A notable example of this occurred in 2001, more than 500 migrants broke through the wire 
fence at the Eurotunnel depot near Calais and ran into the tunnel before they were driven back 
(Carr 2015 p.116). 
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coldly rational conceptual system which seeks to deter illegal immigration. The 
most far-reaching proposals contained in the NAIB included: 
i. Public housing for asylum seekers for up to six months while applications are 
being considered (the Accommodation Centre Scheme); 
ii. Repeal of the provision for automatic bail hearings; 
iii. Extension of the power to detain asylum seekers during the application process 
and not just prior to removal; 
iv. Creation of a new ‘white list’ of safe countries. Rejected applicants cannot 
remain in Britain to launch an appeal if they have arrived from a white list 
country; 
v. Denial of administrative/legal/financial support to asylum seekers unless they 
make their claim as soon as possible – at a port or airport – after their arrival in 
the UK.  
Although business clearly played a role in terms of exerting pressure for 
change, it could be argued that it was more a case of the construction of a new 
bipartisan consensus. On the one hand, many MPs in the parliamentary Labour 
party had adopted policies and practices that, in the British context, could be 
described as ‘centrist’ or managerial. Underpinning this ideology is a belief in 
internationally competitive labour markets.  
On the other hand, Conservative party Members and activists, 
increasingly drawn from the cosmopolitan professional class, felt at ease with the 
economic and social consequences of immigration. As documented by Tim Bale, 
recent Tory cabinets have largely been made up of “forty-something men and 
women for whom ‘traditional’ attitudes on race in particular are as unthinkable as 
they are unsayable” (Bale 2013, p.32). Some of the reformers, like Francis Maude 
and George Osborne, were free-marketers animated most obviously by the 
ambition to emulate Tony Blair.  
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5.1.3. MODERNISATION  
In speeches and seminars to elite audiences, New Labour tentatively made the 
case for multiculturalism, but, aware of the unpopularity of this transformation 
with its working-class base, it adopted the language of economics. During the 
Second Reading debate, Home Secretary David Blunkett  
“We need a balanced approach, and I believe that Members on both sides of the 
House are committed to achieving that. Managed migration allows those 
throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a 
better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic 
migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people.” (Blunkett 
col.341) 
A “balanced approach” involved offering highly skilled foreign workers 
incentives such as permanent settlement and the right to bring family members, 
while ‘rotating’ low-skilled foreign workers in sector-specific visa programmes. 
As the labour economist Philip Martin puts it, the guiding aim of managed 
migration is to “welcome the skilled and rotate the unskilled” (Martin 2006).  
On the other hand, Blunkett’s interest in economic migration was 
tempered by an expressed desire to ‘modernise’ procedures and deliver faster 
decisions, including new tougher arrangements for fraudulent asylum seekers. As 
illustrated in Table 17, the modernisation frame led to a commitment to undertake 
a fundamental review of the system – from initial applications through to 
permanent settlement. Angela Eagle, a junior Minister, described it in the 
following terms: 
“[The NAIB] deals in a holistic and forward-looking way with those complex 
issues… We all know that there are no easy or simple answers. We must combine 
legislative change with sensible administrative change to achieve the 
improvements that we all seek.” (Eagle col.429) 
A “holistic” and “forward-looking” approach involved the use of fast-track 
procedures for manifestly inappropriate or fraudulent claims. In addition, the 
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Labour government drew up a ‘white list’ of countries from which asylum 
seekers were assumed not to face serious risk of persecution (so that rejected 
applicants could not remain in the UK to launch an appeal if they had arrived 
from a white list country). Policy development has therefore been both 
expansionist and restrictionist. Towards some kinds of immigrant, the managerial 
state shows an open and inclusive face; towards many others, it reveals an 
exclusionary and sometimes hostile one.   
 
Table 29. Coding form #17 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Public administration 
 
Policy narrative PN30: Efficiency in administration 
 
Setting Part 5, which involves schedules 3, 4, 5 and 6, which deals with appeals 
and the dramatic speeding up and rationalisation of the process. 
 
Plot The system put in place by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act made 
great strides in improving the asylum system and reducing the number 
of fraudulent applications. However, the whole asylum appeals’ system 
needs be streamlined to improve decision-making and to ensure that it is 
speedy, expeditious and balanced.  
 
Characters National Asylum Support Service (villain), British National Party 
(villain), legitimate asylum seekers (victims) 
 
Moral  “The spectre of a revival of fascism and the policies of race hatred now 
loom over Europe. We underestimate at our peril the uncertainty and 





Blunkett (Lab) cols.355-57; Letwin (Con) cols.358-65; Hughes (LD) 
cols.372-73; Vaz (Lab) cols.377-78; Gerrard (Lab) cols.387-89; Barker 
(Con) cols.390-91; Rooney (Lab) cols.392-93; Singh (Lab) cols.414-15; 
Eagle (Lab) cols.429-31 
 
Hansard DC Deb. Vol.384, cols.341-432, 24 April 2002 
 
The plot/moral of PN30, as described in Table 29, is consistent with the following 
statements:  
• The Bill is concerned about a particular class of asylum seeker: “those who have 
not been refused appeal or lost an appeal, but who are in the course of appeal and 
are detained” (Letwin col.358);  
• Under the current system, asylum seekers can make several different concurrent 
appeals. This perverse incentive has a number of consequences, none of them 
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foreseen by policy-makers. The whole system is “riddled with delay”, 
“prevarication” and, in some cases, “deliberate disruption of the appeals process” 
(Blunkett cols.355-37);  
• The asylum system put in place by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act made 
great strides in improving the application process and reducing the number of 
illegitimate applications. However, the whole asylum appeals’ system needs be 
streamlined to improve decision-making and to ensure that it is speedy, 
expeditious and balanced.  
Managerialists typically work within this more pessimistic tradition of 
public policy, and share the same idea of the ‘strong state’ as offering the a priori 
framework for freedom. Such a philosophy could be argued to reflect the view 
that, since people are assumed to be rational egotists (prone to shirking and 
malversation whenever they get the chance), the best way to limit rule violation is 
to shape the legal environment such that individuals have no option but to follow 
the rules.  
 
5.1.4. THE BRITISH NATIONAL PARTY  
The most frequently repeated justification – and probably the most important 
reason – for EFFICIENCY IN ADMINISTRATION (PN30) was fear of a public 
backlash. Blunkett’s speech, for example, clarified the basis for government 
policy on illegal migration as resting on economic protectionism: 
“The service economy, especially in London and the south-east, relies on 
clandestine and illegal working. That is unacceptable, and it undermines the wages 
and conditions of work of those involved and of other workers. It also leads to bad 
employers undercutting good ones because they do not pay tax or national 
insurance. There are therefore two ways we can operate that gateway.” (Blunkett 
col.342) 
The assumptions underlying the government’s approach at this time were similar 
to those of the previous Conservative administration: immigration controls are 
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necessary to manage immigration in the national interest, and, in particular, to 
prevent the rise of the far-right – due to fears of threats to the local economy or to 
the hard-won benefits of the Welfare State.  
Consequently, discussions of managed migration were almost always tied 
to discussions of the British National Party (BNP), a neo-Nazi organisation 
founded by the far-right political activist John Tyndall. There was a lot of talk of 
‘disillusioned’ English voters, for example, and of the BNP tapping into their 
‘legitimate’ concerns and worries, winning them over with populist, anti-
establishment rhetoric. The comments of Angela Eagle are paradigmatic in this 
respect: 
“The spectre of a revival of fascism and the policies of race hatred now loom over 
Europe. We underestimate at our peril the uncertainty and resentment caused by 
illegal arrivals among our existing populations—the evidence is there for all to see 
in recent European election results. However, most of that uncertainty and 
resentment is not racism, but a genuine concern that needs to be addressed fairly, 
openly and transparently. We need to be inclusive and open about our anti-racist 
stance, but we need to acknowledge people's worries and concerns. For that reason 
I welcome the tone of the debate, which has differed from that of any other debate 
on this sensitive subject.” (Eagle, col.429) 
The key question concerning managed migration would seem to be 
whether or not it can legitimately be termed ‘restrictionist’. The answer depends 
to large extent upon what is meant by restrictionism. On the one hand, the 
perception that migration is associated with economic growth and 
competitiveness has shaped the managed migration agenda, leading to an 
increasingly liberal and expansionist policy framework.59 Incredibly, more 
																																																								
59 These policies include: (i) the abolition of the Primary Purpose Rule; (ii) the abolition of exit 
controls to non-EU destinations; (iii) the doubling of work permits for non-EU workers; (iv) the 
quintupling of student visas; (v) the expansion of the Post-Study Work route; and (vi) the decision 
not to impose transitional controls on EU accession states. 
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immigrants now arrive in a single year than they did in the entire period from 
1066 to 1950 (excluding wartime flows and the Irish) (Goodhart 2005). 
Nevertheless, managed migration does have some features which have 
been associated with restrictionism in a general sense, in particular, its intense 
opposition to fraudulent asylum seekers, undocumented tourists on expired visas, 
and immigrant spouses in sham marriages (Balch 2015; Consterdine 2018). For 
example, steady increases in the number of asylum applications have been met 
with legal-bureaucratic responses, including the importation of visa requirements 
on countries from which asylum seekers come and the imposition of carriers’ 
liability on airlines and shippers for improperly documented persons they bring to 
the UK.  	
5.1.4. OLIVER LETWIN AND THE CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE 
On the whole, the Conservative Opposition supported Labour’s policy. Oliver 
Letwin, the Shadow Home Secretary, praised the Bill in the following terms: 
“[The] great majority of the measures in the Bill are welcome. That is no surprise, 
because we welcomed the White Paper, which the Bill faithfully implements in 
almost all respects. We wholly applaud the naturalisation provisions. In fact, I 
think that they are long overdue. Neither the Home Secretary's Labour predecessor 
nor his Conservative predecessors moved as well in this direction as he has sought 
to do. This will be a bipartisan policy that I hope will last for many years.” 
(Letwin, col.358) 
We may reasonably speculate that this quotation is, in part, a product of 
Letwin’s idiosyncratic style, described by one journalist as “austere” and 
“academic” (cited from Oborne 2004). Unlike his predecessors, Letwin pioneered 
a less combative style in taking on Labour. Suffice it to say, however, the debate 
on immigration had become increasingly circumscribed, and what little inter-
party competition remained became focused on the ‘effective’ management of the 
state. To a large extent, some of those measures – aimed at preventing and 
removing illegal migrants – went further than the laws introduced by Michael 
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Howard in 1996. Notably, this included the repeal of automatic bail hearings. In 
Blunkett’s words, 
“I do not think that it is acceptable for an old lady of 78 to be mugged for £60, as 
happened in my city, and for the three people who mugged her to continue to 
claim that they require asylum in this country… I believe that people who are 
found guilty of committing crimes and are given a custodial sentence of more than 
two years forfeit their asylum rights, and I think that we should legislate to take 
them away.” (Blunkett cols.356-57) 
Differences of opinion were largely related to the makeup of the detention 
centres. Letwin debated the merits of large-scale versus small-scale centers, and 
the advantages of comprehensive rather than piecemeal reform. Unlike his 
Labour counterpart, Letwin wanted to turn the accommodation centres into “one-
stop shops” that included decision-makers through to the adjudicators, “with all 
the expertise required, and against the background of proper, independent risk 
assessments” (Letwin, col.361). This model would be combined by a reduction in 
size and scale. From this viewpoint, what is needed to tackle the public-
management problem is to devise institutions that are “tailored to characteristics 
of the human beings with whom they are dealing”  (Letwin, col.362) – and in that 
sense “economize on love” (quoted by Buchanan 1983, p.24) 
Recognising the Sisyphean task of migration governance, Opposition MPs 
raised additional concerns about the ability of the British state to remove illegal 
immigrants. For example, the removal process can be highly complex and is often 
fraught with legal, administrative and empirical barriers. It can take a 
considerable period of time to decide a case, and there are usually various stages 
of appeal. On one level, the failure to prevent the complex of activities that lead 
to illegal immigration, including visa overstay, clandestine entry and working 




Table 30. Coding form #18 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Public administration 
 
Policy narrative PN29: Law enforcement 
 
Setting Dublin Convention for refugees 
 
Plot Under the present system, managed migration is virtually impossible: 
the numbers arriving are too great for immigration staff to cope with 
and the removals process takes far too long. 
 
Characters Dublin Convention (enemy) 
 
Moral  “It is clear that control of the cross-channel flow of asylum seekers and 
a faster and more effective application and appeal process need to be 





Blunkett (Lab) cols.356-57; Lewtin (Con) cols.363-64; Barker (Con) 
cols.391-92; Watkinson (Con) cols.401-04; Malins (Con) cols.426-27 
 
Source: Hansard DC Deb. Vol.384, cols.341-432, 24 April 2002 	
A similar, if altogether more patchy, intensification of LAW 
ENROCREMENT (PN29) was evident at the external borders of the European 
Union, though complicated by the introduction of the Dublin Convention on 
refugees in 1997. Notwithstanding the considerable efforts that states made to 
prevent the entry of illegal immigrants, the Dublin Convention created an 
important route for entry and provided a further example of how EU laws limit 
states’ room for manoeuvre. For example, between 1995 and 1997 there was a 
bilateral agreement between Britain and France that allowed the swift removal of 
irregular migrants who had crossed the channel illegally. When it came into 
force, applications for asylum fell by 33 per cent (Wilkinson, col.401). Yet, 12 
months after the replacement of the bilateral agreement with the Dublin 
convention, applications rose by 41 per cent. To quote Conservative MP Greg 
Barker: 
“[The Dublin Convention] is complex, bureaucratic and burdensome, and those 
who attempt to operate it would concur with that description. However, in one 
sense, people understand it perfectly. All those resident at the Sangatte camp 
understand it. They understand that they can enter Britain and, de facto, not be 
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returned to France. That is making a mockery of the system. Until 1997, a bilateral 
agreement ensured that asylum seekers could be returned to France within 24 
hours. Now, we have problems returning any of them at all.” (Barker. Col.392) 
In general, EU cooperation since Dublin illustrated that, in the area of migration 
control, intergovernmental cooperation was easier to achieve on labour migration 
than on areas such as asylum or illegal entry.  	
5.1.4. UNACCOMPANIED MIGRANT CHILDREN	
The first Labour government did not reduce immigration through its legislative 
and administrative actions. On the contrary, Labour’s reforms were an 
unprecedented policy reversal – moving from “severe restriction” in 1997 to 
active “encouragement” of immigration in 2002. The government claimed, 
nevertheless, that it had an effective policy compared with its Conservative 
predecessor; that it had reduced unwanted immigration; and that it had reaffirmed 
human rights.  
Concerning the treatment of asylum seekers, Labour could claim with 
some justification that a nationwide, ‘universal’ (though differentiated) system of 
provision had been established. Some of the most important Clauses are 
mentioned below: 
• Clause 43 allowed future Home Secretaries to establish a ‘refugee re-settlement 
programme’ (Singh, col.413)  
• Clauses 36 and 37 ensured (basic) economic and administrative support for 
failed asylum seekers awaiting removal (Singh, col.413).  
• Clause 36 removed the age distinction that previously meant that social security 
payments could not be made by the Home Secretary to asylum seekers under the 
age of18. 
• Clause 113 established, for the first time in British law, the offence of human 
trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation (Woodward, cols.398-401). The 
maximum penalty imposed by the Bill was a sentence of 14 years. 
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Having said this, Labour’s commitment to HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (PN3) 
was called into question by its willingness to impose a series of harsh post-entry 
measures that were designed to keep unaccompanied migrant children away from 
schools in the wider community. In many cases, young girls were passed on to 
residential care homes, often in the southeast of England, but simply disappeared 
after that. Often, the girls had been trafficked to other parts of the EU by gang-
controlled sex traffickers. 
The assumptions underpinning PN3 were threefold. The first assumption is 
that states do not have a right to prevent immigrants and asylum-seekers from 
becoming socially integrated into local communities, and thereby minimizing 
sources of support and networks.  
A second assumption is that many of the problems stem from the fact that 
the system has not kept pace with the scale of the challenge, e.g., there is still no 
comprehensive database of unaccompanied minors. This is a particular problem 
in London and the South East of England. 
A third assumption is that unaccompanied children should be educated in 
the wider community rather than in accommodation centres (Woodward, 
col.400). Thus, a key problem with the detention centre proposals was the level of 
secrecy that surrounded their implementation.  
As illustrated in Table 31, the main body of evidence cited during the 
Second Reading was a 2001 report by Save the Children, ‘Cold Comfort’ 
(narrative setting). The charity had spoken to 125 unaccompanied child refugees 
and found that a significant number of them had experienced uncertainty and 
hardship since their arrival in the UK. Moreover, many of these children had 




Table 31. Coding form #19 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN3: Human Development 
 
Setting (i) Recommendations of the Lord Rooker report (7 February 2002); (ii) 
Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child; (iii) Labour 
Government report "Setting the Boundaries", 
 
Plot A key problem with the detention centre proposals is the secrecy that 
surrounds their implementation and the way in which it treats 
unaccompanied minors. This pattern of neglect continues in children’s 
contact with public services, including the NHS and primary/secondary 
education systems. 
 
Characters Migrant children (victims) 
 
Moral  To reduce the numbers of children going missing, we need to consider a 





Marshall (Lab) cols.365-67; Rooney (Lab) cols.394; Ewing (SNP) 
cols.397-98; Woodward (Lab) cols.398-401; Coaker (Lab) cols.408-09; 
Singh (Lab) cols.412-15; Morgan (Lab) cols.415-17; Sarwar (Lab) 
cols.418-20; Connarty (Lab) cols.421-23 
 
Source: Hansard DC Deb. Vol.384, cols.341-432, 24 April 2002 	
Although the Labour Left welcomed Blunkett’s determination to reform a 
bureaucracy that had left thousands of asylum applications in limbo, there had 
also been a lot of talk about the need for compassion in the accommodation 
system. The essence of this position was perhaps best summarised by Labour’s 
Shaun Woodward: 
“Children and young people who are asylum seekers present us with special 
problems and special responsibilities. Article 3 of the United Nations convention 
on the rights of the child makes it clear that the best interests of the child should be 
the primary consideration. We signed up to that convention because it is right, so 
in dealing with this group of young people we must be sure that we are acting in 
the best interests of the child. It is difficult to see a justification for distinguishing 
what is the best interest solely on the ground of whether a child is a UK citizen or 
a refugee and providing different standards of care, protection and services 
accordingly.” (Woodward, col.400) 
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Other criticisms levelled at the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill 
concerned the status of dependent relatives, the disabled and others who may 
have little enthusiasm or capacity to learn English, especially people who are in 
their twilight years (Marshall, cols.365-67).  
At the core of this policy debate is the schism between ‘globalism’ and 
‘managerialism’ as two rival philosophies or “rationalities” of politics. Globalist 
principles place constraints on the policy devices that Ministers may deploy in 
their ‘fight against illegal immigration’. This is because the kinds of measures 
that are needed to tackle irregularity require invasive powers and regulations that 
are at odds with MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM, and which are therefore likely to 
encounter political challenges.  
 
 
5.2. Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill 2005 
(Case Study 6) 
 
5.2.1. STORMY WATERS 2005-08 
The 2005 General Election best marks the juncture when the Labour 
administration began to perform a volte-face on immigration. Although Labour 
won its third term in 2005, it was at the significant cost of a reduced majority: 
down to 66 from 167 in 2001. Although no state can expect to prevent all forms 
of clandestine or fraudulent entry, let alone identify everyone who overstays their 
visa or works without authorization, the government of the day is nonetheless 
implicated in the production of irregularity.  
Alongside electoral losses, the second prong of Labour’s immigration 
strategy was a determined effort to compete and win against the Conservatives 
new elected leader, David Cameron, who was seen by many political 
commentators as a credible threat to a ‘lame duck’ Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
who had already announced that he would stand down before the next GE. 
Already by 2006, Labour strategist Philip Gould commented in his memoirs that, 
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“Concerns about immigration continued to heighten, and it was increasingly seen 
as a primary cause of other problems. People saw Labour as out of touch, not 
listening and dogged by sleaze and infighting” (Gould 2011, p.493).  
Immigration, with all the socioeconomic consequence it brings, is an example of 
what technology entrepreneur George Gallatin (2018) calls a “meta-issue” – 
individual migrants, in sufficient numbers, can add up to societal consequences 
that nobody consciously intended, and outcomes few people wanted. Mattinson 
(2010, p.133) similarly observed that,  
“Immigration, perhaps more than any other issue, illustrates the disconnect 
between the voter and the Westminster Village…we described it [immigration] as 
a “vortex” issue, one which sucked all other issues in—the NHS is struggling? 
That’s because it’s crowded with immigrants. Can’t get a job? That’s because 
immigrants have undercut your rates…It became an issue that, in the focus groups, 
we always shut down and moved on from and the voters knew it.” 
The development of policy on migration between 2005 and 2008 
highlighted precisely this political vulnerability. Although the number of asylum 
applications fell in the wake of the closure of the Sangatte refugee camp in 2002, 
Labour dug itself a hole during the ‘big bang’ enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 
its decision not to impose transitional controls on the citizens of Central and 
Eastern Europe.60 No other major destination country in the EU followed this 
path. Indeed, all other EU member states except Ireland and Sweden applied 
some controls, notably a five-year transition period prior to opening borders – 
and labour markets – to nationals from the new member states. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, the resultant migratory inflow led to a growing link between 
Euroscepticism and immigration scepticism.  
																																																								
60 Sometimes referred to as the “A10” countries, these new member states included Cyprus, the 





Figure 4. The EU and immigration 
 
Source: Evans and Menon (2017), p.19 
 
One major consequence of this policy decision is that the discursive 
terrain shifted, with the battleground moving between questions of statistical 
forecasting; fears of future inflows of migrants from Eastern Europe; and then 
more recently, questions concerning the efficacy of the Home Office. For 
example, in anticipation of the enlargement of the EU, Blair’s government took 
the precaution of asking civil servants to assess the likely levels of immigration 
from countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on their calculations, the 
Home Office predicted that Britain would receive between 5,000 to 13,000 net 
immigrants per year averaged over a ten-year period from the new member states. 
The reality, however, turned out to be quite different. The Office for National 
Statistic (ONS) estimated that between 2004 and 2012, the net inflow of migrants 
from the new members was 423,000. In a memorable putdown, Liberal Democrat 
home affairs spokesman Chris Huhne told the Commons in 2008:  
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“As we know, Christopher Columbus thought that he had discovered India, when 
in fact he was in America. By comparison with the Home Office, he was a 
practitioner of pinpoint navigation” (quoted from Watt and Wintour 2015). 
 
5.2.1. LABOUR’S FIVE-YEAR STARTEGY 
In response to what the Labour Party perceived as a major policy blunder, some 
aspects of public policy were tightened during Blair’s last two years as Prime 
Minister (2005–06). A new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, was appointed and 
with him came a boost in enforcement efforts via the introduction of a ‘five-year 
strategy’. This included: 
• A new Australian-style points system for migrant workers. 
• A new visa fingerprinting system to fingerprint all immigrants on visas at ports 
of entry by 2008. 
• Identity cards for all non-EU migrants who will be in the country for more than 
three months. 
• Only immediate family members of migrants will be allowed to enter the UK. 
This will mean restrictions on dependents of migrants bringing in further 
dependents. 
• A plan to speed up the deportation of fraudulent asylum seekers, as well as extra 
powers to deal with people traffickers 
The government continued to manage the ‘asylum crisis’ but began 
focusing their attention on tougher penalties	for illegal immigration. Among the 
range of proposed measures were actions to reduce illegal migration flows 
through the crosschecking of data against biometrically enabled travel documents 
(the futuristically titled ‘e-Borders programme’).  
More significantly, a central aspect of this overhaul was a points-based 
system (PBS) to replace all the existing schemes for labour migration (which had 
expanded to almost 80) and for a new Skills Advisory Board to bring together 
business representatives and experts to decide on admissions. Modeled on 
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Australia’s PBS for skilled professionals, it imported all the existing labour 
migration schemes and placed them in a typology of five ‘tiers’. As a 
consequence of these reforms, managed migration has at least five distinct 
components:   
• Tier 1 covers entry of entrepreneurs, investors, and those very few people who 
come under the 'exceptional talent' visa.  
• Tier 2 includes skilled workers who are transferred to the UK by an international 
company; skilled workers where there is a proven shortage in the UK; and 
ministers of religion and sportspeople. 
• Tier 3 is designed for low-skilled workers filling specific temporary labour 
shortages.  
• Tier 4 covers non-EEA students who wish to study in the UK. 
• Tier 5 contained six sub-tiers of temporary worker including creative and 
sporting, charity, religious workers and the youth mobility scheme. 
A “points system” works through allocating different scores to each 
prospective citizen, based on their education, work experience, age and language 
proficiency. A certain number of points are then required to gain entry. The 
purpose of such a system is therefore to discriminate between rival migrants – to 
select human beings with desirable skill portfolios. In contrast, the management 
of unskilled migrant workers has generally followed a different trajectory: 
governments have tried to recruit low-skilled migrant labour through temporary 
and seasonal worker schemes, without extending the bundle of rights that are 
offered to the highly skilled (Martin 2006). 
The political economist Georg Menz (2009) argues that the revaluation of 
labour migration since the mid 2000s is part of a political philosophy and policy 
agenda that has always looked to the state to reshape society around its ideals. As 
Christopher Hood went to great lengths to stress in The Art of The State, New 
Public Management (NPM) is not another form of laissez-faire and, instead, 
grants the state a key role in shaping how economic freedom is to be defined and 
instantiated. So, in the case of immigration, the globalist ideal of freedom of 
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movement would be resisted from a managerial perspective. It is entirely 
plausible, from a managerial perspective, that the state might seek to regulate 
something like labor flows, to serve certain strategic economic goals.			
5.2.3. CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: THE LIMITS TO MANAGED 
MIGRATION 
What can loosely be called ‘managerial’ approaches to skilled migration start 
from the assumption that the world is populated by rational, self-interested state 
actors who are bent on outcompeting one another. Rivalry and competition are 
central to the managerial view of what the world of migration management is and 
should be like. As illustrated in Table 5.4, British governments have increasingly 
responded to employer demand for human capital and at the same time sought a 
more active role in the selection or would-be citizens. These systems work by 
allocating points to would-be migrants on the basis of criteria such as the 
applicant's qualifications, linguistic ability, and work experience. 		





Policy narrative PN30: Efficiency in administration 
 
Setting Immigration fraud in the HE sector 
 
Plot The introduction of a points-based system will ensure that the rules for 
entering the UK to work or to study are clear, simple and transparent. 
An applicant who reaches the pass mark, which can be achieved through 
various combinations of allocated points, is issued with a work-related 
visa. 
 
Characters Home Office (villain)  
 
Moral  Labour frontbench: The current existing schemes for labour migration 
are confusing and cumbersome. We want to make it as simple and 
straightforward as possible. 
 
Conservative and Labour critics: Members of Parliament are constantly 





Clarke (Lab) cols.194-97; Davis (Con) cols.202-04; Vaz (Lab) cols.220-
21; Khabra  (Lab) cols.231; Scott (Con) cols.254 
 




Governments, of course, recruited migrant workers well before migration 
management became the term of choice around the turn of the millennium. 
Indeed, the government already operated a points-based system without a quota: 
the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme, introduced in 2002. What is new about 
contemporary migration management is the extent to which governments seek to 
regulate the composition of labour migration flows through selective and highly 
differentiated PBSs. To quote Charles Clarke, the Labour Home Secretary: 
“The UK needs economic migration. We welcome people who migrate here to 
work and study—they are an essential part of our society and economy […] We 
need migration to fill the gaps in our labour market that cannot be filled from the 
domestic work force.” (Clarke, col.188) 
At the top end of the labour market, firms compete to attract skilled 
workers while, at the tertiary end, many Higher Education institutions have come 
to depend upon a large and steady supply of foreign non-EEA students. 
Unsurprisingly, then, Universities lobby hard for liberalisation of economic 
immigration channels. This point was made ad nauseam during the Second 
Reading.  
The apparent absence of overt partisan conflict did not mean, of course, 
that there were no differences between (or within) the parties on immigration 
between 2005 and 2008. On the contrary, as argued by the Shadow Home 
Secretary, the government’s promise of a “points based” system made little sense 
without a numerical limit.  
Our system would ensure that we balanced the needs of Britain's economy with 
the needs of the population as a whole. The Government agree with the first, but 
not with the second; they want the points, but not the limit. A points system with 
no limit is futile.” (Davis, col.207) 
Without a numerical limit, it was argued, the Labour government would 
manipulate the points threshold to increase the number of people coming to the 
UK – not, as they implied at the GE, to reduce the number of people arriving 
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(Lilley, col.246). Uncontrolled immigration, in Davis’ assessment, had had a 
negative impact on the economy by increasing the cost of scarce land and 
housing: 
“Managed migration contributes to our economy and culture, and to many aspects 
of British society, but uncontrolled immigration can have the opposite effect… 
Here in London, there are pressures on housing. That housing stress has led to the 
Government crippling the right to buy, with the result that many people can no 
longer afford to buy the houses that they live in.” (Davis, cols.204-05) 
Though Davis focused his analysis on Britain, the above narrative of diminishing 
marginal returns is a paradigmatic feature of immigration restrictionism more 
generally. To tease out the implications of this, Peter Lilley used the following 
metaphor: 
“Immigration acts as a lubricant for the economy, rather than a fuel. If we do not 
put oil in the car, it will not work well. If there is more than sufficient oil, the car 
will not go any better and too much oil may cause problems. To stop all 
immigration would be bad for the economy, but beyond a certain point increasing 
the amount of immigration does not make an economy grow any better. 
Immigration is a lubricant, but unfortunately the Government have been under the 
mistaken apprehension that it is a fuel. They put their foot on the accelerator and 
think that the more people we take into this country, the more we will grow. As a 
result, net lawful immigration has trebled under the Government; over the last six 
years it has averaged three times the level that they inherited.” (Lilley, col.243) 
What was curious about Lilley’s rhetoric was not the policy analysis 
itself, which has been known for some time, but the metaphor that he used to 
justify it. Ultimately, everything can be treated in mechanical terms (“fuel”, 
“lubricant”), including state, law, democracy, leadership, and civil society. This, 
in many ways, was more significant than the argument itself. On what for many 
voters is actually a cultural question, the establishment’s arguments on 
immigration, and a whole host of other policies, had become increasingly 
		
218	
straitjacketed. It is far safer, from a managerial perspective, to remodel all 
spheres of human conduct around the example of the market and, in this case, the 
metaphor of a car engine.  
 
5.2.4. EVIDENCE–BASED POLICY 
Whether or not these beliefs are well founded, the perception that migration is 
associated with competitiveness has contributed to the growing influence of non-
departmental public bodies (NDPBs). Indeed, the linkage of migration and 
“evidence-based policy” has become something of a mantra in official discourse, 
well captured in the speech of Liberal Democrat MP Vince Cable: 
“I want to consider the economic aspect of the measure. Now that the right hon. 
Member for Hitchin and Harpenden [Peter Lilley] has returned, perhaps I can 
compliment him on trying to introduce some rigour into the argument. He is right 
that many of the economic arguments for immigration are often spurious and 
superficial. It was important that the Home Secretary started his speech with the 
rather bold assertion that Britain needs economic migration. I happen to agree with 
him, but that case is often casually put and not properly argued.” (Cable, cols.256-
57) 
The stress on applied social science research as a ‘politics-free’ basis for 
enlightened policy-making has frequently recurred, for instance in the creation of 
the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) and Migration Impacts Forum (MIF) 
in 2007. As hypothesised by Professor Alex Balch, much of current public 
management reform might be better interpreted as an attempt to depoliticise 
decision making over admissions: 
“The creation of MAC and MIF, for example, can be seen as a potentially 
technocratic turn – de-politicising decision making over admissions – although 
this can only be ascertained over time and after they have been functioning in 




Such ideas span different political programmes and policy areas. They are 
not the exclusive property of the political ‘left’ or ‘right’ as ordinarily conceived.  
In this debate, however, Labour’s administrative competence was called into 
question. In concluding the Opposition’s case, Shadow Home Secretary David 
Davis made a devastating speech against the Home Office’s culture of 
incompetence, drawing on the full power of his rhetorical skill in a hostile rebuke 
of officialdom: 
“A whistleblower revealed that immigrants from eastern Europe were being waved 
into Britain without proper checks. The then Immigration Minister first denied that 
it had happened—until it was proven to be true. Then, she blamed junior civil 
servants—until it turned out to be the work of senior officials, with ministerial 
acquiescence. Next, she said that such cases were rare and untypical—until they 
were shown to be widespread. Then, the whistleblower was sacked, but the 
Minister stayed.” (Davis, cols.202-04) 
The above excerpt is a reference to a breakdown in relations between the head of 
the Home Office and the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). 
Similarly, Davis referred to “the scandal of the migrant scams” in Romania and 
Bulgaria, which were brought to light by the British consul in Bucharest: 
“This incident revealed a complete lack of communication between the Home 
Office and the Foreign Office. Our consul warned the Government that groups in 
Romania and Bulgaria were making fraudulent claims, yet Home Office officials 
granted such people visas anyway, knowing their claims to be false. Again, the 
consul was sacked, the Minister stayed. The Minister was finally forced to go, but 
only because of the utter chaos and lack of communication in the Home Office 
itself. She claimed not to know of any of these scams; it turned out that she had 
been warned a year before by her own Home Office colleague.” (Davis, cols.202-
04) 
The reference to government officials brought into focus the ‘villains’ of 
the narrative (state bureaucrats) and ‘victims’ (refugees). Rejecting Weberian 
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notions of ‘status honour’ or noblesse oblige among public officials, Davis 
argued that the government bureaucracy is “not fair to anyone” – not to genuine 
asylum seekers, “lumped in with the fraudsters and forced to plead their case”; 
not to economic migrants “…who spend their life savings paying people 
smugglers for the chance to come to Britain”; and not to political dissidents who 
are “…caught up in this Government's public relations offensive and face torture 
or worse if they are sent back” (Davis, cols.202-04).  
 
5.2.4. YARL’S WOOD DETENTION CENTRE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Another striking example of political dissensus concerned the way in which 
temporary migrants were treated by the authorities. The growing importance of 
the RULE OF LAW (PN5) for members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, in 
particular, could be seen in the extremely large number of matters raised in the 
House. Mostly, these matters concerned the removal of rights of appeal for 
students, working holidaymakers, ministers of religion and other miscellaneous 
categories (see Table 33). 
 
Table 33. Coding form #21 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Moral cosmopolitanism 
 
Policy narrative PN5: Rule of law 
 
Setting (i) Proposal to remove all rights of appeal against refusal; (ii) treatment 
of detainees at Yarl’s Wood detention facility 
 
Plot An immigration officer who knows that his decision may be subject to 
appeal is likely to be a good deal more circumspect, careful and even-
handed than the officer who knows that his power of decision is 
absolute. 
 
Characters Entry clearance officers (villains), Yarl’s Wood detention facility 
(villain), asylum seekers (victims) 
 
Moral  “When a right of appeal is removed, what is removed is a valuable and 
necessary constraint on those who exercise original jurisdiction” – Tony 




Fischer (Lab) col.212; Carmichael (LD) cols.215-17; Vaz (Lab) 
cols.221-24; Burt (Con) cols.226-30; Khabra (Lab) cols.231-32; Gerrard 
(Lab) cols.236-40; Lilley (Con) cols.240; Ellman (Lab) cols.247-50; 
Cable (LD) cols.255-56; Malins (Con) cols.262-63.  
 




From this perspective, the right to appeal is axiomatic, and not just 
because of the importance of the process in its own right, but because it maintains 
pressure on the rest of the system to get it right. In other words, the removal of 
any check on current decisions by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) 
would lead to poorer decision-making. For example, Fiona Lindsley, the 
independent monitor of entry clearance refusals without the right of appeal, said 
in her report of February 2005 that “extrapolating from my file samples in 2002 
and 2003 I calculate that 28,000 applicants have been wrongly denied rights of 
appeal in these two years” (quoted from Carmichael, col.215). 
The most controversial aspect of the debate, however, had been the 
growing use of immigration detention centres. Allegations of violence and 
excessive force had often centred on the private security companies that provided 
the escorts for deportation flights (narrative villain). Some MPs had long 
campaigned on these issues; for example, Alistair Burt, the Conservative MP for 
North East Bedfordshire, was particularly active in criticising the Home Office 
over its handling of Yarl’s Wood detention centre. Situated on the outskirts of 
Milton Ernest in Bedfordshire, Yarl’s Wood consists of a number of enclosed 
residences for a predominantly female population. Most of the asylum seekers are 
from sub-Saharan Africa, who are waiting for a decision from the Home Office in 
London. Some had been waiting there for a year, Burt said, and few of their 
applications were likely to receive a positive decision: 
“The reason that I have spoken out in such a way today is that when a woman 
from a far country, with a black skin, is shunted around the detention estate, 
having committed no crime, in a situation in which the system does not believe 
that it owes an explanation to her, to citizens or to representatives, all our civil 
liberties are at risk.” (Burt col.229) 
On a visit to Yarl's Wood in 2004 Burt was shocked by the behaviour of 
the privately run escort service (Serco). Some of the detainees who Burt spoke to 
claimed to have been abused and humiliated by the predominantly male staff who 
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monitored them; they also claimed to have witnessed guards touching women 
inappropriately, and alleged that guards casually inflicted violence on others. In 
addition to this, one detainee was prevented from completing her undergraduate 
degree, while another was prevented from seeking an investigation into alleged 
assault. As Burt summarised it,  
“[Escort services] cavalier treatment of the vulnerable people in their care is a 
scandal to our reputation as a decent nation. That was when my change of heart 
began in relation to this policy – when I found out that Yarl's Wood was built on 
fraud. (Burt, col.230)”  
All of these developments are part of a ‘conveyor belt’ deportation 
machinery, designed to prevent migrants from absconding, both during the 
determination process and after a claim has been rejected. Given the 
controversies surrounding these centres, however, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that this blunt instrument is primarily intended to reduce the supposed 
‘pull factors’ that attract migrants to Britain – and to transmit a deterrent message 
to others by signaling a country's toughness (Hampshire 2013).  
 
5.2.2. JOINED-UP GOVERNMENT  
A common observation about the managerial approach to institutional design is 
that it may be better seen as a family of approaches rather than a single one 
(Martin 2006; Hampshire 2013). Clarke’s stress on what might be called 
“integrated” or “joined-up” government was an important part of this and the 
wider control and intelligence agenda. Recording, reporting and digitisation were 
central to Clarke’s vision of good public management: 
i. Clause 23 brought together the provisions on detention and examination of 
passports; 
ii. Clause 24 reduced the notice period given to asylum seekers who cannot be 
fingerprinted on application; 
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iii. Clauses 26 to 34 enabled the capture of passenger, crew and freight details in 
advance of travel; 
iv. Clause 11 makes it illegal to employ a person if his leave to enter or remain in 
the UK: i) is invalid; ii) has expired, or; iii) is subject to a condition preventing 
him from accepting the employment. 
Part of the control structure of this extraordinary system of public 
management comes from processes of internal interception. These controls take 
many forms, including random ID checks in public places, routine workplace 
inspections and raids, reporting requirements for providers of public services, and 
employer sanctions. That approach to organisation can be linked to a broader 
vision of ‘modern’ government, which aims to reduce irregular residence and 
work, developing internal controls to identify, intercept and remove migrants who 
are already in their territory.  	
Table 34. Coding form #22 
Category Description 
Metanarrative Public administration 
 
Policy narrative PN29: Law enforcement 
 
Setting The 2005 Bill was promised in the Queen's Speech as fulfilling a key 
government pledge – namely, to reduce the levels of illegal 
immigration. 
 
Plot A key provision in the 2005 Bill is to effectively tackle illegal 
immigration by punishing employers who hire undocumented workers 
(Clauses 11 to 20). These clauses bring together the provisions on 
detention and examination of passports and other documents, as well as 
biometric data such as fingerprints (Clause 23).  
 
Characters Illegal aliens (villains) 
 
Moral  The Immigration, Asylum, and Nationality Bill is essential for providing 
a joined-up approach to border management; it is also necessary to 




Clarke (Lab) cols.198-99; Khabra (Lab) cols.230; McNulty (Lab) 
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(i) First, the Labour government have made great strides in rationalising 
the immigration system by speeding up the application process as well as 
improving control-points across the channel. 
(ii) Yet, despite progress in these areas, the enforcement of immigration 
law remains very difficult, often for reasons outside of direct governmental 
control. There are, for example, several different ‘pathways’ to clandestine entry, 
including unauthorised entry at land and sea borders, entry through a port using 
forged documents, visa overstay or violation of visa terms. 
(iii) Finally, the challenge for the government now is to build on those 
successes, and to create a technologically robust system that delivers the 
economic migration that Britain needs. Those checks will be supported, 
furthermore, by measures to clamp down on employers of illegal workers and by 
closer working with the airlines to deal with individuals who use forged 
documents or who destroy them en route. As Tony McNulty, the Minister of 
State for Immigration, summarised it: 
“If the debate is shifting away from where we are at with the asylum system… to a 
substantive debate about where we are at with managed migration, it must deal in 
substance with illegal working and the employer's role [….] By the time the law is 
introduced, there will be about 1,200 warranted immigration officers with full 
rights to employ the fixed penalties. That is where we want our staff, out in the 
community dealing with such matters.” (McNulty, col.271) 
The most obvious instruments, which correspond to the popular rhetoric of 
“integrated government”, are control measures at the state’s territorial borders. A 
near universal trend across all Western European states over the last two decades 
has been the use biometric technologies and large-scale immigration databases to 
differentiate between various categories of passenger. As James Hampshire 
(2013) points out, such policies are part of a relatively coherent theory of 
management – which in many ways follows contemporary ideas of public 







The overall policy trend since the early 2000s has been increased openness 
towards a few selective types of immigration combined with substantial efforts to 
control and limit other types. Managed migration, as such, is like the two-faced 
God Janus: it stands for both a passionate, rhetorical defence of legal migration 
and its social and economic benefits as well as for a schematic, coldly rational 
conceptual system which seeks to deter illegal aliens. These contrasting 
objectives mean that managerial states cannot be straightforwardly characterised 
as either restrictionist or expansionist. On the whole, political parties have 
become more interested in recruiting foreign workers to fill skills shortages in 
their economies, while at the same time strengthening their border controls to 
exclude irregular migrants. Recognising the Sisyphean nature of migration 
governance, MPs make extravagant promises to introduce tougher laws and 







“Populists challenge not just the specific policies but also the depoliticisation of 
the issues. Often correctly, they argue that what once was political can be political 
again, if the majority of the population wants it to be.” 
                                                                                                                 –   Cas Mudde61 
 
“We are now in a period of social transition, a period characterised, that is, by an 
unusually rapid rate of change of the most important economic, social, political, 
and cultural institutions of society. This transition is from the type of society 
which we have called capitalist or bourgeois to a type of society which we shall 
call managerial.” 
                                                                                                              –   James Burnham62 
 
The claim that political parties matter for understanding migration policy is on 
one level tautological. As elected representatives, it is MPs that compete for 
electoral support from voters; political parties that form governments; and 
governments which make immigration policy. The practice of inter-elite 
competition, as we have seen, is a legitimate and necessary part of the democratic 
process, and therefore of migration policy. Yet, despite this truism, the practice of 
inter-elite competition is also influenced by consensus-seeking practices in 
complex social systems – practices that permit a certain amount of rigidity (i.e., 
depoliticisation). The purpose of this chapter therefore is to examine whether 
such consensuses shape the policy preferences of leading elites and the degree of 
autonomy the government has in implementing restrictionist policies. 
Notwithstanding the relative closeness of their electoral support and 
parliamentary representation – indeed perhaps because of these – the major 
parties’ contest for office restricted the range of policy options offered to voters 
and, in many areas of public policy, inter-party debate did not occur.  
																																																								
61 Mudde (2017) 





Q1: “To what extent have the ideological orientations of MPs evolved over time 
and, if so, does the direction of change support Christopher Hood’s claim that 
elite-level orientations have gradually yielded to a managerial consensus?” 
 
If there is a common perception which has informed virtually all debates on 
immigration in the post-Cold war era, including those in this study, it is that 
mainstream parties have begun to show signs of dealignment. For example, since 
the Brexit vote of 2016, it has become fashionable in journalistic circles to frame 
the post-Cold war era as a battle between ‘globalists’ and ‘nationalists’. To quote 
economic historian Michael Lind (2016),  
“The culture war and partisan realignment are over; the policy realignment and 
“border war” — a clash between nationalists, mostly on the right, and 
multicultural globalists, mostly on the left — have just begun.” 
While not entirely incorrect, this argument is nevertheless misleading. Within the 
House of Commons, the most salient political division today is not between 
globalists and nationalists, but between globalists and managerialists. As shall be 
seen below, the liberality of British migration policy during the 1997-2015 period 
resulted from the formation of a bipartisan ideological commitment: the 
attachment of the Conservative and Labour parties to ‘managed migration’, 
mapped on to selective Cabinet-level opposition to immigration quotas.  
 
6.1.1. The Conservative party 
Between 1961 and 1996 the Conservative party enacted a small mountain of 
restrictive legislation in an effort to stop Britain becoming a multicultural society. 
Branded ‘traitors’ to the Commonwealth by progressives, the party was aligned 
ideologically to civic nationalism. This belief-system not only included an 
increasingly restrictive, anti-New Commonwealth immigration policy, but also a 
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series of progressively liberal race relations acts that accelerated the process of 
immigrant incorporation into British society.  
Ultimately, however, the Right’s opposition to Britain becoming a 
multicultural society was frustrated, as high total fertility rates, family 
reunification and the right of asylum led to rapid ethnocultural change despite 
tough immigration controls. This, in turn, led to a ‘populist moment’ in the 
parliamentary Conservative party, facilitated by the support of this stance among 
a majority of Conservative members and their newly elected leader, Margaret 
Thatcher. Demands for an immediate reduction in immigration, for a register of 
family dependents, and for a new British Nationality Act were symptomatic of 
this trend (Layton-Henry 1984, p.149). 
Following 13 years in Opposition, however, the Tory party that entered 
office in 2010 was a very different creature from the one that had defeated James 
Callaghan in 1979. The Party had ideologically re-orientated to the centre ground, 
washing its hands of British nationalism in favour of embracing the apparently 
new ‘globalised world’ Britain found itself in. Such a course was part of the 
Conservatives strategy to project a more caring and cosmopolitan image than in 
the past. Thus, when dealing with a divisive issue which had to be addressed in 
order to demonstrate the party’s competence, these had to be given an upbeat tone 
(e.g., “migration has enriched our culture and strengthened our economy”).  
At the heart of this political consensus was the adoption of managerial 
technocracy, an ideological alignment described by its guru Tony Blair as ‘a third 
way’ approach that sought to reconcile social justice (‘equity’) with economic 
competitiveness (‘efficiency’). The principal values of ‘managed migration’ 
include: (i) a commitment to evidence-based policy and a points-based 
immigration system; (ii) a desire to modernise procedures and deliver faster 
decisions; and (iii) a commitment to introducing new tougher arrangements on 
asylum seekers and undocumented workers. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
Conservative strategy on immigration in the run-up to the 2008 GE was to try to 
retain the managed migration framework, by discursively politicising it and 





 The modernisation of the Conservatives is essential to understanding why 
policies supported by large majorities of the British public, even if nominally 
adopted by the governments (e.g., reducing net migration to “the tens of 
thousands”), will not be fully implemented by the machinery of government. 
Despite the government’s claim that it is creating a “hostile environment” for 
illegal immigrants, the policy framework of the mid-2010s was effectively the 
application of New Labour’s governing philosophy of managed migration. As 
illustrated above in Figure 5, the Conservative party is the party of, if not 
unambiguously for, managerial rule. The essence of this position was perhaps 
best summarised by Theresa May, 
“When properly managed, immigration enriches this country, as we benefit from 
the skills, talent and entrepreneurial flair that people bring to our society. But, as I 
said in my recent speech, when net migration is too high, and the pace of change is 
too fast, it puts pressure on schools, hospitals, accommodation, transport and 
social services, and it can drive down wages for people on low incomes. So we 
must achieve the right balance, rejecting both extremes of the debate, from those 
who oppose immigration altogether to those who want entirely open borders.” 
(Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, cols.195, 13 October 2015) 
Although May first spoke about creating a “hostile environment” for illegal 





























their countries of origin even if, after lengthy legal procedures, it is decided that 
they have not got grounds to remain. In this context, British MPs are represented 
– plausibly enough  – as a ‘managerial elite’, and thus as favoring modes of 




The situation within the parliamentary Labour Party is somewhat more diffuse 
than that of the Conservatives. Following 18 years in opposition, the New Labour 
government that entered office in 1997 was naturally inclined to try to limit 
migration to demonstrate ‘competence’, but both pro-business and pro-Common 
Market inclinations push them in a more expansionist direction. As is typical for 
parties on the mainstream centre-left, Labour has been internally torn between 
fealty to the ‘small-c’ conservatism of their working class base and responding to 
their bourgeoisie supporters’ concern for economic efficiency. Consequently, the 
leading supporters of the pro-immigration camp may be found within the 
cosmopolitan elite, much of which considers a heavy, continuing flow of 
immigrants (legal or otherwise) as an important source of innovation and 



































The Labour Party’s historical record on immigration demonstrates that 
left or centre-left parties do not do not necessarily mimic their opponents or chase 
the majority voter position in a ‘crude’ utilitarian fashion. On the contrary, 
Labour’s record illustrates that mainstream parties do not unequivocally favour 
restrictionist policies. Notable examples include: 
i. the abolition of the Primary Purpose Rule;  
ii. the abolition of exit controls to non-EU destinations;  
iii. the doubling of work permits for non-EU workers;  
iv. the quintupling of student visas; and 
v. the expansion of the Post-Study Work route  
One could legitimately argue, for example, that Tony Blair’s pro-Europeanism 
goes some way to explaining the A8 decision in 2004, as Labour’s enthusiasm 
towards greater EU integration was reflected in Britain being a champion for an 
enlarged EU. If Labour had maintained its 1960s Euroscepticism, it is likely that 
transitional controls would have been placed.  
In parallel and intersecting with the above policy, New Labour also 
claimed to be against open borders, and periodically announced crackdowns 
against illegal immigrants. As discussed in Chapter 5, the overall policy trend 
since the early 2000s has been increased openness towards a few selective types 
of immigration combined with substantial efforts to control and limit other types. 
Managed migration, as such, is like the two-faced God Janus: it stands for both a 
passionate, rhetorical defence of legal migration and its social and economic 
benefits as well as for a schematic, coldly rational conceptual system which seeks 
to deter illegal aliens. Consider, for example, the reappropriation of Thatcherite 
themes (‘swamping’) by David Blunkett: 
“Due to the continuing rapid rate of increase of patient numbers and in particular 
the increasing proportion of patients requiring an interpreter for consultation, we 
find the quality of service we are offering is falling and staff are under intolerable 
strain. That is what I meant when I used the word "swamped" this morning. I 
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could have used an equivalent word, "overburdened", but I think that people 
would have objected to the idea of a burden. I could have used the word 
"overwhelmed", and I will now, because overwhelmed is how GPs feel, as do 
some schools—I stress that it is only some—that are having to deal with language 
requirements that accommodation centres will be able to fulfill.” (Hansard HC 
Deb. vol.384, col.348, 24 April 2002) 
While immigration does not neatly divide the cosmopolitan Left from the 
managerial elite, it is opening up an important cleavage which bisects the PLP. A 
pro-immigration wing, braced by interventions from Diane Abbott and David 
Lammy (among others), urges Labour to hold the line as a resolutely pro-
immigration party. Against this, managerialist voices such as that of Yvette 
Cooper and Hilary Benn urge the party not to lose touch with its patriotic 
working-class base. Ms Cooper, for example, has dismissed Ms Abbott’s 
suggestion that calling for immigration controls would turn Labour into 
“Ukip lite”. “Immigration is really important for Britain” Cooper said, “it just 





Q2: “To what extent have MPs politicized the racial, religious and/or cultural 
characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?” 
 
Q3: “To what extent have MPs depoliticized the racial, religious and/or cultural 
characteristics of migrants in discussions of migration control?” 
 
The study of the politics of migration is exceptional in the amount of attention 
researchers have paid to the problem of agenda setting, beginning with studies of 
the initial legislation of the 1960s. Anthony Messina’s (1989) provocative study 
explored why race had lain dormant as a political issue until the early 1980s and 
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how British parties and leaders had acted to depoliticise it. Subsequent studies 
were similarly concerned with the problematic status of race and ethnicity as 
parts of the political agenda. However, unlike Messina (1989), the study of 
agenda-setting in the field of migration has tended to focus on the alleged role 
played by political parties in normalising racism. According to political 
sociologist Aurelien Mondon (2016), “[racist] discourse is no longer limited to 
the margins; it is mainstream and this needs to be widely acknowledged before it 
can be stopped”. Randall Hansen (2000, p.10) refers to this thesis as the 
“racialisation account”. 
 
6.2.1. Depoliticisation of race 
Despite the fact that the racialisation thesis commands broad support in the 
academic community, the argument is seriously flawed, supporting an argument 
about the ‘normalisation’ of racism with reference solely to unrepresentative 
quotations by often-marginal figures. Historically, racism played a much bigger 
role in the pre-war period. For example, in the early twentieth century 
Conservative MP Sir William Evans-Gordon expressed alarm at the number of 
Jewish refugees claiming asylum in Britain: “Ten grains of arsenic in a thousand 
loaves would be unnoticeable and perfectly harmless”, he told parliament, “but 
the same amount put into one loaf would kill the whole family that partook of it” 
(quoted from Malik 2013).  
By way of contrast, both major political parties in the post-war era have 
sought to avoid a political debate that draws (too heavily) on British white 
identity (‘societal depoliticisation’). As illustrated in Figure 7, the vast majority 







To forestall any misunderstanding: this does not mean to say that race is wholly 
absent from the discursive terrain of elite-level parliamentary discourse. On the 
contrary, since the early 1960s, one of the key arguments made against 
immigration is that it has a corrosive impact on SECURITY. Anti-immigration 
groups mobilised against Commonwealth free entry on the basis that it 
represented a threat to race-relations and to NATIONAL UNITY (PN26). 
Commenting on the ‘patrial clause’ in the 1971 Immigration Bill, Conservative 
MP Ken Clarke stated, 
“In my view… a perfectly respectable case can be made out for this [partial] 
definition. In part, it recognises the somewhat different racial content of those 
people who are likely to want to come to this country under the grandfather 
Clause. It is intellectually dishonest for liberal opinion—as it is for illiberal 
opinion—to pretend that the debate about immigration control in this country at 
the moment centres on anything other than the racial problems which the country 
faces.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.813, col.126, 08 March 1971) 
More recently, however, the terms of this debate have shifted. Both sides 
now acknowledge that the impact of immigration on society is likely to be 
positive: cultural diversity is celebrated as a fundamental value. For members of 


























Figure 7. Cultural protectionism (1961-2015) 
Preservation of language 





and allegedly monolithic national identity (Cobley 2018). To quote Mims Davies, 
the Conservative MP for Eastleigh: 
“We are fortunate to live in a country that has benefited enormously from being a 
true melting-pot nation, and we speak in a truly global and outward-looking 
country and a truly diverse city. Students across the world come to our universities 
seeking the finest education, global investors continue to put their faith in the 
economic security of the nation and our proud culture of arts boasts the positive 
values of immigration and true diversity. (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, col.255, 13 
October 2015) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, opponents of immigration only see 
immigration’s negative impacts on the economy: typically, the centre-right 
worries about the wage and property squeeze suffered by the urban poor, while 
the centre-left borrows free market assumptions to defend open borders. As a 
result, politicians have become accustomed, even desensitized, to the way in 
which complex human realities are economized. Writers and speakers in this 
mode of discourse hone in on the measurable and the quantitative, with a 
balancing fear of subjective value judgments. The comments of Tory back-
bencher Simon Hoare are paradigmatic in this respect: 
“The [2015 Immigration] Bill does not try to debate—because this is not the 
kernel of the argument—whether immigration is a good or bad thing, and it does 
not seek to further or foster racism or discrimination; it seeks purely to find better 
ways of defining the legal and the illegal. There is no qualitative judgment on an 
immigrant community the vast majority of whom play a full and active part in 
British life and are welcomed to our shores.” (Hansard HC Deb. vol.600, col.258, 
13 October 2015) 
As Hoare himself confesses, there is no “qualitative judgment” on the 
assimilability of migrant communities: it does not “try to debate… whether 
immigration is a good or bad thing”. Depoliticisation, here, is most clear in the 
domain of metanarrative – the latticework of ideas, concepts and characters that 
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underpin government policy. The biggest ideological divide in contemporary 
migration politics, as illustrated in Figure 8, has been a battle between the forces 
of globalism (MORAL COSMOPOLITANISM) and the forces of managerialism 




6.2.2. Deracialisation of public policy 
Despite the claims of some MPs that there is a rhetorical “race to the bottom” or 
an attempt among party leaders to “out-UKIP UKIP”, the security-identity axis is 
less politically salient than it was during the 1961-1995 period. Politicians from 
across the political spectrum have liberalised entry rules and backed policies that 
generally expanded migrant visas. Against this background, the racialisation 
thesis fails on three fronts:  
(1) First, the racialisation thesis is prone to confirmation bias, supporting a 
hypothesis about Parliament’s construction of racism with reference solely to 





























(2) Second, the racialisation thesis is prone to disconfirmation bias, 
ignoring numerous contradicting instances in which a principled stand was made 
against racism; 
(3) Third, the racialisation thesis is prone to decontextualisation by 
ignoring the broader complex of administrative (e.g. law enforcement) and non-
administrative factors (e.g. impacts on public service delivery) that influenced 
policy. 
Of course, many critical race theorists (CRT) insist that racism has 
mutated, adopting new ‘hidden’ guises. According to this view, racist 
assumptions about minorities pervade ‘our’ mind-set and are reinforced in the 
media and popular culture. The problem with such arguments, however, is that 
they are impressionistic, and, in many cases, unfalsifiable. This does not mean to 
say that racism is irrelevant to the history of the post-war period. On the contrary, 
there are several instances in which racism played a key role – most notably in 
the 1964 General Election victory of Peter Griffiths in Swethwick, whose 
supporters told voters that “If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or 
Labour” (quoted from Hansen 2010). The explicit language employed by Enoch 
Powell also served as a catalyst for a more wide-ranging attack on the political 
consensus in race-relations. 
On the other hand, the findings of this thesis show that there is a 
considerable gap between the tabloid-friendly rhetoric of some MPs and the 
reality of policymaking on both the centre-left and centre-right. A myopic focus 
on what politicians say to the public (‘swamping’, ‘flooding’, ‘hostile 
environment’, etc.) has led some migration scholars to underestimate the 
importance of official parliamentary discourses on immigration and assimilation 
policy.  
In ending this study, it is worth considering the political implications of 
the bipartisan consensus. As explained in the opening chapter, the findings of this 
thesis can be placed in what has been called Pasteur’s Quadrant: an argument 
that the study is important for both advancing a body of knowledge and also 
important for meeting some political challenge (Stokes 1997). Arguably, one of 
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the biggest challenges for the UK government is this: how do you reap the 
benefits of immigration (economic and social) whilst respecting – rather than 
suppressing – Britain’s cultural identities? More than any other issue, 
immigration serves as a particularly powerful test case of claims that political 
parties are ‘out of touch’ and unduly influenced by special interests. 
 
 
6.3. Pasteur’s Quadrant: political expression and 
representation through political parties 
 
6.3.1. Crisis of legitimacy 
Casting an eye across modern Britain, a wide range of social, economic and 
cultural issues are linked in one way or another to migration: its impact on 
schools, hospitals, housing, GDP, national security and community relations. Few 
subjects apart from the economy are consistently ranked in the top three 
challenges facing the country (Duffy 2014). In the words of Erica Consterdine 
(2018, preface), a Research Fellow at the Sussex Centre for Migration Research: 
“A decade ago, one of my former lecturers told me that if you really want to 
understand any given society, you should take a look at their immigration 
system… It is one of the most divisive, contested and important issues of our 
time.” 
Whatever the final outcome of Britain’s re-negotiation with the EU, the 
problems thrown up by the legacy of mass immigration will continue to shape 
migration politics for the foreseeable future. One leading authority on 
demography, Professor David Coleman, has estimated that the native white 
population will become an ethnic minority by 2066 (Coleman 2013). According 
to Professor Eric Kaufmann of Birkbeck College: 
“Britain is changing, becoming increasingly diverse. The 2011 census shows that 
White British people are already a minority in four British cities, including 
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London. Over a quarter of births in England and Wales are to foreign-born 
mothers. Young Britons are also much more diverse than older Britons. Just 4.5 
per cent of those older than 65 are nonwhite but more than 20 per cent of those 
under 25 are.” 
One consequence of this demographic revolution is that the political class now 
finds itself in the grip of a crisis of legitimacy (McLaren 2012a; 2012b; 2012a; 
2013b; 2014; 2016), and that crisis is growing inexorably stronger because of:  
a) the depoliticisation of public policy (Crouch 2004; 2011) 
b) asymmetric multiculturalism (Kaufmann 2017); and  
c) the government’s continued policy of managed migration (McLaren 2015) 
The early stages of this crisis have led to a populist backlash as neo-
nationalist parties/protest movements tear a path through the usual politics of 
‘left’ versus ‘right’. Already, in some western European countries, both pro- and 
anti-immigration movements run dueling demonstrations.  
At the European level, EU politicians no longer speak of European 
integration, but of how to prevent the complete break-up of the Schengen zone. 
The so-called ‘migration crisis’ – sparked by Angela Merkel’s government in 
2015 – has quickened the populist advance across the continent. The government 
of Hungary, for example, has responded to this crisis by building a fence to wall 
itself off from Serbia, while the governments of Austria and Slovakia have 
imposed frontier controls with other EU states.  
The managerial elite’s reaction, in many cases, has been to deflect 
attention away from the issue by repudiating past immigration levels and 
pledging numerous crackdowns on ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Balch 2010; 
Consterdine 2018). Unfortunately for the British government, however, this 
Janus-faced populism has simply fuelled widespread cynicism about the two 
major parties. Unsurprisingly, voters point to a mismatch between what is 
promised and what is delivered (McLaren 2015). According to Professor Lauren 
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McLaren, this ‘rhetoric-reality’ gap has undermined trust in mainstream political 
institutions. 
 
Figure 9. Immigration and political trust, interactive effects 
 
Source: McLaren 2015 (p.137) 
 
Figure 9 provides a graphical representation of the significant interactions 
between immigration concerns, perception of government handling of 
immigration, and political trust. Figure 6.6 indicates that the impact of 
perceptions of government handling of immigration on political trust is stronger 
for those who believe immigrants have not contributed to British culture, while 
for those who believe immigrants have contributed to culture, the impact of 
perceptions of government handling of immigration is very limited. These 
findings support the propositions outlined in Chapter 1: that opponents of a 
multicultural society generally perceive the parties “not as incompetent firemen, 
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unable to contain the blaze… but as arsonists” (quoted from Messina 1989, 
p.188). 
 
6.3.2. The limits of managed migration  
When confronted with this crisis of legitimacy, some of the more nuanced 
proponents of managed migration have extolled assimilation as the solution. In 
this vision, all the myriad problems of a multiethnic society can be overcome 
through  
i. citizenship tests,  
ii. education in civics theories,  
iii. monolingualism, and  
iv. the promotion of ‘British’ values.  
According to this view, newcomers need to adopt the UK’s common laws, rules, 
norms and institutions: the things that make people ‘British’. To take a recent 
example, in 2016 Communities Secretary Sajid Javid proposed an oath of 
allegiance63 for all public-office holders:  
“If we are going to challenge such attitudes, civic and political leaders have to lead 
by example…We can’t expect new arrivals to embrace British values if those of us 
who are already here don’t do so ourselves, and such an oath would go a long way 
to making that happen.” (Javid 2016) 
Every public office-holder, in Javid’s view, should swear an oath of allegiance to 
British values, such as “tolerating the views of others even if you disagree with 
them”, as well as “believing in freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom 
from abuse... a belief in equality, democracy, and the democratic process” (ibid). 
This proposal is effectively a continuation of Gordon Brown’s plan to produce a 
‘formal statement of British values’. As Brown put it back in 2007 
																																																								
63 Javid’s proposal came in response to a report on social cohesion by Dame Louise Casey, which 
found that in some communities women were the subject of abuse and unequal treatment. 
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“A strong sense of being British helps unite and unify us; it builds stronger social 
cohesion among communities. We know that other countries have a strong sense 
of national purpose, even a sense of their own destiny. 
And so should we. And it helps us deal with issues as varied as what Britain does 
in Europe; to issues of managed migration and how we better integrate ethnic 
minorities. Today we have a citizenship test for newcomers wanting to be citizens 
- 24 questions on life in the UK that lasts for 45 minutes.” 
The problem of managerialism in mainstream political parties, and 
specifically post-Cold war British parties of government, has not been a central 
concern of this thesis. Nevertheless, after surveying the post-1990s politics of 
migration, it is difficult not to conclude that managerialism in the Conservative 
and Labour parties is a serious impediment to meaningful party-political 
competition and, hence, to the scrutiny of government policy. As the above 
quotations show, political parties have become more active in promoting top-
down assimilationist programs.  
It is, of course, legitimate to argue that the advantages of UK immigration 
rules as they exist now outweigh the disadvantages. It is possible to say that the 
global benefits of large-scale economic migration mean we should not seek to 
limit it at all. It is also reasonable to believe that immigrants need to adopt the 
UK’s common laws, rules, norms and institutions. But it is not possible to 
implement all three of those positions. For example, at very low levels of 
migration, there are strong social and economic incentives for migrants to 
assimilate into the dominant culture. Human beings, after all, are social creatures: 
they do not want to be ostracised from the wider community or ‘left behind’ 
economically. At very high levels of migration, however, assimilation of 
migrants becomes harder, particularly if newcomers are able to assort solely with 
others from their own country and can get by with minimal interaction with the 
ethnic majority. Put simply, assimilation and large-scale immigration make a 
volatile mixture.  
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One of the central tasks for an adequate critique of managed migration is 
to give an account of administrative limits – currently a void at the heart of the 
subject. Each type of administrative limit discussed below represents a 
recognisable and frequently encountered family of phenomena, regularly 
appearing in different guises and contexts. 
 
6.3.3 Clustering  
First, immigrants (and their descendents) tend to cluster geographically in a small 
number of enclaves: they do not spread out evenly across the entire country.64 
Initially, these clusters are the result of ‘push-pull’ dynamics in the global 
economy: immigrants tend to be more willing to move into crowded areas with a 
high concentration of interconnected businesses (Dustmann and Frattini 2013). 
Once a cluster is established, however, ethnic communities can have their own 
distinct shops, schools, restaurants, sports teams, religious buildings, and para-
legal institutions. Thus, the larger the size of immigrant diaspora, the fewer social 
interactions there will be with the indigenous population, and therefore the slower 
the rate of assimilation (Collier 2013).65  
 
6.3.4 Chain migration  
Second, immigration (as a phenomenon) starts small and builds up gradually, 
feeding upon itself along the way. It is a process that begins with an initial influx, 
followed by settlement, and then secondary migration through the reunification of 
families. Once sizeable immigrant families have settled, familial networks tend to 																																																								
64 Pakistani migrants, for example, have tended to settle in Birmingham and the old Pennine 
towns, whereas Bangladeshi migrants have tended to cluster in East London. People of Indian 
descent, in contrast, are generally more widely dispersed, living mainly in Wolverhampton and 
the West of London, as well as in Bradford, Slough, and Leicester. People of Afro-Caribbean 
descent are mostly in Birmingham, Manchester, and London, with Brixton, Peckham, and 
Hackney the leading residential zones. 
65 One of the main themes of the Cantle report, commissioned in 2001 in response to a series of 
violent inter-ethnic clashes in the north of England, is that damaging racial polarisation is likely to 
occur when there are no points of contact between different communities. 
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reduce the incentives toward assimilation, with settled migrants frequently 
functioning as “bridgeheads” (Collier 2013). This, in turn, generates a slackening 
of people’s will and conviction to maintain an allegiance and belonging link to 
the nation-state.  
 
6.3.5 Transnationalism 
Third, rapid developments in information technology and transport (i.e., 
smartphones, social media, affordable flights, free international phone calls, etc.) 
have allowed migrants to remain psychologically close to their country of origin. 
Such people are thought to be living what might be called ‘transnational lives’, 
meaning they are not fixed in any one particular country though may have 
citizenship or a right to residence (Castles 2004a; 2004b). Moreover, when 
immigrants are admitted to liberal states, they benefit from the much wider scope 
of toleration that is now afforded to those whose lifestyles deviate from the 
mainstream. This is partly because Western cultures have become increasingly 
individualistic.66 As a result, the implementation of an assimilationist policy 
framework has to be administered in ways that are consistent with liberal-
democratic principles – by encouragement rather than compulsion.  
 
6.3.6 Identity politics 
Finally, immigrants (and their descendents) may have problems assimilating 
emotionally with European society because of competing ethnocultural loyalties. 
The psychological motivations for this are well established in such 
predispositions as ‘ethnic nepotism’ and ‘ethnocentrism’ (Salter 2002; 2006). 
Thus, while successive generations of descendents from immigrant families may 
become more psychologically distant from their ancestral homeland, many other 
generations will choose to lead ‘parallel lives’ in ethnically defined enclaves. 
																																																								66	As Macpharlane (1978a; 1978b; 1992; 2012) and others have argued, kinship has been weaker 
among the British – and individualism correspondingly stronger – since at least the 12th century.	
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According to Gary Freeman (2011, pp.1556-57), a Professor of migration studies 
at the University of Texas, some generations may even assimilate in reverse: 
“Spectacular events like the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh and 
riots over cartoons poking fun at the Prophet have made it impossible to gloss over 
the very real clash of value systems migration has introduced to the liberal 
democratic West. The success of radical right parties in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Austria, Australia, and Italy suggests the importance of taking more 
seriously the tension between democracy and liberal, open immigration policy.” 
Taken together, these social phenomena are pregnant with implications. 
Apart from the fact that they justify the central focus of this thesis, they also 
expose the limits of top-down government management. If uncontrolled 
immigration leads to strong patterns of self-segregation, then there is an obvious 
limit to the number of people a society can absorb and the speed with which it can 
assimilate them. The consequences of this, however, go far beyond the bailiwick 
of public policy. With the emergence of a globalist-managerial consensus, the 
goals of politics have become increasingly self-referential and technocratic, and 
what little inter-party competition remains has become focused on the ‘effective’ 
and ‘efficient’ management of the state. On what for many voters is actually a 
cultural question, the establishment’s arguments on immigration, and a whole 
host of other policies, have become straitjacketed. The “redemptive feature” of 
democracy, to borrow Margaret Canovan’s (1999) phrase, is broken.  
 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
 
If the story of the Conservative and Labour parties’ consensus on managerial rule 
offers any lessons, it is that the convergence of party policies and elite political 
discourse without popular consent are not without cost. As Professor Cas Mudde 
observed in 2016: “Populists challenge not just the specific policies but also the 
depoliticisation of the issues. Often correctly, they argue that what once was 
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political can be political again, if the majority of the population wants it to be.” 
While emanating from different directions, what unites the various populist 
movements is a staunch criticism of managerial governance and an appeal to 
those who feel they have been betrayed by mainstream parties. Indeed, the close 
association of the major parties with managerial governance has undoubtedly 
motivated citizens to express their migration-related concerns elsewhere. The 
victory of the Leave campaign in 2016, for example, was underpinned by 
political and cultural grievances that transcended traditional ‘left-right’ 
ideological lines – and a rejection of mainstream parties that had too long ignored 
those concerns. The campaign for control has, in short, been superseded by a 






TABLE A1: Agenda-setting in the British House of Commons (1961-2015) 
% of total policy narratives in case study (rounded off to 2.d.p)  
Policy narrative 
 
1961 1971 1981 1995 2002 2005 2015 
Assimilation 0 0 0 0 2.63   0 0 
Business efficiency 0 0 0 10.26 0 6.45 0 
Counter-terrorism 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Crime prevention 5.26 0 0 0 0 0 2.38 
Cross-border social capital 0 0 4.26 2.56 0 0 2.38 
Efficiency in administration 2.63 14.29 6.38 5.13 23.68 16.13 7.14 
Ethnic innovation 0 3.57 0 0 0 0 0 
Forecasting of immigration flows 5.26 0 0 0 0 6.45 0 
Gender equality 0 0 4.26 0 0 0 0 
Human development 10.53 3.57 2.13 20.51 23.68 3.23 7.14 
Impact on public services and housing 13.16 7.14 0 5.13 7.89 6.45 7.14 
Impact on public spending 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Integration 10.53 3.57 0 0 0 0 0 
Job displacement 0 3.57 0 0 0 0 0 
Law enforcement 0 3.57 0 15.38 15.79 16.13 38.10 
Legislative scrutiny 0 0 0 5.13 0 0 0 
Multiculturalism 0 0 0 0 2.63 0 0 
Multiplier effects 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
National unity 5.26 14.29 10.64 10.26 7.89 3.23 0 
Opportunity costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Preservation of language 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Preservation of social norms 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.38 
Public health 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Racial equality 15.79 25.0 27.66 17.95 5.26 0 11.9 
Racial self-interest 0 0 2.13 0 0 0 0 
Rationalisation of law 0 3.57 19.14 0 0 0 0 
Rule of law 0 17.26 21.28 7.69 5.26 32.26 9.52 
Skilled migration 0 0 0 0 0 9.68 7.14 
Soft power 10.52 0 2.13 0 0 0 0 
Spatial management 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transaction costs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled migration 21.05 0 0 0 5.26 0 0 




TABLE A2: Ideological orientation of Members of Parliament (1961-2015) 
% of total policy narratives in case study 















































































































































TABLE A3: Ideological orientation of Labour Party MPs (1961-2015)  
% of total policy narratives in case study 




















































































































































TABLE A4: Ideological orientation of Conservative Party MPs (1961-2015) 
% of total policy narratives in case study 
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